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Introduction 
Abstract 
This thesis investigates the impediments to access engendered by the government's decision to 
reduce public funding to health care and incorporate market principles in the financing process. 
The critique begins with competitive markets and their application to the provision of health 
care. The intent is not to argue along the lines of 'state verse the market' but rather to explicate 
the fundamental changes which are going on in the thinking of government and policy makers 
today in respect to their approach toward providing health care. Against this background the 
implications of these fundamental changes are assessed on a rapidly growing group in New 
Zealand, the elderly. 
An empirical study of the elderly is conducted in order to validate both the micro and 
macro issues raised in this thesis. The macro issues focus on the effectiveness of market 
reforms and the issue of access for the elderly, while the micro issues relate to the reality of 
private sector involvement for the elderly. 
The conclusions to be drawn from the thesis are threefold. First, the involvement of the 
private sector in providing health care has created fundamental access problems for the elderly. 
If the current political mandate in health care is followed then this will manifest into an even 
greater problem in the next millennium. Second the reduction of the state's role in financing 
health care is creating uncertainty and financial pressure on the elderly. Third, the private 
insurance market is not suitable as a provider of essential health care services required by the 
elderly in New Zealand. 
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Introduction 
Introduction 
In the early 1990s, New Zealand's health system, which was established in 1938 and based on 
a model of social equity, under went a fundamental reformation. It was reinvented with a 
contemporary economic structure based on competitive markets and sold to the public on the 
premise of greater efficiency and equity for all. The macro objective was to reduce the role of 
the government in social policy areas in order to get the economy back on track. This was to be 
achieved by returning a surplus to the country's economic budget and paying back its crippling 
overseas debt. The strategy was to integrate the private sector with that of the public and 
jointly provide the increasing demand of health care resources to the population. What has 
materialised is that the government has withdrawn from the provision of certain essential 
services, relying on the private sector to fill the void. 
With the increased privatisation of the once very public domain of health care, the 
move from a social equity model to one based on market-competition has had major 
implications for health care providers, patients, low socio-economic groups, the state as a 
whole and other groups in society. 11ris thesis does not take a general swipe at the impacts the 
private sector is having on health care. Rather, it aims to investigate the implications of 
opening up health care to the market on major aspects of provision to an increasingly important 
group in New Zealand's society, the elderly. 1 
.The primary objective of this thesis is threefold. First, at a wide level of generality an 
examination is made as to the implications of changing from a 'social equity model' of 
financing health care to one based on 'market competition' for the elderly in society. Second, at 
a narrower level of generality an assessment is made as to the ability of the elderly under the 
new financing model to adequately access health care under the government's 
1 It is increasingly important due to the fact that population estimates of elderly in New Zealand in the 
first two decades of the new millennium are projected to rise by 16.5 percent from current levels 
today, a trend which is in line with other countries, as cited in New Zealand Now 65 Plus, Statistics 
New Zealand, Wellington, New Zealand, 1995,pl4. 
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directives of private sector provision. lhlrd, this thesis examines the ability of the private 
sector to provide for this group now and in the future when many more New Zealanders will be 
over the age of 65. 
Controversy and public dissatisfaction has surrounded the government's move to 
reform New Zealand's health system. Much of it flows from the lack of support from the 
medical professionals. While the reform process has been slowed due to public dissatisfaction, 
the current coalition government has no intention of abandoning its path of state withdrawal 
and private sector incorporation. While those persons on the Business Roundtable argue that 
the reforms have not failed - they have only experienced a few expected teething problems -
others, including those who work in the health sector administrators and medical professionals, 
say that the adoption of the competitive model to finance health care has inherent problems 
which are having serious impacts on society today. These will only worsen if the current 
direction in health does not change. Reforms to the health care system were implemented for 
the benefit of the economy, in fact some economists claimed they were essential for an 
economic recovery. However, serious problems regarding the ability to access much needed 
care is beginning to emerge. Much can be attributed to the government's withdrawal from 
financing and its replacement by the private sector. The most critical element is the role that 
the private sector now plays in the provision of health care. The specific focus in this thesis is 
on the ability of the private insurance market and in particular the private insurance companies 
to be able to provide the necessary health care required by the elderly, as their numbers rise in 
the new millennium. 
With this focus two hypotheses are postulated, first, the governments shift from a 
'social equity model' in health care provision to one based on 'competitive markets' has created 
fundamental distributional concerns which favour certain minority groups and disadvantage 
others, namely the most rapidly growing in New Zealand - the elderly. Second, access is 
becoming increasingly difficult due to the incorporation of the private sector and the 
withdrawal of the state involvement in financing health care. Consequently if the current health 
care mandate of the government is continued into the next millennium then New Zealand's 
largest growing population group will have limited access to essential health care. 
Introduction 3 
The first chapter comprises the theoretical core of the thesis. It critiques the arguments 
which fuel the debate surrounding the presence of market competition in financing the health 
care system. The review is concentrated on the theories of Donald and Gerard and Harris and 
Seldon which conflict with arguments raised by Scott and Evans. The purpose is to critique the 
competitive market approach per se and then to assess the issues which arise when applied to 
the environment of health care. A review of the various types of financing models used by 
OECD countries is undertaken in order to compare and contrast various financing options 
available to policy makers. 
Chapter two examines which financing options have been adopted by various 
countries and compares the system used to the proportion of public and private spending by 
those countries. · The purpose of this is to place New Zealand's chosen position in a 
international context. 
Chapter three critiques the arguments from both health professionals and health 
economists surrounding the refonns to New Zealand's health care system which will provide 
the contextual background to this dynamic environment at the same time the government's 
justification for the reforms, such as the world wide drive for privatisation, is examined and it 
is revealed that restructuring the welfare state is a global phenomenon. Reforms to health in 
New Zealand are part of a much larger pattern of upheaval and transformation of political, 
economic and social relations. In addition, the ideology of the National party is studied and 
neo-liberalism jg identified as the catalyst behind the reforms. The final part of this chapter 
assesses the direction of the coalition government towards health and, in particular, towards the 
care of the elderly. 
Chapter four examines the impacts to the elderly as a result of changes to the health 
system through market incorporation. It is argued that the private sector, in particular 
insurance companies, is an increasingly important provider of health care services but it has a 
number of fundamental failings which are affecting the elderly now and are highly unlikely to 
improve in the future. It is postulated that if the coalition government continues shifting the 
financing of New Zealand's health care system to the private sector while effectively reducing 
the states role of social responsibility, this will result in increasing financial pressure and 
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continuing uncertainly for the elderly, now and in the future. For this purpose, an empirical 
study of the elderly' s experience with the health system is undertaken.2 This then allows an 
analysis of impacts resulting form private sector involvement. 
The last chapter deals with the questions arising from the macro issues in this thesis 
which are drawn from the theories in chapter one. Using evidence from the case study the 
arguments advanced by both sides are tested. Further, at the macro level the nature of the 
public policy transformation is probed with an emphasis on the experimental nature of the 
policy shift. It is postulated that private insurance companies are not suitable for providing the 
elderly with the necessary health care that they require. The existence of moral hazard and 
adverse selection are investigated within insurance companies with an assessment made as to 
whether the private sector is capable of providing for the health care needs of the elderly in the 
new millennium. 
There are a number of goals which have motivated the writing of this thesis. The 
emphasis is primarily focused on the belief that there is an essential need for empirical research 
on the fundamental dynamics of private sector involvement in areas which involve social 
policy. The reasons for this should be evident with the private sector playing an increasingly 
larger role in the provision, supply and distribution of essential resources in this country and 
others. The issue lies in the fact that there is scant evidence as to the actual effectiveness of 
competitive markets in health care. The American system is fraught with warnings and the 
concern is that New Zealand's health system is going to develop many of the negative elements 
which have formed in that country. 
It must, however, be pointed out that competitive market involvement in health care 
can, and indeed does, have a place . The issue is whether the private providers are capable to 
supply health care resources in a way that the elderly can afford. After all health care is an 
industry with unique characteristics. The life and wellbeing of every individual in the 
community will, at some time or other, be dependent on the quality and affordability of its 
services. If these are controlled privately then they must be accessible. 
2 Refer appendix A for the questions asked, and for comments made. 
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fu this respect this thesis will investigate an area of increasing interest and importance 
to New Zelanders - the integration of private and public involvement in the provision of health 
care services. Professor Harn3 contends that the priority is for the public and private sectors to 
work more effectively together in the future. To consider either public or private finance alone 
as superior is a sterile debate. The integration of the two is here to stay. Ham purports that 
continuing with a large measure of public funding of health care with private finance existing 
as an important supplementary source of finance is important. Ultimately, however, who 
manages a hospital, or who runs the services does not matter as long as the patients are getting 
the standard and the quality of care they need. The question is whether this goal is being met 
under the current arrangements. 
As important as it is to clarify the focus of this thesis, so too is it important to clarify 
what is outside its scope. It does not deal with every issue which might be deemed to impinge 
on the health of the elderly as.there are many factors which are involved, such as lifestyle (diet, 
social behaviour, smoking and drinking, inactivity), social class, and ethnicity. Unlike reports 
such as 'Care for Older People in New Zealand, '4 this paper is not about assessing what the 
elderly need on a micro scale. Nor is it about evaluating and critiquing the quality of services 
provided by the private sector. This thesis is interested in whether or not the elderly will be able 
to gain access to essential health care resources which are controlled by the private sector 
under the new competitive market model. This study combines quantitative and qualitative 
method, in its collection, analysis and presentation of data. Quantitative data from the survey 
was gained by conducting 23 0 surveys of the elderly, of which 45 percent of surveys were done 
in the North Island, predominantly in and around Auckland city and suburbs. The other 55 
percent were conducted in and around Christchurch. The data were collated and converted into 
various graphical representations. Half the survey sample was taken randomly from the 
telephone directory. The other half was interviewed randomly in person. Further 
methodological details are given in Appendix A. 
3 Professor Chris Hams, who is Professor of health quality and management at the university of 
Birmingham, and director of the university's health services management centre. 
4 Written in 1995 as advice for the National Advisory Committee on Core Health and Disability 
Support Services. 
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The findings of this study confinn that if the current involvement of the private sector 
continues unci.bated then New Zealand's largest growing population group (those over 65) will 
have limited access to essential health care. This is evidenced by three factors. First insurance 
premium rises are driving the elderly to either scale down their cover or cancel there policies 
altogether, which leaves them reliant on an ill equipped public system. Second, the clustering of 
private facilities in only the economically viable areas is creating geographical maldistribution 
concerns. Third, the numbers of elderly are rapidly growing creating further stress on an 
overworked public system. 
The study confirmed that the government's shift from a 'social equity model' in health 
care provision to one based on 'competitive markets' favours certain small minority groups 
such as those with high incomes and few dependents, while disadvantaging the largest group, 
the elderly. This was evidenced by the transferring of costs from the higher socio economic 
group to the lower through a reduction in social policies and a reduction in taxes which in 
effect transfer costs directly to the elderly. 
Most significantly the study found that private insurance companies are not suitable 
for providing the elderly with the necessary health care that they require. This was evidenced 
by the major distributional concerns in the fonn of price discrimination and market adaptation 
beneficial to the industry. This then results in the formation of a two tier system of health care -
one for the wealthy and one for the poor. 
As a result of these findings, it is suggested that the government reassess the level of 
control the private insurance markets have, and provide a reasonable level of core services 
available to the elderly, rather than exclaiming this task as being to difficult. Yet such a 
reassessment brings with it troublesome social problems, not all are health-related, but to 
ignore those that are, is at great cost to the country's health and social services. This is not to 
dispute the urgency to initiate long term planning now, and to prepare for future pressures on 
the health system as the population ages, but it is imperative that policy makers ensure that the 
elderly have access to essential health care resources, and are not left to fend for themselves in 
the market driven environment of.the private sector. 
CHAPTER ONE 
Theory of Market Competition in Health Care 
In recent years there has been a surge of interest in refonning health care systems by 
replacing government regulation with competitive market forces. Although much of the 
impetus has come from the United States, the phenomenon is worldwide. Spurred on by ever-
increasing health care costs, many analysts and policy makers have embraced the competitive 
market as the method of choice for refonning health care. This belief stems from economic 
theory, which purports to show the superiority of markets over government regulation.1 
Political conflict over the respective roles of the state and the market in health care has 
a long history. The current incorporation of the private sector and market principles into New 
Zealand's health care system represents the resurgence of ideas and arguments that have been 
promoted with varying intensity throughout the 20th century. Indeed, international experience· 
over the last forty years has demonstrated that greater reliance on the market is associated with 
inferior system performance, inequity, inefficiency, high cost, and public dissatisfaction.2 The 
United States is the leading example. So why is this issue being introduced and embraced by 
New Zealand policy makers as a prudent way of financing health care? The short answer is a 
combination of internal pressures, such as high costs, budget deficits and large social spending, 
and external pressures, namely international pressure from the IMF and World Bank 
economists. 
The popularity of incorporating market principles into health care is evident in the fact 
that the traditional economic model of competition has a strong grip on influential health 
economists around the world. However, a 1989 survey of health economists in the United 
States and Canada demonstrates that the validity of the market in health care is controversial.3 
1T.Rice 'Can Markets Give Us the Health System We Want?', UCLA School of Public Health, in 
Journal of Health.Politics, Policy and Law, Duke University Press, Vol22, No.2, April 1997,p383. 
2 RG.Evans, Going for the Gold: 'The Redistributive Agenda behind Market-Based Health Care 
Redorm', Journal of Health Politics Policy and law, Duke University Press, Vol.22, No.2, April 
1997,p.453. , 
3 Feldman, R., and M.A. Morrisey. 1990. Health Economics: A Report on the Field. Journal of 
Health Politics, Policy and Law Vol 15, Pp.627-646. 
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One of the questions asked by the survey was whether the competitive model could appiy to a 
health care system. Respondents were evenly divided on this question; half thought the model 
could apply, and half did not. Interestingly, the respondents who advocated the competitive 
model had a purely economic background with no history of social policy experience. 
Similarly, in his recent survey of health economists, Victor Fuchs found a great deal of 
,agreement on so-called positive issues, but very little on normative ones, which would 
presumably include whether health economists believe that the competitive model should be 
applied to the health ea.re market.4 There is, therefore, no unified agreement amongst health 
economists as to whether the competitive model is an appropriate means for studying and 
perhaps reforming health care systems. 
The intent of this thesis is not however, to argue along the lines of 'state versus the 
market' in providing health care, but rather to investigate what impact and implications are 
resulting due to the incorporation of the private sector into health c~e on the most rapidly 
expanding group in New Zealand - the elderly. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the 
economic theory behind the competitive market model and to assess arguments for and against 
it. Following this, potential failures of the private insurance market (PIM), which is becoming 
the most important sources of health care provision, are reviewed. 
Before launching into an analysis of health care markets, it is imperative to understand 
that there are several elements which combine to make up a health care market. One such 
element is for the supply of health care services by health care professionals. Another is for 
products such as phannaceuticals and equipment. There is also a market for the financing of 
health care. On a macro scale this includes a set of market-like instruments or arrangements 
which include privately owned or managed institutions, and can range from stockholder-owned 
insurance companies to non profit sickness funds in the German tradition. It is this wider 
private insurance market (PIM) which is to be the focus of this study due to the growing 
importance of the insurance companies role in providing health care to society, in particular 
the elderly. 
Incorporating market competition into the health system means access to care is 
determined largely on an ability to pay. Providers of care are directly rewarded according to 
market forces mainly through fee for service payments.5 Hence, on this approach, the consumer 
is sovereign and health care is based on demand expressed through the market, whereas in the 
'social equity model' health care is based on need with resources being distributed primarily on 
grounds of equity. Equity is the sacrifice when one places the burden of paying the full cost 
' . 
upon the immediate recipient as a fundamental issue of access to health care is created. 
4 Fuchs,.V.R. 'Economics, Values, and Health Care Reform', American Economic Review, 
1996,Voll-24, Pp. 86. 
5 Klein R, Private pactice and public policy: regulating the frontiers, 1982, as cited in McLachlan, 
G and Maynard.A, The Public/Private Mix/or Health, NPIIT, London, 1982,Pp.95-128. 
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'the USA experience has shown that significant numbers of people miss out on 
health care because they cannot afford private health insurance and they earn too 
much to qualify for state assistance. Hence, under a competitive market system, 
services will be provided only to those who can afford to pay. This means that some 
groups in society will receive inadequate health care unless the equity problem is 
addressed in some way. If equity is a goal of society, then an element of 
government involvement is necessary to intervene even if to do so necessitates a 
trade-off between equity and efficiency. ' 6 
Those who argue that heoJth care is best funded through the market see the market model 
having a number of advantages which reflect the assumption that health care is an ordinary 
commodity. These advantages include 
• greater responsiveness to consumer preferences, contributing to innovation and equal 
treatment. 
• greater equity through rationing by price 
@ more flexibility and an expansion of hospital-based services. 
• the removal bureaucratic inefficiency and greater consumer and provider responsibility.7 
However, Evans contends that because market mechanisms yield distribution advantages for 
particular influential groups, a number of problems result, such as 
• A more costly health care system yields higher prices and incomes for suppliers, 
physicians, drug companies, and private insurers. 
• Private payment distributes overall system costs according to use ( or expected use) of 
services, costing wealthier and healthier people less than finance from (income-related) 
taxation. 
• Wealthy and unhealthy people can purchase (real or perceived) better access or quality for 
themselves, without having to support a similar standard for others.8 
Evans states that there is, and always has been, a natural alliance of economic interest between 
service providers and upper-income citizens to support shifting health :financing from public to 
private sources.9 These arguments will be examined in part two of this thesis. 
While many of the techniques used by economists are fairly new, the emphasis on 
competition is not, dating back to the writings of Adam Smith over two hundred years ago. 
Smith believed that people, driven by their own economic interest in the marketplace are guided 
by an 'invisible hand' to act in a manner that is ultimately most beneficial to society at large. 
6 Scott G, Health in the marketplace, Health Reforms a second opinion, Wellington Health Action 
Committee, 1992,p.17. · 
7Harris.R and Seldon.A, Not from Benevolence. Institute of Economic Affairs, London 1977,as cited 
in B.Hindess, 'Political Choice and Social Structure': An Analysis of Actors, Interests and 
Rationality. Elgar/Gower, Brookfield, 1989. 
8 Harris & Seldon, Not from Benevolence,1977. 
9 Harris & Seldon, Not from Benevolence,1977. 
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In a competitive market people are allowed but not compelled to trade their stock of wealth, 
including their labour, to purchase goods and services. Firms are compelled to produce only 
those things that people will be willing to purchase, and to do so in the least costly manner. 
The market reaches equilibrium when demand matches supply, there is no surplus hence no 
waste and no shortage. Such an outcome is desirable for several reasons: people are making 
their own choices, the only goods and services produced are those that people demand, and 
they are produced without wasting resources. Because of this the notion of competition is 
intuitively appealing. There are, however, a number of variables at work in a market, in 
particular, elasticity of demand, or to put it another way, the responsiveness of consumers to 
price change. For a commodity that is a luxury good, for example European cars, if the price 
increases it is likely that the demand for them will decrease, therefore, it could be said that 
demand for European cars is elastic. Health care is a necessity so, theoretically, if prices rise 
demand will remain the same. This means that those who supply health care are in a very 
advantageous position, especially if there are only a few suppliers. Th.is is one of the major 
reasons why much regulation is needed in a health care system which is opening itself up to 
market mechanism. 
The above demonstrates that the simple-minded application to health care of economic 
theories about competitive markets is more complex in its nature due to external variables. 
Analysts across the spectrum ·of opinion reject the simplistic dichotomies of government versus 
the market, or regulation versus competition.10 More pertinent are questions concerning the 
impacts and implications of market competition on specific groups in society and their effects. 
It is not hard to find academics in the field of economics that are critical of the value of 
markets in health care. Scott contends that competition and a free and uncontrolled health care 
market will fall short of providing the health care society wants for the fundamental reason that 
in order for the market system to function effectively the consumer must have knowledge of; 
• their existing health status, 
• the relevant treatment and prevention options available, 
• competence of providers .11 
Most consumers do not have this knowledge or have only partial knowledge and must rely on 
the supplier of health care to provide it. However, providers are not enthusiastically moving to 
remedy this imbalance as 'commercial sensitivity prevents both the sharing and the 
dissemination of information.' 12 Moreover, the fact that providers have more information than 
consumers offers providers the opportunity to capture and control the system by over-servicing 
those consumers able to pay and supplying the mix of service that suits the provider, rather 
10 Health Care Study Group 1994, 'Understanding the Choices in Health Care Reform'. Journal of 
Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol.19, 1994, p.499. 
11 Health Care Study Group 1994. 
12 Health Care Study Group 1994. 
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than the consumer. Admittedly this can occur under a government-funded and provided system 
as well, but there is a greater potential for it to occur under free-market conditions where 
government monitoring, intervention and controls may be minimal.' 13 Therefore, government 
intervention is essential to ensure that the consumer is safeguarded against dangerous and 
ineffective treatments, and provided with sufficient information to make a choice. It is a 
fallacy to assume that there should be fewer regulations and controls in a competitive market, 
as the private sector requires government intervention for solutions which are compatible with 
societal goals. Any gains from competition must be balanced against the additional cost of 
regulation and control. This does not mean that the state should necessarily be the dominant 
provider of health care, but it is essential that the state regulate and provide funding for those 
individuals unable to pay for essential health care. An unregulated market will not result in an 
economically efficient or socially equitable provision of health care.14 
The government has been reducing public funding in health care over the last 17 years 
(as addressed in chapter 3). The reforms in the early 1990s have encouraged markets, in 
particular PIM, to provide health care resources to individuals. Other means of funding 
withdrawal, such as rationing health care resources in the fonn of waiting lists and user pays, 
has always existed amongst much controversy. Rather, it appears that the government has 
opted for fundamental change, such as running dO\-vn the public health care system by reducing 
expenditures and opening the way for the private insurance market, in order to ration public 
resources. 
Historically, many countries have determined that market failure in health care was too 
severe so a large propo1tion of services continue to provided by the central government. 15 Even 
in the most market-oriented economies a common, everyday commodity like food is subjected 
to some level of government intervention in its financing, and sometimes in its provision. On 
the demand side of the market, income subsidies are provided to certain groups of people to 
give them the ability to purchase the basic necessities of life, like foodstuffs. Once consumers 
have been subsidised and producers inspected, they are free to make transactions between one 
another in a largely unregulated environment. It is assumed that consumers are the best judges 
of their own welfare. However, in health care government intervention is much more extensive 
than this. Intervention in the health care market often involves governments purchasing care on 
behalf of consumers and even providing such care.16 In the United States, public programs like 
Medicare and Medicaid were established outside the competitive marketplace in order to 
13 Health Care Study Group 1994. 
14 Health Care Study Group 1994. · 
15 Even in the US, 42 cents in every HC dollar is financed by government, Borren P and Maynard 
A.Searching/or the Ho(v Grail in the Antipodes: the market refonn of the New Zealand health care 
'Pi:stem England; University of York, Centre for Health Economics., 1993, p15. 
6 Donaldson and Gerard, Economics of Health Care financing, The Visible Hand, MacMillan Press 
Ltd, Hong Kong, 1993,p26. 
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There is now much discussion about introducing more competition into both programs, 
however, such proposals have engendered a tremendous amount of opposition because it is 
contended that the introduction of more competition \\ill jeopardise the principles that formed 
the basis of these prqgrams in the first place. 17 Adam Wagstaff and Eddy van Doorslaer found 
that; 
'There appears to be broad agreement.. ,among policy-makers in at least eight of the 
nine European countries ... that payments towards health care should be related to 
ability to pay rather than to use of medical facilities. Policy makers in all nine 
European countries also appear committed to the notion that all citizens should 
have access to health care. In many countries this is taken further, it being made 
clear that access to and receipt of health care should depend on need, rather than on 
ability to pay.' 18 
Donaldson and Gerard argue that although no market works perfectly, leaving the resource 
allocation process to be determined by market forces remains the best way of getting as close 
as possible to the ideal outcomes of the perfect market. 19 The basic reasoning underlying 
extensive government intervention in health care, however, is that none of the assumptions of 
ideal markets work in a health care system. Blank warns that if universal access and cost 
containment are central to New Zealand health policy and this country moves towards a more 
market competition among providers, a continuation of government control of the framework 
for funding and provision of services is necessary.20 
The failings of market assumptions are manifested in a number of ways, for example 
in relation to individuals, illness is unpredictable. It follows from this that one cannot plan 
one's future consumption of health care in the way that one could for other commodities. Such 
a possibility could result in an expansion of insurance mechanisms whereby an individual or 
family could make payments to some risk-pooling agency (usually an insurance company) for 
some form of financial reimbursement in the event of an illness leading to the insured person 
incurring health care expenses. People who take out insurance are risk-adverse and gain utility 
form covering the uncertainty of large financial losses.21 From the foregoing, it would be 
plausible to say that insurance is a sensible institutional response to the problem of uncertainty 
in the incidence of large health care expenses. 
However, relatively few people, beyond some libertarian and right-wing politicians, 
believe that all matters pertaining to the delivery of medical care services should be left to the 
marketplace. Some individuals may believe that health care is no different from any other 
17 Rice 'Can Markets Give Us the Health System We wa'nt?',1997,p399. 
18 Wagstaff, A. and van Doorslaer. E, 'Equity in the Finance ofHealth Care: Some International 
Comparisons', Journal of Health Economics, Vol.11, 1992, Pp361-387. 
19 Donadson and Gerard, Economics of Health Care financing, 1993,p26. 
20 RH Blank, New Zealand Health Policy: a comparative study, Auckland: Oxford University Press 
1994, Ppl19-120. 
21 Borren & Maynard, Searching for the Holy Grail in the Antipodes: the market refonn of the New 
Zealand health care .system,1993, p15. 
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commodity, but that view is shared by few analysts and citizens. Most market advocates, such 
as health economists Alain Enthoven and Mark Pauly, support najor interventions by the 
government to subsidise insurance coverage and promote improved rules of the game for an 
otherwise inefficient market.22 This is critical considering that insurance markets are haW1ted 
by three areas of failure: diseconomies of small scale, moral hazard, and adverse selection. 
These are examined below. 
Diseconomies of Small Scale 
Diseconomies of small scale anse in markets with several competing insurance 
companies, each with its own administrative and marketing costs. In a large company, such 
administrative costs would be reduced because they would be spread over more customers. 
However, a large monopoly insurer may be exploitative. An alternative policy response would 
then be to have a public monopoly so that low costs are maintained without the risk of 
exploitation. Some costs, such as marketing, checking for eligibility, rebates and premium 
collection, may be drastically reduced or cut out altogether (for example, premium collection 
may be 'piggy-backed' onto the taxation collection system.) Diseconomies of small scale result 
in market failure because it is conceivable that a person would not be willing to pay for 
insurance which is inflated by the cost of small-scale competition or by an exploitative 
monopolist, but would be willing to vote for a system involving the collection of premiums 
through some public mechanism such as taxation.23 One of the reasons why market mechanisms 
are often thought to be better than government intervention is that neo-classical theory assumes 
that such costs are zero, or at least very small. The cost of producing the information to make 
the market work is ignored. Torrens estimates that the cost of administering private schemes 
for individual subscribers is more than twice that of the public programme Medicaid which 
hovers at around 8-12 percent.24 A significant proportion (20-30 percent) of subscription 
income in private schemes goes on advertising, sales and administrative expenses adding 
substantial costs to the provision of health care. 25 
Moral Hazard 
The second failing, moral hazard, can be divided into 'consumer moral hazard' and 
'provider moral hazard'. Each has two aspects. Consumer moral hazard arises on the one hand 
because the very.fact of being insured reduces the financial costs of treatment at the point of 
consumption and hence makes being ill less of a liability. Consequently, the incentive to adopt 
22 A.C.Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed Competition, 1991, Pp.24-48. 
23 Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed Competition, 1991. 
24 Paton.C, "Health care financing: mobilizing the money" Health Policy and Management: The 
Healthcare Agenda in a British Policical Context, Chapman & Hall, London, 1996. 
25 Paton, 'Health care :financing: mobilizing the money', 1996. 
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healthier lifestyles is diminished and the probability of requiring care rises. Moral hazard is 
likely to be more significant in certain other spheres (for example, autornobile insurance) but it 
also applies to health. The other aspect of consumer moral hazard is the effect of being 
insured when sickness occurs and services are required. A zero or reduced price at the point of 
use encourages a higher rate of use than would otherwise be considered efficient. There is a 
detachment created between the actual cost the care needed and the value derived by 
consumers. Thus, the market fails to transmit efficient price signals to consurners.26 Consumer 
moral hazard is the form in which moral hazard is most often referred to. The phenomenon can 
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Figure 1 Effect of insurance on demand for health care 
Source: Donaldson and Gerard, Economics of health care Financing 
In figure 1 it can be seen that a zero price of health care at the point of delivery would result in 
the over consumption of health care relative to what would occur under nonnal market 
mechanisms. At a prevailing market price of Pe, the amount of over consumption is 
represented by the amount OQJ - Oqe. This over consumption results in a welfare loss to 
society represented by the area ABQl as a result of the benefits to patients of health care 
26 Paton, 'Health care financing: mobilizing the money', 1996. 
Theory of Market Competition in Health Care 15 
consumed at Q2 is represented by the distance between Q2 and point C, while the cost of such 
care is represented at P. More benefit (or welfare) to society could be obtained by shifting the 
resources expended by these excess demands out of the activities covered by health insurance 
and either into some other health-inducing activity, or even out of health care altogether. It 
should be noted that the described model of moral hazard is neo-classical. In particular, the 
implication is that the individual represented in the demand curve in figure 1 is that of a fully 
informed and rational consumer. However, this assumption has already been questioned. 
Provider moral hazard can result from a simple lack of awareness of costs or from the 
use of fee-for-service (FFS) remuneration methods for doctors whereby fees depart from 
'market prices'. In systems that use FFS methods of remuneration, doctors are paid a fee for 
items of service provided to patients. For example, a surgeon may receive a fee for a particular 
operation carried out, a radiologist for reading a mammogram, and a general practitioner for a 
consultation or for providing a more specific item of service like a vaccination.27 The danger in 
such systems is that doctors have a financial incentive to provide care in excess of that which 
would be given if treating fully infonned consumers. The important point is that in FFS 
systems the potential for unnecessary care only arises when fees depart from the 'true 
competitive prices' which the doctor would usually receive. Thus, if the fee is greater than the 
true competitive price there will be an incentive to over provide. Conversely, if the fee is 
. below the true competitive price, then there will be an incentive to scrimp on care.28 
These dangers cannot be tempered by consumers because, firstly, they often do not 
have the knowledge to be able to judge what is appropriate and what is not, and, secondly, they 
have no financial incentive to moderate such behaviour because a third party will be paying for 
the costs of care. It is commonly found in the United States that a further 'wedge' is driven 
between the cost of providing care and the value derived_ by consumers because it is often the 
employer who negotiates and pays insurance premiums. Thus, there are two 'third parties' 
whom health care consumers and providers can pass costs onto - insurance companies and 
employers. The consequence of moral hazard (of all kinds) has been rising premiums which are 
ultimately borne by the consumers themselves. Similarly, in publicly-orientated systems, such 
as the UK and Scandinavia, health care providers do not incur the full opportunity cost of 
provision in many aspects of care (for example diagnostic tests), therefore, rendering them 
prone to provider moral hazard arising from a lack of awareness of costs.29 
Moral hazard also exists in private insurance-based health care systems. With a third 
party (i.e. the insurance company) paying health care bills on a full reimbursement basis and 
employers contributing heavily to premiums, neither the consumer nor the provider has an 
incentive to be cost-conscious. 1Jie consumer faced with free or low cost health care at the 
27 Paton,'Health care financing: mobilizing the money',1996,p.32. 
28 Paton,'Health care financing: mobilizing the money', 1996,p.32. 
29 Paton,'Health care financing: mobilizing the money', 1996,p.36 
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point of consumption has little or no financial incentive to restrain demands on the service. 
Likewise, doctors have no financial incentive to moderate such demands. Indeed if reward is on 
a fee for service basis, as is often the case, they may have an incentive to generate demand for 
their services (the phenomenon of supplier-induced demand). Even today, in parts of the 
hospital sector in the USA, moral hazard is further exacerbated by the existence of 
retrospective cost reimbursement of hospitals by insurance companies. Such practices 
discourages monetary responsibility.30 
To combat the problem of moral hazard, cost-sharing or co-payment schemes have 
been introduced by insurance companies. Essentially, the aim of these schemes is to place some 
financial burden on the consumer to eliminate or at lease reduce 'unnecessary' use of health 
care. Individual schemes differ according to the nature of the financial arrangement but take 
four main forms, a flat rate charge for each unit of service, co-insurance (the insun · · ·· · · · 
has to pay a certain proportion of each unit of health care consumed), a deductibl _ _____ _ _ _ 
'excess' in some motor vehicle insurance policies (the individual pays 100 per cent of all bills 
in a given period up to some maximum amount beyond which insurance benefits are paid in 
full), or a combination of the last two.31 
Adverse selection 
Adverse selection results from an imbalance of information in the insurance market; 
that is, buyers of insurance often have more of an idea of their risk status than sellers of health 
care insurance. Initially, in a competitive market if the insurance companies have no idea of 
individual risk status, a premium could be set reflecting the general health risk of the insured 
population. Thus, the premium paid by everyone who takes out insurance would be the same, 
reflecting the 'average' risk level of the insured population. This is what is called 'community 
rating'. For some members of the insured population who perceive their own risk level to be 
lower than average, this community rating premium will seem to them to be too high. 
Moreover, such low risk groups are usually younger and do not feel that health care is a 
necessary cost. They will, therefore, elect not to take out health care insurance and will not be 
covered in the event that the unexpected happens. More importantly, however, the effect of this 
decision is that the average risk level of those remaining insured will rise because it is people of 
lower-than-average risk who have dropped out of insurance. Thus, to cover the projected 
health care costs of this population, premiums must rise. Once again, the result of this is that 
those perceiving their risk status to be lower than the average of those remaining insured will 
drop out of insurance, and the process will carry on. This process, whereby the best risks are 
selected out of the insured group, is called 'adverse selection'. 32 
30 Paton,'Health care financing: mobilizing the money',1996p.56 
31 Paton,'Health care financing: mobilizing the money',1996,p.56 
32 Paton,'Health care financing: mobilizing the money',1996, p.33. 
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drop out of insurance, and the process will carry on. This process, whereby the best risks are 
selected out of the insured group, is called 'adverse selection' .32 
In a competitive system other phenomena would be expected to follow from adverse 
selection. The presence of a low-risk, uninsured group of people presents the opportunity for 
insurance companies to tailor premiums to levels of individual risk, rather than population risk. 
This is 'experience rating'. If fine distinctions can be made, a premium will reflect assumed 
future risk level based perhaps on some idea of past history of personal and family health as a 
predictor for the future. As a result of this process, higher-risk groups (typically the lower-
paid, elderly people and the chronically sick) will be required to pay higher experience-related 
premiums to maintain coverage, premiums which they may not now be able to afford. The 
process by which low-risk individuals are drawn into low-premium plans is often referred to as 
'skimming' or 'creaming off' .33 
How then does adverse selection constitute market failure? Two groups of people may 
be left uninsured as a result of adverse selection, those of low risk who start off the cycle by 
pulling out of insurance at community rates and those in high-risk groups who cannot afford 
experience-rated premiums. Adverse selection constitutes market failure for the former group 
because both insurer and customer · are willing to enter into a contract, but the necessary 
information required for the transaction is not transmitted from one party to the other via the 
market. The transaction is prevented by asymmetry of information about risk status. Low-
premium insurance policies could be offered, but because of asymmetry, insurance companies 
would have no prior information on potential customers which would not help them to 
determine whether inappropriate high risk individuals are applying. Therefore, the policies are 
not offered. Despite this failure of the market, society may not wish to respond because the 
failure mainly affects a group which are not big users of health care and are not so affected by 
the failure. For the high-risk group, adverse selection creates market failure as it is a direct 
catalyst for premium rises. Premiums are increased to the point where they are beyond the 
budget of people who are in the high risk group. The elderly, the sick and the beneficiaries are 
consequently priced out of the market.34 
Primary Health Care Financing Models 
This next section provides a synopsis of four health care financing models. The first is 
a mix of both public and private financing and is the most predominant structure amongst 
OECD countries. The second is the private health care insurance model which includes both 
the preferred provider organisation (PPO) and the Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) 
32 Paton,'Health care financing: mobilizing the money', 1996, p.33. 
33 Donaldson and Gerard, Economics of Health Care financing, 1993, p.36. 
34 Donaldson and Gerard, Economics of Health Care financing, 1993, p.37, 
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countries have implemented. Most OECD countries use some variation of these models in 
order to provide health care financing (detail of the exact types are specified in Chapter 2). 
I.Mix of Public & Private Financing 
According to Cowan ( 1990), one of the most important lessons of the past decade has 
been that privatisation is just one instnunent among many that must be employed if economic 
recovery is to be achieved. The responsibility for greater efficiency and higher production must 
be shared by both the private and the public sectors. The problem is how best to mix these 
sectors so that the· welfare of both the individual and society can be most effectively advanced. 
Once privatisation begins it cannot be easily reversed. If it succeeds, a popular constituency for 
it is created.35 The organisation of financial intennediaries may be on a monopolistic, 
oligopolistic or competitive basis. In a monopolistic system, the financial intermediary is 
usually a public agency such as a government, a quango or a health corporation. In an 
oligopolistic system (i.e one in which there are a small number of large intermediaries) finance 
can be controlled by public agencies or private agencies, such as insurance companies, or a 
combination of these. In a competitive system, a large number of small private intermediaries 
would exist. The closest practical example of this latter system is one based on the vertically-
integrated Health Maintenance Organisation (HMO) which provides a package of primary and 
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Figure. 2 Public/private mix in health care financing and provision 
Source: Donaldson and Gerard, Economics of health care financing, 1993 
35G.L Cowan, Privatization in the developing world, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1990, p.6. 
36 Cowan, Privatization in the developing world,1990,p.53. 
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The provision of services, however, does not necessarily have to match the financial 
organisation. For instance, hospital care in many European cowttries represents a large, 
vertically integrated health system in which finance and provision are combined within one 
organisation. Both finance and provi~ion are public as in the case of quadrant (1) in figure 3. 
In many countries, general practice would fall into quadrant (2) where such care is provided by 
self-employed doctors who, nevertheless, happen to receive almost all of their income form the 
public purse. A system based on HMOs, on the other hand, represents a similarly integrated 
(but privately funded) system which could fit into quadrants (3) and (4), when purchasing care 
from private or public providers. 
Donaldson and Gerard contend that it is important to recognise that systems do not 
have to be vertically integrated in these ways.37 A third party private payer, such as an 
insurance company, could also fit into segments (3) and (4). The fundamental point is that 
public finance does not have to match public provision, nor does private finance have to match 
private provision. Public provision could be financed by private arrangements (private 
insurance, direct charges, etc.) and private provision by public finance (e.g. prospective 
payments made by government agencies directly to private hospitals).38 Control of financial 
arrangements gives governmental bodies more direction over the health care system in the 
pursuit of societal objectives. The Government's role is seen as financing rather then in 
providing health care. As the collective purchaser of care on the community's behalf, a public 
body can dictate terms of provision with equal power to both public and private providerS.39 
Simply providing public services does not guarantee use by those groups for whom they are 
intended, because healthier, richer or privately insured patients may be more 'attractive 
customers' for hospitals than those more in need of care. New Zealand's public sector finances 
77 percent of health care while 6 percent is financed through private insurance, and the other 
17 percent financed by out of pocket private payments. Hence, the mix of financing for health 
care represents three quarters public one quarter private.40 
37 Cowan, Privatization in the developing world,1990,p.53. 
38 Cowan, Privatization in the developing wor/d,1990,p.53. 
39 R.G Evans, 'Public health insurance: the collective purchase of individual care', Health policy 7, 
1987, Pp. ll5 - 134. 
40 The state picks up nearly the same percentage of the costs of the health system as it did in the 
1970s. Concern over the condition of New Zealand's pulic health system has led to increasing 
numbers of New Zealanders deciding to take out some level of health insurance. But while the 
number of New Zealanders with health insurance is climbing towards 50 percent, the percentage of 
total health costs funded by private individuals, either directly or through health insurance, has 
changed little since the 1970s. as cited in The Evening Post, 'Insurance picks up the tab',_24 Sep. 
1996, p6. 
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2. Private Health Care Insurance 
Globally, governments have proven to be quite tough.as budgetary negotiators and are 
imposing increasingly stringent controls on health care expenditures as their own fiscal 
position weakens. Private insurers, on the other hand, have no particular incentive to limit cost 
escalation, if anything it is to the contrary. From the point of view of providers, the optimal 
situation, at least in economic terms, is to have complete freedom to set prices and choose 
treatment patterns, but to have a high level of insurance coverage in the population so that the 
resulting bills will be paid 41 American experience indicates that a high level of coverage 
requires very large public subsidies, directly for the elderly and poor, and through tax 
expenditures for those with private coverage. But the tax expenditure subsidies for nrivate 
insurance can, as shown in the United States, be structured to yield the greates1 
people in higher income brackets.42 The expansion of private insurance within a public system 
of health care finance offers benefits to both providers (higher prices) and upper-income payers 
(a more regressive financing structure). It therefore supports a potent political alliance. 
Additionally, if providers are able (selectively) to recruit people into the private insurance 
system by offering them the reality, or even just the possibility, of superior services, this 
reinforces the financial advantages. However, the complex administrative mechanisms for 
achieving these redistribution objectives are themselves costly. They result not only in higher 
incomes for (some) providers, but in an increasing flow of resources into the overhead costs of 
managing the health care system. 
The inherent instability of private health care financing also leads to uncontrolled cost 
escalation. This, in tum, generates an administrative arms race as each payer struggles to shift 
the ever-increasing cost onto others. Such efforts are highly rational, indeed necessary for 
survival, at the level of the individual institution. From the perspective of society as a whole, 
they generate an ever-increasing level of pure waste motion.43 The uncertainty surrounding the 
incidence of ill-health and the efficiency of treatment means that health care is seen as an 
41 R.G Evans, 'Public health insurance: the collective purchase of individual care', 1987, Pp.450-451. 
42 R.G Evans, 'Public health insurance: the collective purchase of individual care', 1987,Pp.451-452 
43 Some have challenged the identification of excessive adminnistrative costs with waste in 
K.E. Thorpe, 'Inside the Black Box of Administrative Costs'. Health Affairs, 1992,p.1 l. They point to 
the extraordinnarily sophisticated management techniques in the United States, the extent and detail 
of data generated, and the leading-edge research in health services. In these, the United States celary 
does lead the world. But as Evans contends such responses, however, miss the point. Managerial (and 
even reserach) activities are not ends in themselves. They are only valuable issofar as they contribute 
to the ultimate ends of a more efficient and effective HC system, and a healthier and more satisfied 
population. As the United States achieves much worse results than systems that spend much less, 
extra administrative expenditure is wasted, regardless of how much sophisticated management it may 
buy. It apears to support a vast negative-sum game of interinstitutional competition over cost transfer 
and benefit approptiation. 
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appropriate case for insurance. Insurance can help individuals and groups to adjust in 
preferred ways to these uncertainties. As has been seen, this may be achieved by government 
intervention providing comprehensive public insurance, by a combination of government and 
private finance or by a comprehensive range of private finance. For a given premium a set of 
health care risks may be insured against. In the case of pure private insurance, the insurance 
company covers specified risks of ill-health to the consumer and incurs the consequential 
expense of health care. Private insurance companies usually operate in a market with a small 
number of large companies (an oligopolistic structure). Although such a structure may achieve 
economies of scale, there is an incentive for companies to act together to strengthen their power 
in the market and in doing so keep premiums high and in line with each other. 44 
New Zealand has two main health insurance providers, Southern Cross health care 
which has a market share of about 60 percent, and Aetna health care which has about 19 
percent of the New Zealand's health insurance, covering some 240,000 people. Other smaller 
companies, such as National Insurance Life, covers approximately 5 percent of the market. 
Health care packages vary with the amount of cover and cost, but prices between companies 
with comparable packages are similar. Aetna New Zealand has increased premiums in 1996 by 
an average of 20 percent. These increases follow similar rises by the country's largest insurer 
Southern Cross.45 
Depending on the level of charges for health care, people in low-income groups or 
high-utilisation groups may be excluded from consumption as a result of a lack of ability to 
pay. Government intervention may be required in such a situation. There is also likely to be 
some anxiety about the effect on an individual's health if they are deterred from 'non-trivial' 
utilisation. Cost sharing need not, however, reduce the overall impact of supplier-induced 
demand. Doctors may, for example, switch their demand-inducing abilities from lower-income 
groups to those more able to pay. With the presence of supplier-induced demand, cost 
containment does not seem so obviously achievable through cost sharing. Even worse, serious 
health problems may be left untreated as more minor (but able-to-pay) cases replace more 
serious (not-able-to-pay) cases. Potentially the same amount could be spent on health care but 
to less effect in terms of improvement or maintenance of the community's health. 46 Consumers 
in a private insurance system are given a central role in choosing the nature and extent of their 
own health care coverage. They are able to purchase additional health care insurance according 
to their o\vn preference and, of course, ability to pay. The provision of high-quality care and 
other peripheral services is typically greater than in governmental systems. 47 
44 KE.Thorpe, 'Inside the Black Box of Administrative Costs',Health Affairs, 1992,p. l 1. 
45 Bailey. G, 'Aetna insurance for elderly $2000 a year' The Evening Post, 11 Sep 1996,p.56 
46 Bailey. G, 'Aetna insurance for elderly $2000 a year' The Evening Post, 11 Sep 1996,p.56 
47 Bailey. G, 'Aetna insurance for elderly $2000 a year' The Evening Post, 1996,p.57 
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'If you're poor in New Zealand you're twice as likely to die in any given year as 
someone who is well-off' .48 Ichiro Kawachi, an assistant professor in the school of public 
health at Harvard Medical School in Boston, believes that this applies to New Zealand. 
Kawachi states that since the introduction of Rogemornics, ill-health among the poor has 
increased, particularly for Maori. While Western nations generally have an improving life-
expectancy, New Zealand's rate of improvement is contrary to that trend. The under-privileged 
are the most affected and this group is growing rapidly. Kawachi claims that while the rich are 
getting richer, a rapidly-growing under class is trapped in a poverty cycle with a rapidly falling 
life expectancy. That decline is dragging New Zealand's international life expectancy ranking 
down. This is blamed on the monetarist policies of the Fourth Labour Government which have 
been continued by National. Health Ministry briefing papers for the incoming Government 
show that in the last 30 years New Zealand men have slipped from having the seventh-highest 
life expectancy rate to 13th amongst 25 OECD countries. Women's rates over the same period 
have fallen from 10th to 17th.49 These trends show that while there may be uncertainty 
surrounding the incidence of ill-health, only certain groups in society have the ability to take 
out the insurance cover necessary to protect themselves. The others (without an ability to pay) 
are reliant on government provision. While consumers in a private insurance system are 
theoretically given a central role in choosing the nature and extent of their own health care 
coverage, realistically many are denied this choice as their soci-econornic status has already 
determined it for them, hence the health insurance system fails them. 
i) Preferred Provider Organisation 
One recent major reform in private health care insurance markets in the USA has led 
to the growth of Preferred Provider Organisations (PPOs). They arrange contracts with 
medical professionals to carry out specific operations, procedures or other medical duties at a 
set rate. This keeps costs down for the insurance companies and allows them to budget more 
accurately. PPOs have arisen in the USA as a result of attempts by insurance companies to 
enter into competition with HMOs. Premiums are either paid by employers or are shared 
between employer and employee. Price at the point of use of services is zero. Insurers contract 
selectively with providers ( e.g. primary care doctors and hospitals who provide care below a 
cost per case). The contract is on the basis of both a negotiated fee schedule, which the 
preferred providers accept as payment in full and acceptance of utilisation review. User 
charges and deductibles tend to be lower in PPOs than under previous private insurance 
arrangements. so 
48 J. Saunders, 'The nation with a heart of stone', The Evening Standard, 8 Febuary 1997. 
49 Saunders, 'The nation with a heart ofstone',1997. 
SO J. Zwanziger and RR Auerbach, 'Evaluating PPO performance using prior expenditure data', 
Medical Care, 29, 1991, pl42-151. 
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Donaldson and Gerard claim that adverse selection and experience rating will almost 
inevitably develop within a care system based on PPOs, leaving the more costly groups without 
health care cover unless they are subsidised.51 There is also no financial risk to primary care 
providers with respect to the volume of services provided. With FFS as the basis for payment 
the doctor can, to some extent, manipulate utilisation. However, this has a limit, because if cost 
per case rises above a certain limit, then the sector may not be selected as the preferred 
provider at the next review. The incentive for hospitals to keep costs down arises because a set 
of prices has been agreed in advance.s2 
Patients can choose between a limited set of providers or choose another provider on 
less favourable terms, so incentives also exist on the demand side. One specific advantage of 
PPOs is that they have enabled employers in the USA to move quickly to control health care 
costs for employees who are already under FFS schemes. Companies either organise schemes 
themselves or persuade insurance companies to do it. Insurance companies co-operate because 
this provides a means of competing with HMOs.53 
ii)Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) 
Health maintenance organisations (HMOs) are a product of private insurance systems. 
HMOs provide (or arrange and pay for) comprehensive health care for a fixed, periodic per-
capita payment (or 'premium') which is paid for by the consumer (usually with a subsidy from 
employers or social security). Consumers do not usually pay charges at that point. The 
premium is set in advance and is independent from the volume of services provided to the 
individual during the period. Providers can be salaried or paid by FFS. Adverse selection and 
experience rating will inevitably arise if, as is likely, competition develops. Doctor demand 
inducement is unlikely to be very prevalent because not only do doctors compete for custom, 
usually on an annual basis, but also the annual HMO budget is fixed in advance. Because any 
discrepancy between the budget and expenditure will fall on the HMO and thereby to the 
doctors, there is a much greater incentive for doctors to be cost conscious. High spending 
doctors will then be financially penalised.54 
Organisationally, HMOs can be of one of four types: a staff model, in which all 
doctors are employed and/or contracted directly by the HMO, a group model, in which the 
HMO contracts with an independent group practice to provide services, a network model, in 
which more than one independent group is contracted to provide services, or an independent 
practice association (IP A), in which the HMO contracts several doctors in independent 
practice. Consequently, there are many financial and organisational variations on the basic 
51 Donaldson and Gerard, Economics of Health Care.financing, 1993,p58. 
52 Donaldson and Gerard, Economics of Health Care.financing, l993,p59 
53 Donaldson and Gerard, Economics of Health Care .financing, 1993,Pp.60-61 
54 Donaldson and Gerard, Economics of Health Care financing, 1993,p.63 
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HMO model. Consumers select the health care plan of their choice on an annual· basis, 
therefore, more choice is thought to exist. Because consumers usually receive only a fixed 
subsidy towards payment (or a fixed percentage of the premium), they too have an incentive to 
be cost-conscious. Additionally, some HMOs do have user chargers, particularly for drugs.55 
3. Direct Tax System 
A system of direct taxation removes the problem of adverse selection because of the 
absence of competition between financial intermediaries.56 By detaching premiums from 
expected risk levels and making them compulsory, a tax system redistributes wealth from those 
with low ex ante expectations of illness to those at high risk. Individuals are effectively 
charged one form of community rate, one which is dependent on an ability to pay, but not on 
previous experience of ill-health. A tax-financed system redistributes according to two 
indicators of individual well-being, health status and income. It can, therefore, be more 
efficient than any form of redistribution based on income alone, although there is no guarantee 
_that it will be. It also provides the means of effectively capping total expenditure, provided that 
there is the political will to contain expenditure. Such a system is virtually free form 'loading' 
problems, representing probably the most efficient way of collecting Moines to finance the 
health care system (often referred to as 'piggy-backing' onto the existing system of tax 
collection). The use of nominal charges may be seen to provide an incentive to the consumer to 
restrain some demand, particularly so-called 'unnecessary' ('frivolous' or 'trivial') demands1 
Within the public sector, however, there is no systematic financial signalling system of the sort 
a well-ordered market would provide. This would inform participants about intersectional 
costs, such as GP versus hospital outpatient care, and internal costs which could form the basis 
of clinical budgets or prepayments per case. Thus, in NHS-type systems, decisions about the 
optimal balance of services usually have to be made either in the face of considerable 
ignorance about likely cost and likely benefit or only after in depth study. The system does not 
generate a pricing mechanism for routine 'managerial' choices. Nor does it provide a 
continuing environment of penalties or rewards for inefficient or efficient behaviour. Those 
who commit resources (the doctors) usually do so in ignorance both of the :financial cost of 
each clinical decision and of the true opportunity cost in terms of the health services that have 
not been provided to others. The budgeting systems that constrain doctors are also typically 
constructed in extreme ignorance about both costs and benefits. This ignorance can 
simultaneously lead to claims by some that the total health service financial resources are not 
used effectively, while others claim that the service is under funded. The difficulty lies in the 
55 B.L Harris, A.Stergachis and D.L. Reid:'The effect of drug copayments on utilisation and cost of 
~harmaceuticals in a health maintenance organisatin •. Medical care, 1990, p908. 
6 Refer table, 1, thrid coloum under direct taxation. 
57 Donaldson and Gerard, Economics of Health Care financing, 1993, p.59 
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fact that it is impossible to decisively refute or support either of these claims, at least, not with 
current levels oflmowledge about costs and benefits. 58 
4. Public Health Care ln~urance 
A public insurance system can be administered by a monopolistic agent, such as a 
quango (semi-autonomous, non-governmental organisation), a regional government, or a 
national government. For purposes of equity, premiums can either be indexed to income or, as 
is possible with private insurance, be made tax-deductible. Premiums can be deducted directly 
through payment by the employers of low-paid workers. The resulting fall in demand for the 
less skilled leads to still lower wages and/or more unemployment. Moreover, arrangements 
would have to be made to ensure cover for the unemployed (voluntary or involuntary), the 
retired, those not in the labour force, and the dependants of those individuals.59 
Care would normally be provided free at the point of use of services under public 
health care insurance, although it would be possible to introduce co-payments and charges for 
'hotel' services. General practitioners could be paid on the basis of salary, capitation or fee for 
service (or some combination). There is the possibility of tight government control over fee 
schedules. Hospitals could be reimbursed in a variety of ways: retrospectively, prospectively, 
by size of the population served, item by item, globally, with or without peer review and with 
or without monitoring of outcome and the quality of care. Some hospital income may also 
come from FFS, nominal charges to patients, and for charges for 'hotel' and other on-site and 
peripheral services.60 
The crucial aspect of a public health insurance system is monopoly of finance. The 
lack of competition between financial intermediaries prevents adverse selection and experience 
rating. There may also be economies of scale and the avoidance of the recording, billing, 
collection and enforcement costs (e.g. checking for fraud) of private insurance systems. 
Competition can take place in a public health care insurance system, for it is possible to 
envisage the presence of both public and private service providers where the private sector is 
subject to the same system of payment as the public sector (e.g. internal markets). Advantages 
may be gained from competition among providers of care because the public insurance agency 
(in Canada, the provincial government) acts as the collective purchaser of services on the 
community's behalf.61 
It is from these four models that OECD countries have structured the financing of 
there health care systems. Table 1 characterises the main options for raising finance. Within 
each, of these new systems some principal variants are recognised which control moral haz.ard 
58 Donaldson and Gerard, Economics of Health Care financing, 1993, p.62 
59 Donaldson and Gerard, Economics of Health Care financing, 1993p.62 
60 Donaldson and Gerard, Economics of Health Care financing, 1993, p.62. 
61 Evans, 'Public Health Insurance; the collective purchase of individual care', p.118. 
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by consumers, doctors and institutions, and deal with adverse selection. HMOs are aimed at 
controlling both consumer and provider moral hazard. Other methods, such as charges, can be 
used in all types of system. The options under public insurance and direct ta.-xation systems are 
identical ex~t that public ~surance systems can include compulsory community-rated 
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Table 1 Options arising from funding arrangements for health services: controlling moral 
hazard and adverse selection 
Source: Donaldson and Gerard, Economics of health care financing 
In Table. I column one Private insurance shows the combination of mechanisms which 
can be used to control moral haz.ard and adverse selection. At the bottom of this column on 
controlling adverse selection it may be seen that the basic system for raising finance notes the 
implementation of ·special schemes for poor, elderly and disabled people.' As the column 
Public insurance demonstrates there i~ provision for an experienced-rated subsidy. Under this 
the elderly would be entitled t<;> a subsidy which pays part of there insurance premium. 
Currently in New Zealand there is no such subsidy for the elderly. 
62 Donaldson and Gerard. Economics of Health Care financing, 1993,p.6-t 
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New Zealand's system combines a mix of both public and private financing with 
rapidly increasing levels of private involvement matched with a steady public decline. Of 
particular interest here is the private health care insurance model, for as New Zealand 
withdraws from public provision, greater reliance is bearing on private he.alth care insurance to 
provided essential medical care to New Zealanders. 
Conclusions 
In spite of the fact that most questions in health policy can be answered only through 
empirical research, an examination of the theory is important to understanding the direction of 
the government and their expectations when developing health care policies. Rice contends 
that if analysts misinterpret economic theory as applied to health by assuming that market 
forces are necessarily superior to alternative polices, then they will blind themselves to policy 
options that, although falling outside the conventional, demand-driven competitive model, 
might actually be better at enhancing social welfare.63 Market forces do have a prominent place 
in health care organisation and delivery, but, as has been shown, economic theory has a 
number of strong critics who address essential shortcomings. Many of these are exacerbated 
when applied to health care. The most prevalent shortcomings are, first, market mechanisms 
which yield distribution advantages for particular influential groups, such as the wealthy and 
the business world. Second, · inelastic demand for health care means that if prices increase 
demand will remain the same, creating an environment ripe for exploitation by profit making 
c,ompanies. Third, the likelihood of cost escalation is due to the diminished incentive to contain 
costs. Fourth, a lack of knowledge in the market place which creates an imbalance of 
information when increased infonnation which is one of the main justifications for market 
involvement.64 Fifth, the fundamental problem of the market system's inability to provide equity 
of access. 
As New Zealand's health care system is now relying increasingly on private health 
. insurance companies to provide care, the theory of insurance market failure is useful to gauge 
problems likely to arise. Part two will assess each one in turn with the empirical research 
gathered from the interviews and case study. The various types of health care financing 
systems that are used by the OECD countries has been outlined to reveal the alternative 
options available to the planners of New Zealand's health care system. 
63 Rice, 'Can Markets Give Us the Health System We Want?',1997,p.422. 
64 RScollay, S. St John, 'From micro to macroeconomics' Macroeconomics and the contemporary 
new Zealand Economy, Addison Wesley Longman New Zealand Limited, 1996, p9. 
CHAPTER TWO 
International Trends & Lessons in Health Care Provision 
Virtually all OECD cotmtries face the same problems and have common objectives 
concerning health care, particularly the provision of quality health care at an affordable cost. 
They have all experienced sluggish economic growth over the past 13 years compared with the 
first three decades following the Second World War. They all have ageing populations. They 
all confront the problem of potential costs arising from the continuing development of health 
technologies and a large percentage of them are increasing their levels of private funding into 
health care while reducing the public amount.I Part of this chapter will study the impetus for 
these changes, the purpose being to understand where the drive for refonn is sourced and to 
illuminate international trends in areas relating to the dynamics of demographic transition. Also 
an analysis of the various financing models of health care, health expenditure and the role of 
the private sector in other countries is made. New Zealand's position regarding 'the 
international standards' of financing health care is assessed in an attempt to determine the 
extent of New Zea.lands' conformity or conversely its divergence from these. Furthermore, 
consideration is given to the first postulation, that the governments shift from a 'social equity 
model' in health care provision to one based on 'competitive markets' has created an issue with 
distribution, which favours certain minority groups and disadvantages others, namely the most 
rapidly growing in New Zealand - the elderly. It is to the central element concerning 
distribution and the minority group which is favoured that will be focused on here. 
Elderly and Growing 
Population ageing is not a phenomenon unique to New Zealand. Growth in elderly 
populations is one consequence of a phenomenon first recognised in European societies known 
as the "demographic transition". This process is common to most developed industrialised 
nations.2 From the individuals point of view most would agree living longer is desirable. To the 
state, however, it means developing policies to deal with the future costs of this expanding 
group and their demands on limited resources such as health care. 
1 OECD, Health Data, The comparative analysis of 27 Health Systems, 1996. 
2 New Zealand Now 65 Plus, Statistics New Zealand, Wellington, New Zealand,1995, p14. 
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Figure 3. Elderly Population by Geographical Area, 1950-2020 
Source: New Zealand Now 65 plus, 1995 
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Some of the world's oldest population structures are found in European countries (as 
figure 3 shows) where the demographic transition began much earlier than in New Zealand .. 
European populations have continued to grow progressively older since the end of World War 
II. In 1950, fewer than 10 percent of Europe's population was aged 65 years and over. By 
1990, this had risen to an estimated 13 percent and by the year 2020, it is projected to reach 
around 18 percent.3 
New Zealand is experiencing its own demographic transition. Low fertility has led to 
fewer young people in the population, while declining mortality has led to the increasing size of 
older age groups in the population structure. Comparing New Zealand's ageing population 
with that in other countries shows that in 1951, 9 percent of New Zealand's population ,vas 
aged 65 and over. This was higher than the 1950 levels in countries such as Australia, Canada 
and the United States, but less than the levels in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom (as 
shown in figure 4).-t 
3 New Zealand Now 65 Plus, Statistics New Zealand, Wellington. New Zealand, 1995, p U. 
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Figure 4. Elderly Population, Selected Countries, 1950 and 2020. 
Source: New Zealand Now 65 Plus, 1995 
By the year 2021, New Zealand's elderly are expected to make up around 16 percent 
of the total population. By the middle of next century they are predicted to be one in four 
which is a similar proportion to Australia. Countries such as Denmark, Finland, Japan, and 
Sweden which have experienced sub-replacement fertility in the 1970s and 1980s will have 
more than one in five people in this age group by 2021.5 The growth in Japan's elderly 
population during the 1950-2020 period is expected to be spectacular, with the elderly 
projected to increase from 5 percent to almost 25 percent of Japan's total population.6 As a 
result of this, a nwnber of implications for policy development emerge which will cater for the 
greater diversity of needs within that population. Why is this a concern· for those concerned 
with health care? As Blank7 purports elderly persons are the leading users of hospital care on a 
per capita basis and have the highest expenditures for health care in the United States. 
Ironically, because of medical improvements and technologies that prolong life, chronic disease 
requiring frequent medical care has become a greater problem. Obviously, the demand for such 
care will continue to increase in an ageing population. Studies have confirmed that the elderly 
are high-cost users of medical care, much of which in the United States is funded by the federal 
government through Medicare and Medicaid. In 1980, for example, 63.9 percent of the health 
care expenditures for those over 65 years of age ,vas paid for by the public sector. This 
contrasts with 28.6 percent for those under 65.8 In New 
5 Sub-replacement fertility is when the number of births in a population is below the level needed for 
the population to reproduce itself. 
6New Zealand .Vow 65 Plus, Statistics New Zealand, Wellington,, New Zealand.1995, pl-1-. 
7RH, Blank Rationing Medicine, Columbia University Press. New York 1988. 
8 Blank, Rationing .\ledicine, 1988. 
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Zealand those over 60 make up 16 percent of the population and use 44.3 percent of the health 
budget.9 This ~eing and consumption high group are going to put an increasing strain on the 
health care system to provide them ,vith both elective and acute health care. This could 
certainly be suggested as one reason for the implementation of reforms to the health care 
system, to transfer this future cost from the government onto the elderly directly. 
The World Wide Drive for Privatisation 
In 1991 the newly elected government embarked on a comprehensive restructuring of 
the health system. The Green and White Paper of 1991 laid out the foundations for the reform, 
citing a number of benefits likely to result from the change the proposals included; 
• dividing the role of area health boards into services purchase and provision 
c, separating the organisation and funding of public he,ilth from personal health care services 
• encouraging competition among providers 
• integrating within one agency the fimding for all personal health care 
• encouraging continuity of care and co-ordinated management across the spectrum of 
personal health care services 
• providing access for everyone to an acceptable level and quality of services while allowing 
greater freedom of choice for individuals 
• exlicitly defining "core health services" for which government funding would be available, 
although not necessarily fully funded by the state 
• retaining the state's role as the major funder of the health sector 
• encouraging individual responsibility for health care 
• formalising the system of user charges for personal health care services, and 
• strengthening and redefining the role of the Ministry of Health as a key policy adviser to 
and monitoring agent for the government. 
These proposals, with amendments, were largely implemented on 1 July 1993 by way of the 
Health and Disability Services Act of 1993.10 
Plans to reform have required the dismantling of the previous health system so as to 
create a new system based on 'managed competition'. In this new regime health-service 
provision is organised through processes of competition among and between private and public 
funders and providers of health care. The changes being made easily rival those created by the 
1938 Social 
9 New Zealand Now 65 Plus,1995,p.21. 
lO OECD, The Refonn of Health Care Systems, A Review of Seventeen OECD Countries, Paris, 
1994,p.237. 
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Security Act which set the parameters of the previous system. The current health reforms, like 
those in 1938, are part of a much la~ger pattern of upheaval and transformation of political, 
economic and social relations in New Zealand. Politically, this transformation began in a 
sustained way with the election of a Labour government in 1984, continued with Labour's re-
election in 1987 and has been pushed still further, by the election of a National government in 
1990.11 
The move to reform was not isolated to New Zealand alone. Since the 1970s there 
have been global attempts to restructure the welfare state in capitalist industrial societies, 
especially those characterised by high rates of public expenditure, large budget deficits, and 
low rates of economic growth.12 Recession economies have been used as one of the reasons 
why governments have cut back social expenditure and adopted alternative means of funding 
the provision of essential social services. Attacks on, and attempts to restructure the welfare 
state have, for the most part, been the preserve of the political right which has usually defended 
its actions on the grounds of questioning both the efficiency and the effectiveness of public 
expenditure. 13 High rates of social expenditure are seen as having a negative impact upon rates 
of economic growth and are also said to create social dependence and high levels of taxation 
which act as disincentives to work and save. It is also argued that many public services are 
characterised by inefficiency and ineffectiveness.14 Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in 
the health sector where there has been a growing scepticism over the rising cost of medicine, 
especially in view of its relatively minor impact upon health outcomes in industrial societies.15 
The New Zealand health reforms, however have to be seen in the context of a world-
wide drive for privatisation. The 1990s era of budget cutting and privatisation began at the end 
of the 1970s with the election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister of the U.K in 1979, and 
Ronald Reagan as President of the United States in 1980. Both were pledged to the reduction 
of expenditures for public services and their privatisation, and shifting the tax burden from the 
very rich to the working and middle classes of the population. As Milton Terris, a leading 
American public health specialist, has pointed out: 
11 A. Sharp,, 'The Changing Role of the State in New Zealand since 19841,A Leap into the 
Dark,Auckland University Press, 1994,pl07. 
12 I.Gough, and A. Steinberg,1981-; The Welfare state, capitalism, and crisis. Political Power and 
Social Theozy 2, Pp.141-171, as cited in J. L. Scarpaci, Health Services Privatisation in Industrial 
Societies, Rutgers, United States, 1988. 
13Gough & Steinberg, The Welfare state, capitalism and crisis, 1981. 
14 New .zeaJ.and Department of Health 1988. 
15 I.Kawachi, 'The American Connnection', Health Reforms, A Second Opinion, 1992. 
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'These policies have been exported to the rest of the world through the International 
Monetary Fund [IMF] and the World Bank, which have followed a consistent policy for 
demanding adherence to so-called 'austerity measures', austerity for the working and middle 
classes, and prosperity for the rich and powerful, as an essential condition for receiving loans 
for their hard-pressed economics16 In the field of health, for example, the World Bank in 1987 
published the following entitled, Financing Health Services in Developing Countries: An 
Agenda for Reform, which proposed that 'an agenda for reform in virtually all countries ought 
to be carefully considered'. It is not surprising then, that no fewer than 18 out of 24 OECD 
countries were planning or implementing major changes to health services by 1991.17 The 
common problem, it was argued, was an ever increasing demand for health services as a result 
of an ageing population, new technologies and higher consumer expectations. It may be seen as 
surprising that for some reason the most radical reforms implemented in all of the OECD 
countries have indeed occurred in New Zealand and Sweden18 
The World Bank's agenda for reform included four policies: charge users of 
government health facilities; provide insurance or other risk coverage;19 use non-government 
resources effectively; and decentralise government health services. In essence, cut public 
budgets and privatise services in health care. Despite Health Ministers repeated assurances to 
the contrary, the health reforms in New Zealand are clearly pursuing the same strategy 
established by the Reagan-Thatcher administrations, which continue to be implemented today 
by the British and American governments, as well as the World Bank and IMF. Thus, New 
Zealand has much to learn from the American experiences in health care, notwithstanding 
protests that they are irrelevant to this country.20 
The health reforms constitute an experiment without any ethical basis. No pilot studies 
or research were fully carried out. At a late stage, under pressure and with extreme haste, pilot 
studies were reluctantly started in limited areas. Contrast this with the area health board 
system, which was developed step-by-step over 15 years with the support of both National and 
Labour governments. More concerning however, is the realisation that the essence of the 
reforms is not to improve the health of the country, but rather to transfer the cost of care onto 
its users. 
16 Kawachi, 'The American Connnection', 1992. 
17OECD,The Refonn of Health Care Systems, A Review of Seventeen OECD Countries,1994, p.ll. 
18OECD,The Refom1 of Health Care Systems, A Review of Seventeen OECD Countries 1994, p.11. 
19 The agenda did not specify whether this was to be private or publicly provided insurance. As New 
Zealand has sought and encouraged private insurance it is likely that this is what was meant by the 
World bank in its report. 
20 Kawachi,'The American Connnection',1992. 
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Health care financing Comparisons of OECD Countries 
Just as increases in the elderly population varies in each country, so to does the type of 
financing chosen by the policy makers to fund health care. A visual representation of the 
different types of systems adopted by countries is presented belO\v to establish the degree of 
market incorporation introduced by some countries compared to others who remain with 
govemment regulated and financed systems. The purpose of this is to compare New Zealand's 
financing framework with that of other countries. 
FVI-PV 
Ff-PU 
Figure.5 The Combinations of Health Care Systems used by 20 OECD countries 
Data Source: OECD 1994. 
In figure.5, system FSI-MPP is :financed mainly by social insurance with mixed public and 
private providers. Countries which use this system include Belgium, France, Germany, 
Austria, Japan and Luxembourg. System FT-PU is financed predominantly by taxation ·with 
mainly public providers. This is the most favoured system and includes 10 of the countries 
surveyed; Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Portugal, Norway, Sweden, Ireland, Spain and 
the United Kingdom. System FVI-PV is financed mainly by voluntary insurance v.-ith mainly 
private providers. United States and Switzerland are examples. System Ff-MPP is financed 
mainly by taxation with mixed public and private providers. This is the system favoured by 
New Zealand and Australia. 
Within these countries there is a marked variation between those who allow voluntary 
insurance and those who implement compulsory insurance. Voluntary insurance represents 40-
45 percent of health care financing in Switzerland and the United States, while social insurance 
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accounts for between 56-60 percent of health care financing in Lu.,xembourg and 80 percent in 
Austria. Nearly all these countries have universal insurance coverage. Austria and 
Luxembourg (social) have 99 percent coverage. The United States has partial compulsory 
coven ge for the aged and disabled ( 13 percent of the population) and of certain groups among 
the poor (10 percent of the population) but achieves coverage of 86 percent of the population if 
voluntary insurance is included. Yet figures for those without any form of insurance cover in 
the United States is said to be around 35-45 million or 20 percent of the population.21 
Comparative data on international expenditure for health care is notoriously complex 
because of differing definitions and fluctuating exchange rates. Nevertheless, economists have 
used elected measures to make international comparisons. The measure employed in this 
examination of health expenditure will be Gross Domestic Product (GDP).22 Table 2 charts 
the change in total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP in a number of OECD countries. 
Cost containment policies have been implemented in New Zealand, as in other countries, with 
the intention of limiting health expenditures to an acceptable share of national resources. 
Although this goal of 'an acceptable share' remains elusive in some countries, as it does in 
New Zealand, expenditure trends suggest that movement has generally been in the desired 
downward direction. 
The growth in health expenditures as a percent of GDP was lower during the 1980s 
than the 1970s in the majority of the 17 countries reviewed by OECD.23 This may be good 
news for the country's economic position, but with increasing costs in health care spurred on 
by advancements in technology with new procedures and expensive drugs it is hard to·believe 
that spending less amounts on health care is an effective way of meeting the needs of a growing 
21 Abel-Smith, Who is the Odd Man Out: The experience of Western Europe in containing the cost of 
health care, Milbank Quarterly,1985,p.17. 
22The first point to note about this approach is that there is no predetermined optimum percentage of 
GDP that is appropriate to spend on health to solve the perceived health problems of any country. The 
main problem associated with making international comparisions of health expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP is that health expenditure has a price and quantity element. The county with the 
highter ratio may simply have different internal price relativities (i.e greater expenditure but same or 
less resources). The United States serves as an example. With health expenditure at 12.4 percent of 
GDP in 1990, it had the highest ratio of all the OECD countries. But the fact that doctors have 
relatively higher incomes in the United States means that relatively more has to be expended for any 
given number of doctors. Further, the fact that the U.S spent 12.4 percent of its GDP on HC does not 
necessarily mean that the average American is assured of accessibility, equity and quality in terms of 
HC delivery. Despite its crudity, this ratio is often used for cross country comparison and, will serve 
the purpose sourght here in this chaper. 
23OECD, The Refonn of Health Care; 1992. 
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Australia 5.8 7.7 8.8 8.6 
Austria 5.4 8 8.8 7.9 
Belgium 4.3 7.4 8.2 8 
Denmark 6.3 8.8 8,5 6.4 
Finland 6 8,8 9.4 7.7 
France 3.9 4.4 5.4 9.8 
Gennany 5.7 6.9 8.5 10.4 
Greece 3.9 4.4 5.4 5.8 
Iceland 5.7 6.9 8.5 8.2 
Ireland 6.7 8.4 7.1 6.4 
Italy 5.9 6.9 8.5 7.7 
Japan 4.8 6.8 6.9 7.2 
Netherlands 6.7 8.4 8.6 8.8 
New Zealand 5.3 6.9 7.7 7.1 
Norway 5.9 6.8 8.3 8 
Spain 4.4 5.9 7.1 7.6 
Sweden 7.5 9.6 7.9 7.2 
Switzerland 5.5 7.5 9.3 9.8 
UK 4.7 5.9 7.1 6.9 
USA 7.6 10.3 14 14.2 
Table 2. Total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the OECD 
countries 
Data Source: Department of Health OECD Files 1994 & l 997population. The issue is 
the degree to which New Zealand is reducing its public health care spending and how the 
compatibility of this reduction ·with international trends. 24 
The pattern in New Zealand (refer figure 6) shows a large reduction in spending over 
the last 16 years. The data suggests that the funding structure is shifting. 
Figure 6. New Zeala~d's Public funding share of health care expenditure 
Data Source: OECD. 199.J. 
24 See Table 2. 
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The New Zealand government's gradual withdrawal from funding health care is leading to a 
situation where public health services are no longer accessible to many people. Keene 
commented 
"There is not enough money spent on health. Although National is apt to quote 
figures showing it is pwnping more money into health, the most reliable 
indicators tell a different story. Annual puhlic health spending on each person 
in 1995 dollars is slightly less now, around $1400, than it was in 1989 before 
the start of the reforms. Public health spending as a percentage of GDP at 5.8 
(1997) percent is lower than in 1988 and is in the bottom quarter of OECD 
countries. ' 25 
Table 3 charts changes in international public expenditure on health care. By 1980 New 
Zealand public funding of health care peaked at 88 percent of total health care expenditure. 
Since then the decline has been steady decreasing as much as 11 percent in a decade and a half 
to levels lower than in the l 960s. 
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Table 3 International comparisons: Public funding share of total expenditure 
(%) 
Source: Department of Health OECD Files 
25Lydon Keene of the Coalition for Public health in S. Coney. 'Polls suggest health is the one issue 
that could S\\ing this election\ Sunday Star Times, 15 September 1996. 
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Considering that Australia and New Zealand share the same type of financing system, funded 
mainly by taxation with mixed public and private providers, there is considerable difference in 
public funding expenditures throughout the 30 years. In spite of attempts to align most 
elements of New Zealand and Australia's economic and social structures, New Zealand has 
chosen to follow a similar pattem to the U.K, although public funding figures are not as 
consistently high. 
Internationally, while there is a tapering off of public spending on health care, as 
shown in figure 7, it is not as extreme as that which New Zealand is experiencing. These trends 
suggest the role of Government in providing funding for health care globally is being gradually 
reduced. It can only be assumed that the gap is being filled by the private sector and its 
associated markets. The trend is adding to other evidence supporting the fact that the private 
sector is going to play a much larger role in providing health care in the new millennium. 
Year 
Figure 7 Public Health Expenditure averaged for 21 OECD countries over 30 
years 
Data Source: OECD The Reform of health care Systems 1994 
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The Role of the Private Sector in Other Countries: 
Comparisons & Lessons for New Zealand 
Evans contends that advocates of the private market are making their arguments as if 
the last forty years had never occurred.26 He states that issues that were contentious in the 
1950s and 60s are being dragged out again, with all sorts of previous arguments being dusted 
off, repainted, and presented as new thinking about the role of the private sector.27 Evans 
argues that after several decades of international experience with different mixes of public and 
private funding systems, the market system of health care has been largely abandoned. 'Private 
markets have been reduced to a subsidiary role in all developed countries other than the United 
States, largely on the basis of distributional concerns'. 28 Hsiao gave a recent evaluation of 
Singapore's experience with medical savings accounts to which he concluded that, contrary to 
those claims, increasing the role of private :financing bas led to more rapid cost escalation, an 
overcapitalised system of duplicated and under-utilised facilities, and rapid increases in 
physician incomes. Even when patients are paying prices in nominally "free" markets, 
hospitals compete on technology rather than price. Hsiao described the Singapore funding 
system as carefully planned and well executed. It was the fundamental theory that was in error. 
In 1993, Singapore authorities concluded that the health care system is an example of market 
failure. The government has to intervene directly to structure and regulate the health system.29 
This observation has become so prominent that, given the accumulation of international 
experience, one could wonder how the government could justify implementing the reforms. But 
it is significant because it follows a decade long effort, under the most favourable 
circumstances, to make the market work.30 
In the developed world, despite wide variations in detail, there is a broad similarity of 
system characteristics which White has labelled "the international standards" for health care 
systems.31 The characteristics are; 
A) Universal coverage of the population, through compulsory participation; 
B) Comprehensiveness of principal benefits; 
C) Contributions based on income, rather than individual insurance purchases; 
D) Cost control through administrative mechanisms, including binding fee 
schedules, global budgets, and limitations on system capacity.32 
26 Evans, 'Going for Gold',1997,p.432. 
27 Evans, 'Going for Gold',1997,p.432. 
28 Evans, 'Going for Gold',1997,p.432. 
29 Rice,'Can Markets Give Us the Health System We Want?'l997,p263. 
30 Evans,'Goingfor Gold',1997,p.448. 
31 J.White, Competing Solutions: American health Care Proposals and Intemational Experience, 
Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1995. 
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New Zealand's system ascribes quite closely to White's 'international standards'. The 
predominant divergence arises under C) Contributions based on income, ra~er than individual 
insurance purchases. While New Zealand's system is based predominantly on health care 
funded publicly through taxation, this is declining and individual insurance is rising. This is 
evidenced by Health Ministry figures on health insurance spending which have almost trebled 
since the beginning of the decade. Total health insurance spending grew from $15.8 million in 
1979-80 to $141.7 million in 1989-90 and to $389.6 million in 1994-95,33 
The United States with the FVI-PV systems34 does not subsctibe to the 'international 
standards' and, as White points out, is the exception to the generalisation, departing in a major 
way from the standards outlined in both structure and performance.35 The same point was made 
ten years earlier by Abel-Smith who observed that the United States was the "odd man out" 
among modem health care systems.36 As such, it provides an enonnously valuable point of 
comparison for New Zealand. What happens if a country does not move toward a central role 
for government in the financing of health care, or conversely, from New Zealand's perspective, 
moves away from such a role for government? The decade between Abel-Smith's observation 
and White's review has reinforced the earlier conclusion. The United States has a health care 
system that is, by most measures, not only unique in the developed world but also uniquely 
unsatisfactory. This is not to say that the health care provided in the United States is of poor 
quality. Generally the quality is excellent.37 American patients typically express a high degree 
of satisfaction with their own care. But as a system for organising, delivering, and particularly 
for financing health care, the American approach is, by international standards, grossly 
inefficient, unfair, monumentally top-heavy with bureaucracy, and offthe charts in both the 
level and the rate of escalation of costs.38 It suggests 
32Whlte, Competing Solutions: American health Care Proposals and International Experience, 1995. 
33Health insurance spending trebles', The Dominion, 9 January 1997. 
34FVI-PV, Mainly Voluntary Insurance, with private providers. 
35 White, Competing Solutions: American health Care Proposals and International 
Experience, 1995. 
36 B. Abel-Smith, Who Is the Odd Man Out, 1985, p.17. 
37 Evans, 'Going for the Gold, 1997, p.434. 
38 Althougth the specific numbers may be controversial, the broad empirical facts do not appear to be 
in dispute. No one denies, for example, that the uniquely American form of health insurance 
generates very large administrative costs, much higher than in any other national system. S. 
Woolhandler and D.U. Himmelstein, 'The Deteriorating Administrative Efficiency of the U.S. Health 
Care System' New England Journal oflvfedicine, 1991,p.324. have done the most to focus attention 
on these excess costs; their estimates relative to, say, the costs ofadministering a Canadian-style 
universal system, would now be well over $100 billion. Others have generated lower estimates, but 
the point is that whether unnecessary paper pushing costs Americans $80 billion or $120 billion, the 
amount is large. Similarly, one can debate whether the number of Americans without health 
insurance at any point in time is closer to 35 or to 40 million. 
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that it may be impossible to support a modern health care system predominantly from private 
funds. 39 
Some could argue that as New Zealand's health care system is approximately three 
quarters government funded, the American model may not seem so relevant. It is, however, a 
very sobering warning for increasing the responsibility of the private sector in providing health 
care to New Zealanders. As control is taken out of government hands and placed with the 
private sector it becomes increasingly difficult to make amendments to the system 40 The record 
of the last forty years suggests that the United States trod the wrong road in trying to rely on a 
private system to organise and finance health care. The irony is that the rest of the world, 
which has struggled to reach what now seems to be a reasonably satisfactory system, albeit one 
needing a good deal of further work, is showing signs of importing American ideas and 
expanding the role of the private market. The standard claim by market advocates has always 
been that placing more of the cost burden on individual users will lead to lower utilisation and 
more careful purchasing by consumers/patients, more competitive behaviour by providers, and 
ultimately to a less costly, more responsive and more efficient health care system. If this does 
not occur, it must be because the user charges are not high enough. The international 
comparative experience of the last forty years is strongly contradictory to this claim. 
Whether or not the claim is true, one of the consequences of shifting the cost burden 
from taxpayers to users is a redistribution of wealth from lower to higher income individuals.41 
American experience indicates that a high level of coverage requires very large public 
subsidies, both directly for the elderly and poor, and through tax expenditures for those with 
private coverage. Indeed such public programs like Medicare and Medicaid were established 
outside the competitive marketplace in order to ensure that their priority - access to medical 
care services for the elderly and the poor - was met. 42 But the tax expenditure subsidies for 
private insurance can be, and in the United States are, structured to yield the greatest benefits 
for people in higher income brackets. At the same time, the tax-supported public program for 
the elderly has extensive user charges, deductibles and coinsurance built into it in the name of 
cost control. But these charges are in turn covered, in whole or in part, by private medigap 
insurance policies or through extensions of employer coverage as a retirement benefit. Such 
private coverage is highly correlated with income.43 
39Evans, 'Going for the Gold', 1997,p.435. 
40 As Hillary Clinton found out when attempting to introduce public HC programmes into what is 
primarily a private system. Once the private sector has a major role in delivering HC, then the 
entrenched interests of insurance companies, plus the combined weight of those in the medical 
profession who advocate it, must be contended with, Evans,'Going for Gold',1997,p.436. 
41 Evans,'Going for Gold',1997,p.436. 
42 Evans 'Going for Gold',1997,p.398. 
43 Evans notes the very poorest are eligible through the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary program for 
reimbursement of their user charges by Medicaid, if they know about the quality for the program. 
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The whole system produces much higher costs and a much more regressive 
contribution structure than would be politically acceptable in any single-payer public system 
funded from general revenue. 44 But all this administrative apparatus does not come cheap. In 
an analysis of OECD data by Gerdtham and Jonsson, in which the effects of differences in the 
relative prices of health care services were identified, it was found that a large proportion of 
the difference in per capita expenditures between the United States and other OECD countries 
was a result of higher relative prices of health care in the United States.45 Americans receive, on 
average no more care than Canadians, very little more than Japanese, and much less than 
Swedes. But they pay much more, relatively, for what they get. 'American health care costs 
more because Americans face greater threats to their health, and need more care ... But they do 
not get much more care, they just pay much more for it. 46 
The extreme case frames the general issue. The expansion of private insurance within 
a public system of health care finance offers benefits to both providers (higher prices) and 
upper-income payers (a more regressive financing structure). It therefore supports a potent 
political alliance. If, in addition, providers are able (selectively) to recruit people into the 
private insurance system by offering them the reality, or even just the perception, of superior 
services, this reinforces the financial advantages. However, the complex administrative 
mechanisms for achieving these redistributional objectives are themselves costly. They 
inevitably result not only in higher incomes for (some) providers, but also in an increasing flow 
of real resources into the overhead costs of managing the health care system leading to 
uncontrolled cost escalation. This in tum generates an administrative arms race as each payer 
struggles to shift the ever-increasing costs onto others. Such efforts are highly rational, indeed 
necessary for survival at the level of individual institution. From the perspective of the society 
. as a whole they generate an ever-increasing level of pure waste motion.47 
Although upper-income Americans may pay a smaller share of the costs of their health 
care system than they would if it conformed to White's international standards, many of them 
actually pay more in total because their system is so much more expensive. Public sector 
spending on health care in the United States, at $1599 per capita in 1994, was greater than in 
any other 
44 Evans, 'Going for Gold',1997,p.451 
45 Gerdtham, U.G and B jonsson. 'How Does Canada Do It? A Comparison of Expenditures for 
Physicians' Services in the United States and Canada'. New England Journal ofi\,fedicine, Vol 323, 
1991, Pp.884-890. 
46 Gerdtham & Jonsson, 'How Does Canada Do It? A Comparison of Expenditures for Physicians' 
1991. 
47 A Wildavsky, 'Doing Better and Feeling Worse: The Political Pathology of Health Policy', 
Daedalus 1977, p.453. 
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OECD country, except Switzerland, even without accounting for the American tax expenditure 
subsidy. Canada, for example, with universal public first dollar coverage for hospital and 
medical care spent substantially less.48 Americans, therefore pay more in taxes for health care 
in addition to (or despite) their massive contributions through the private sector. 
While health planners in this country try to distance themselves from the American 
model, overseas observers (backed by recent international studies) confirm our trend toward 
emulating the U.S policies. William Waldegrave, the British Secretary of Health, singled out 
the New Zealand health system for its emphasis on 'privatisation' and during the 1991 election 
campaign he assured the British public that the Conservative Government in Britain would not 
follow New Zealand's example. Mr Waldegrave's observations were based on what he 
described as the National Government's decision to limit the range and scope of public health 
services. By expecting crown health enterprises (CHEs) to operate as successful businesses, 
the National Government has effectively narrowed the definition of 'health' and simultaneously 
reduced 'the health service' to a range of commodities which can be bought and sold like other 
tradable goods such as butter, wool and lamb. This process of 'commodification' stems from 
nee-classical economics which has dominated the policy agenda in this country since 1984. 49 
A recent international study on the social effects of free-market policies concludes that 
the rise of monetarism in countries such as the USA, Britain and New Zealand has placed an 
enormous burden on society in the form of widespread unemployment, increasing social 
dislocation and an overall decline in economic and social security. In specific social service 
areas such as health, the theology of market forces, user pays, consumer choice, and targeting 
was supposed to produce a more efficient service, however in reality social services in 
countries, such as the United States, have noticeably deteriorated. SO 
In Gennany under the FSI MPP system,51 private insurance premiums are calculated 
according to age in five year cohorts. The premiums do not increase as the individual ages, so 
individuals pay more when they are younger, thus setting aside a reserve needed to cover 
higher costs as they age.52 In New Zealand, however, there is no such plan. Instead those over 
the age 
48 OECD/CREDES, OECD Health Data 96. Software for the Comparative Analysis of 27 Health 
s9stem. Paris: OECD Health Policy Unit, 1996. 
4 Borren & Maynard, 'Searching for the Holy Grail in the Antipodes: The Market Reform of the 
New Zealand Health Care System', 1993. 
50i3orren & Maynard, 'Searching for the Holy Grail in the Antipodes: The Market Reform of the New 
Zealand Health Care system, 1993. · 
51 PSI MPP the system which is financed by mainly social insurance with a mix of public and private 
~roviders. 
2 U.Reinhardt, 'West Gennany's health Care and Health Insurance System: Combining Universal 
Access with Cost Control'. Report Prepared for the U. S Bipartisan Commission on Comprehensive 
Health Care, Washington, D.C June 25,1990. 
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of 65 pay on average 60 percent more for their premium annually than someone under this age. 
This is compounded by the fact that the majority of people in this age group are retired and on 
a fixed and considerably low income. New Zealand's two biggest health insurers, Southern 
Cross and Aetna Health, have 60 percent and 19 percent of the market share respectively. 
Aetna's rates have risen, on average, 20 percent annually. Southern Cross has increased its 
rates on average by 12.5 percent annually, with its largest increase of 20 percent in Ultracare 
premiums.53 Just when people feel secure because they have insurance cover for their 
retirement years, insurance costs force many to cancel their policies. Many elderly are not able 
to continue paying for insurance which they have held for over 20 years as their fixed incomes 
do not allow them the flexibility of paying the increasing premiums. Insurance companies can, 
therefore, make safe profits by insuring people when they are young and fit then force them out 
when they are older. A plan such as that in Germany may well be valuable in distributing the 
cost over the lifetime of a person so they pay more when they can and less when their income is 
fixed. 
Private insurance provides coverage for slightly more than 11 million people in 
Germany and while it has not outlawed private insurance for benefits covered under the 
national health insurance program, any individual earning more than approximately $3,400 per 
month can purchase insurance from about forty five private insurers. 1bis alternative coverage 
represents to many the 'escape valve for the affluent'. Those who purchase private insurance 
as their sole coverage tend to be single people with high incomes.54 In New Zealand most 
medical insurance is bought by people on middle to higher incomes with employer group 
schemes making up about 50 percent of the market and covering many on lower incomes.55 
The increasing role of the private sector in the United Kingdom which has the 
favoured FT-PU system, shows parallels to New Zealand as they develop at similar rates and 
for seemingly similar reasons.56 There has been a significant increase in the prevalence of 
private medical coverage in Britain over the past two decades (see figure 6). Less than 4 
percent of the population was covered by private insurance in 1971. Almost a decade later 
private coverage rates had only increased to 5 percent. By 1989, however, approximately 11 
percent of the population was covered by private insurance. 57 
53Uitracare is a insurance package which.is top of the line, giving the holder a comprehesive 
coverage, citied in P. Love, 'GDing Private', The Evening Post, 26 Oct. 1996. 
54 Schneider, Markus, Health Care Cost Caontainment in the Federal Republic of Germany, health 
Care Financing Review 12,no.3 1991 in L.A.Graig, 'Health of Nations', An International Perspective 
on US Health Care Reform.,1993. 
55 P.Love, 'Going Private', The Evening Post, 26 Oct. 1996. 
56 Ff-PU, ta"<ation with mainly public providers, the most preferred financing system, used by 10 
OECD countries. 
57 P.Love, 'Going Private', 1996. 
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Figure 8. Private Health Insurance coverage in the U.K, 1970-1992 
Source: Health of Nations, 1993 
By 1991, this has increased to 12 percent of the population.58 Comparatively, New 
Zealand has approximately 7 percent of the population insured (in 1998). The creation of the 
National Health Service (NHS) did not include the outlawing of private insurance for those 
benefits covered by the national plan, as the Canadian system did. Unlike Germany, where 
citizens can opt out of the public plan if their incomes are high enough, British citizens cannot 
opt out of the plan by not paying taxes. Thus, they move back and forth between the NHS and 
private plans. Private insurance plans allow patients to seek care in private hospitals or even in 
NHS hospitals that have beds for private patients - known as 'pay beds'. The private sector 
route enables patients to get around long waiting times for elective surgery. As one policy 
study noted, 'The private patient pays to avoid waiting, the NHS patient waits to avoid 
paying'S!l 
Tight budgetary constraints have led to waiting lists for particular types of non-
emergency surgery in the UK. Waiting lists have been a persistent feature of the NHS since its 
inception which was in an environment of post-v.,-ar rationing of all goods and service. Yet 
public willingness to wait for certain surgical procedures has steadily declined as the 
'democracy of the till [became] more attractive than the equity of the queue'(,Q It is estimated in 
the U.K that there are currently 
58 P.Love, 'Going Private', 19%. 
S9 P.Love, 'Going Private', 1996. 
60 P.Day and R.Klein, The Politics of Modernisation: Britain's New Market Model of General 
Practice: Do Consumers Know Enough to Make it Work?' Health Policy, No.14, 1989. 
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more than 900,000 people (55m population) on waiting lists for such procedures as hernia 
repair, treatment of varicose veins, hip replacements, and cataract removal. 61 Due to the nature 
of the operations being sought this would suggest that those who are waiting are in the older 
age group. New Zealand has the same waiting list problem yet it seems much greater if the 
total populations are compared. In March 1996, 100,000 people (3.5 million population) were 
reported to be on a waiting list. 62 Percentage wise this means that 1.6 percent of the U.K 
population is on a waiting list compared to 2.8 percent of New Zealanders. For those, however, 
who can afford insurance, there is no waiting for health care. The equity of such a system is 
certainty something to be concerned with. 
The increased prevalence of private insurance coverage in Britain can be traced to 
several factors. First, there is widespread belief that the NHS provides second-class care, due 
largely to the existence of waiting lists. Further, that there are insufficient services within the 
NHS causing patients to look elsewhere for care. Increasing numbers applying for private 
insurance coverage certainly reflects the frustration over having to wait for certain medical 
procedures. But increasing private coverage is also the result of a patient's desire for control 
over such specific aspects as the timing of an operation, the particular surgeon and the 
particular hospital in which the procedure is performed. The second major factor fuelling the 
growth of private insurance coverage is the increase in employer-provided private insurance. 
Approximately 70 percent of private coverage is provided by employers. Employer-provided 
health insurance is a taxable benefit for the employee, the employer pays the premium (which 
is tax-deductible business expense) and the employee pays taxes on the premium paid on his or 
her behalf.63 New Zealand, however, does not have a tax-deductible benefit for employees, 
rather it imposes a fringe benefit tax of 49 percent onto the cost of such insurance, providing 
little incentive for companies to provide insurance. Despite this, approximately 60 percent of 
Southern Cross policy holders have health care cover provided by cornpanies.64 
Another similarity to New Zealand in the U.K is the infiltration of the private sector 
into the hospital and nursing home sector. Nursing and residential homes for the elderly are big 
business for private firms as only 20 percent of the elderly are cared for in NHS geriatric 
wards.65 The majority of the aged who are institutionalised are cared for either in public 
community homes or in private nursing homes. Compared to the acute sector where private 
providers represent a 
61 C.Whitney, 'After a Decade o/Thatcherism, Have British Values Altered, New York Times, 
June9, 1991 
62 K.Schereer, The Evening Post; 'Voters most tender on fate of change-weary hospitals', 3 Sep 1996 
63 Whitney, 'After a Decade ofThatcherism, Have British Values Altered, 1991. 
64Interview with Fiona McCloud, Branch manager of Southern Cross Christchurch. 
65 This is comparable with New Zealand figures, which show a rapid decline in public provision. 
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small portion of total health care services, they have virtually taken over the institutional long• 
stay elderly care sector.00 Currently only five percent of the British elderly (between the ages of 
sixty-five and seventy-four) are covered by private medical insurance for acute care coverage. 
A new law took effect in April 1990 that allows those over age 65 to claim private insurance 
premiums for acute care coverage as an income tax deduction. If a family member pays for 
private health insurance for a relative, the individual who pays may deduct it from his or her 
income tax. This is one government intervention measure which addresses to some degree the 
imbalance which private sector involvement in insurance brings about. 
Conclusions 
International trends are showing an increasing role for the provision of health care 
through the private sector in the 21st century. This is expressed by a number of factors. First, 
is the gradual and universal decline of public input into health care funding of which New 
Zealand is one of the more dramatic examples after having had such a high level of government 
funding in the eighties.67 Second, to counter this public decline there is a substantial rise in the 
levels of private participation in a number of countries in the form of insurance companies, 
private hospitals, clinics, residential homes, and many other areas which the government has 
withdrawn funding from. 
Further :findings found that by the first two decades of the new millennium most 
industrialised countries will be faced with a projected increase in their over 65 population 
group by an average of 15-17 percent. The result of these changes have meant the 
implementation of reform policies which are designed to transfer the responsibility of health 
care provision form the state onto the individual. When comparing the types of financing 
systems employed by various countries with their health care spending trends it was clear that 
the type of system did little to constrain the general trend of reduction in public spending and 
an increase in private. There is however, clear preferences in the particular type of financing 
system used. 10 OECD countries favour the FT-PU system which is health care financed 
primarily through taxation with mainly public providers. New Zealand shares the less popular 
FT-MPP model with Australia. 
A third observation was made regarding the reductions in New Zealand's health care 
spending. Reductions in total expenditure as a percentage of the GDP showed considerable 
decreases back to its level three decades ago. The average expenditure by OECD countries in 
1992 figures was 8.1 percent in 1996 whereas figures for New Zealand were 5.8 percent. This 
is a significant difference and places New Zealand close to the bottom of the OECD countries. 
66.R. Day & B.K.lein, 'The Po/ictics of Modernization, 'Britain's National Service in the 1980s', 
London, 1989. 
67 With the United States, Belgium the Netherlands and Spain being the exception to this conclusion. 
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These reductions further supported the argument that the government is transferring 
responsibility for health care. Since 1980 New Zealand has decreased public expenditure by 11 
percent. While globally, trends show an overall reduction in public spending, they are, 
however, nothing compared to the large change in New Zealand. The void created by the 
withdrawal of government spending has been filled to some degree by the private sector with 
total health insurance spending having trebled in a decade and a half. The problem that arises 
in the United States is tha~ there is a large dependence by the elderly on the state to pay for 
their care, with public funding from the federal government coming through Medicare and 
Medicaid. It shows tliat the private sector is not capable to supply the necessary HC to the 
elderly. 
Lessons learned from overseas experience comes firstly from Singapore where the 
implementation of market mechanisms in health care failed, resulting in rapid cost escalation, 
over capitalisation of the system, under-utilisation of facilities and a rapid increase in 
physicians incomes. The environment had all the right variables to make it work, it was the 
fundamental theory that was seen to be in error. In the United States it is shown that large scale 
private sector involvement in health care has lead to higher costs (with a GDP spend of 14% 
health care annually), extreme difficulty in controlling the system and major distributional 
concerns, not to mention the most notable effects. Striking' resemblance's can be seen in the rise 
in health insurance between the U.K and New Zealand. However, the U.K system has certain 
mechanisms in place, such as employer incentives and tax deductions, for the elderly to 
balance up the inequity which the private sector brings with it. It appears also that the role of 
the private sector internationally is seen not as providing an essential mechanism for health 
care delivery to all, but rather 'an escape value for the affluent'. This in itself should set the 
alarm bells ringing for New Zealand as private sector involvement is seen to be encouraging 
the concept of a two tiered system. Worse still, few mechanisms have been installed, as have 
been in other countries, to provide some fonn of safety net for those groups unable to afford to 
pay. 
CHAPTER THREE 
Reforms, Ideology and the Coalition Government 
This chapter deals with three important changes, the first of which is the experimental 
nature of reforms which have been implemented in New Zealand, beginning with the minor 
amendments of the 1980s and later to the fundamental adjustments which marked the 1990s. It 
is imperative that the circumstances surrounding the reforms to New Zealand's health care 
system is given the attention it deserves as it is a, result of them that the private sector is 
becoming an increasingly important part of health care financing today. The second change to 
occur is the adoption of neo-liberal ideology in policy making and the manifestation of this in 
health care policy. The third change, is the formation of a Coalition Government between 
National and New Zealand First, and the development of their combined health proposal. The 
chapter seeks the answers to a number of questions as to each of these three changes. First, in 
what way were the reforms experimental? Second, what role does neo-liberalism play in the 
creation of health care policy? Third, what has been the justification for the reforms in health 
care? Fourth, what are the coalition government's plans for the private sector and its role in 
health care? 
Experimenting with New Zealand's Social Policy 
The Fourth Labour Government paved the way for social policy changes under 
National. Although Labour made no dramatic social policy reforms of its own, National's 
welfare state cutbacks, privatisation and user-pay reforms followed the pattern introduced 
under the Labour Government's initiatives, even if going far beyond them. 1 Piecemeal erosion 
of the welfare state under Labour meant that 'by October 1990 the structures were in place 
whereby a change in government, or of political strategy, could see the system virtually 
decimated overnight'2 The social security changes introduced by Labour created a political and 
ideological climate in which the December 1990 cuts and the 1991 Budget changes were 
possible. '3 
1C.James, New Territory, Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1992,p.139. 
2 J.Kelsey, Rolling Back the State, Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1993,p.137. 
3 M.O'Brien, & C.Wilkes 1993, The Tragedy of the Market: A Social Experiment in New Zealand, 
The Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, pl 71. In its six years in office from 1984, New Zealand's 
fourth Labour government made limited progress in its attempts at reducing the burden of these 
ongoing commitments. In 1984 it imposed a tax surcharge on the income of better-off 
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At around the turn of the century, Pember Reeves, New Zealand's first Minister of 
Labour, described the Australasian states of this time as a 'social Laboratory' in which the 
parties of labour fashioned radical experiments for the greater edification of the world . .i Such 
experiments involved using the instruments of state control to achieve economic and social 
objectives and included many of the central policy institutions that have made these countries 
distinctive among the nations of advanced capitalism. Almost a century later, in the 1980s and 
1990s the governments run by both Labour and National set out to transform the society and 
political economy once again. Now, however, in response to changes in the organisation of the 
international economy the theoretical focus was reversed with the rhetoric of policy innovation 
being directed to deregulation and rolling back the state.s 
It is this contemporary process of political and policy change that has been called 'The 
Great Experiment'. Clearly the 1980s were a period in which economic crisis constrained the 
ambitions of reforming governments of left and centre in all OECD countries. The two typical 
responses were an initial defiant stand against economic reality followed by a constrained 
acquiescence (France and Greece), or an attempt to limit the damage caused by economic 
status (most other nations) with moves toward deregulation when all else appeared to be failing 
(Denmark, Sweden). Arguably the Socialist government in Spain was among the more active in 
introducing nee-liberal economic policies, but this must be seen in the context of its need to 
sweep away the remnants of reactionary economic regulation and simultaneously preside over 
the expansion of the welfare state along familiar continental European lines.6 Australia and 
even more New Zealand were the only OECD nations in which Social Democratic/Labour 
governments sought to actively transform society and economy toward a 'more market' model 
on a scale comparable with the ambitions of the right. 
superannuitants to recoup some of its payments, though it did legislate to raise the qualii)ing age 
starting early next century. The Labour government also attempted to ease its heavy debt senicing 
obligations by refinancing some existing expensive debts at lower cost and, more dramatically, by 
selling off a wide range of government perations ('privatisation') and using the proceeds to retire 
public debt. Yet these efforts were only partially effective because health, education and social welfare 
spending rates continued to increase. Furthermore, the budget remained in deficit, forcing the 
government to take out further loans to bridge the difference between its taxation and trading 
revenues and its faster-growing expenditures. H.Gold, New Zealand Politics in Perspective, Ed3, 
'The Setting', Longman Paul Limited, 1992. 
4 Pember Reeves 1902 as cited in 'Introduction: Setting the Scene for Economic and Political Change 
The Editors,' Castles,F.G, Gerritsen:R, Vowles.J, Auckland University Press ,The Great Experiment, 
Labour Parties and Public Policy Transfonnation in Australia and New Zealand, 1996 p.1. 
5 P.Kelly, The End of Certainty: The Story of the 1980s, Allen and Unwin, Sydney and James,C. 
1992, New Territory, Bridget Williams Books, Wellington. 
6 G.F,Castles, 1995, 'Welfare State Development in Southern Europe', West European Politics, 
vol.18, no2,P.291. 
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When National came to power in 1990 it was determined to ease the countries heavy 
debt servicing obligation_s and improve the country's balance of payments position. National 
announced wide-ranging cuts in welfare spending, lowering nearly all benefit levels virtually 
overnight and tightening eligibility requirements, as well as introducing higher health charges 
and reduced spending on housing and defence. In its 1991 Budget, National further raised 
health charges for middle and high income earners and also moved to contain expenditures on 
national superannuation by freeing current rates for two years and by gradually raising the age 
of eligibility. By curbing the growth of public expenditures in these areas the National 
government aimed to reduce future deficits, government borrowings and debt obligations, so as 
to avoid raising tax rates. All of this has been done. 
However, opponents voiced their concerns about the experimental nature of the 
reforms and how a lack of experience internationally made changes in New Zealand all the 
more cautionary. 
Several countries including New Zealand and Sweden are moving towards 
competitive contracting and managed markets before the full effects of the 
contract model have been evaluated ... they are the more remarkable in view of 
the lack of unanimity among academic observers about either the beneficial 
effects of such competition as has occurred, or the potential benefits of a still 
more competitive market. 7 
Overseas advice and reco~endations purported that reforms should be expanded from 
commercial areas through to social policy. As Jean-Claude Paye, former OECD secretary 
general said 
'you have to move on a broad front. You can't select one or two domains for 
reform. Reform should not be limited to economic matters, but should include 
social areas, like the labour market, health and education. ' 8 
So the experiment was comprehensive in that the market was introduced into both economic 
and social policy arenas on the advice of international economic advisers despite the fact that it 
was untried and untested. 
Why Reform the Health System? 
The governments fundamental justifications for the health care reforms included 
improvements in management, more effective and efficient use of resources, clearer lines of 
7 OECD,1994,p34 
8 J.Kerr, 'Achieving a positive economic direction in Business Roundtable, 'From Recession to 
Recovery, September 1992. 
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accountability, cost-containment, and greater choice of services to consumers.9 The 
government's motives are said to be a result of severe fiscal constraint, the strong 
devolutionary tendency of the state in the latter part; of the 1980s, and the struggle to establish 
biculturalism. Although National came into office promising to maintain and improve the area 
health board system put into place by Labour, it swiftly set about enacting a different agenda. 
At his first meeting with Ministry of Health officials the new Health Minister Simon Upton, 
made it clear that he was going to be guided not by the Ministry's briefing papers but by 
Treasury's. The result was the Health and Disability Services Act 1993 which abolished 
elected area health boards and replaced them with the system of Crown Health Enterprises 
(CHE) and private health care providers competing for funding disbursed by Regional Health 
Authorities. This model, however, has failed to evolve into what the government intended. 
The National government claimed in the Green and White Paper that there had been a 
cost explosion in health care. 
Between 1980 and 1991, the Department of Health's budget increased from 
$1.1 billion to $3.8 billion, an increase of some 27 percent more than the 
increase in consumer prices over that period. 10 
There are, however, deceptive elements to these figures. First, the increase was from 1. 121 
billion (nett) in the March 1980 year to $3.807 billion in the June 1991. These two dollar 
amounts are not quite comparable because in the latter period the Health Department had to 
pay new levies, including superannuation contribution, fringe benefit tax, rent on premises and 
OST. Nevertheless, taking ~e figures at face value and deflating them by the consumer price 
index (which increased by 215 percent over the same period) gives a movement of 7.7 percent, 
so it is unclear where the 27 percent came from. Secondly, the population grew by 8.4 percent 
over the same period.11 Therefore, using the Green and White Paper's measure, government 
spending on health per head, adjusted by the consumer price index, actually fell by 0.7 percent 
over the last decade. This means that for more than a decade governments have been reducing 
their involvement in health funding. This reduction has been backed up by Neutze and White 
who state that the Ministry of Health .figures quoted by the Director of Health.12 were 
misleading and that from 1989 to 1997 there has been an effective reduction of $106.6 million 
in health care funding.13 
9 OECD,1994, p.240. 
lO S.Upton, Your Health and the Public health, Green and White Paper, Minister of Health, 1991, 
if,7-8. , 
1 J.M.Neutze and H.D. White, Cardiology Department, Green Lane Hospital, Auckland, 'Comparing 
Health Expenditures', New Zealand Medical journal, 11 October 1996, p.388. 
12 Dr Karen O Poutasi is the current (1998) Director-General of Health in New Zealand. 
13 Neutze & White, New Zealand Medical journal, 1996, p.388. Neutze and White provided 
evidence to prove that a letter written by Poutasi on health funding (K.0 Poutasi, Comparing health 
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The gap left by the withdrawal of government funding has been filled by the private 
sector, with the cost of health care shifting rapidly from public to private. Between 1980 and 
1991 private health insurance increased from 1.1 percent of total health expenditure to 3.5 
percent. By 1996, this figure had almost doubled to 6 .1 percent. Converted into dollar terms 
$15.8 million was spent on private health insurance in 1980, and in 1994 this figure was 
$389.6 million.I" The amount financed out-of-pocket by individuals increased from 10.4 
percent to 14.5 percent in this same period and in 1996 to 16.8 percent. The introduction of 
health reforms will only serve to further these trends.15 Quite contrary to the Green and White 
Paper, New Zealand has been unquestionably successful in containing costs to the detriment of 
provided publicly health care. The alleged blow-out in health care expenditure is seen as more 
of a myth than a truism.16 One of the great strengths of New Zealand's health system is that 
there is a single dominant funder, the state. It has been able to hold expenditure by using its 
monopoly position as a bargaining strength in paying for or purchasing health services. This 
system has also been responsible for providing a high degree of equity to the envy of many 
other countries for over half a century17, so why the move away from this successful model? 
The belief by the National party was that the policy of structural change should be in 
itself sufficient to drive a change in economic performance. National believed that the 
individual elements of an economic liberalisation programme would add up to a systematic 
improvement in performance of the economy. The framework in place represented a relatively 
unsophisticated comparative static view and envisaged the economy moving from one low 
performance growth path onto another high performance path. The framework, however, 
appears to had taken relatively little regard to transitional issues, like the loss of output during 
the transition, the flexibility of adjustment mechanisms, the timing and sequencing of 
measures, and the hystersis effects. lt also paid little attention to distributional issues, such as 
the costs of adjustment, the relative winners and losers in the transitional process and whether 
the losers should be compensated.18 Reform implementation was rapid. Given the urgency of 
e;,,.--penditure,[letter] NZ Med J 1996;109:325-6) contained 'serious distortions'. Neutze and White 
contend that "Poutasi's presentation is similar to the repeated publications by government. Both 
distort the true situation and confuse the public. We would hope that the Director-General of Health 
sees her role not as supporting a given political stance, but as trying to achieve the best possible 
health system in New Zealand. As such she has an absolute obligation to present expenditure trends 
in an honest and transparent fashion which will be understood by all the public. 
14 'Health Insurance Spending trebels', The Dominion, 9 Jan 1997 
15 R.Bowie, Uncovering the health ~xpenditure myth, Health Reforms - A Second Opinion,Health 
economist 1992. 
16Bowie, Uncovering the health expenditure myth, Health Reforms,1992. 
17Bowie, Uncovering the health expenditure myth, Health Refonns, 1992. 
18Bollard. A,The Political Economy of Liberalisation In New Zealand, Working Paper 93/2 - New 
Zealand Insititute of Economic Reserach 1993. p.29. 
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the situation, there was a certain impatience with such issues. Treasury and other advisors 
appear to have recommended to government that with an elected tenn of only three years, they 
should make maximum use of any political honeymoon and cram in as much reform as 
legislatively possible. On the basis of the New Zealand government's post war inability to 
maintain a consistent long tenn policy stance, the Treasury clearly doubted the chance of 
sustaining a gradual programme for any length of time necessary to deal with the above issues. 
In addition Treasury felt a speedy programme was necessary to maintain credibility in the 
reform, because there were pressing problems such as mounting debt.19 
The government accepted this advice. Along with Treasury it anticipated some 
significant transitional disruption to the economy, though probably not so severe or long-term 
as actually occurred. As a consequence the government launched onto a fast track reform 
programme. The speed was constrained by the ability of departments to analyse policy 
alternatives, of the Crown Law Office to write law and of Parliament to enact it. It was not 
constrained by any self imposed requirement to consult with industry or other groups. The 
refonn programme remained in place during 1984 - 87 tenn despite poor economic indicators 
and rising unemployment. Paradoxically, however, the speed of the reforms meant the full 
costs did not become apparent before the election. Labour was re-elected in 1987 promising to 
finish the reforms. But after the dismissal of Roger Douglas the programme continued at a 
slower pace and more controversial decisions such as major privatisations were made 
tentatively. The Labour government made little attempt to extend its re~orms into the growing 
area of social services. In 1990, under a newly elected National government, the reforms were 
continued under Ruth Richardson as Minister of Finance, then Bill Birch. The Coalition 
agreement derived from the 1996 election saw Winston Peters continuing the philosophies of 
his predecessors. The National government programme concentrated efforts on refonning 
social services and reducing the macro economic deficit. This programme has proved 
increasingly unpopular with the electorate which seems to be suffering from refonn fatigue.20 
In 1990 a referendum on the electoral system delivered a blow to both National and 
Labour with a resounding vote to change the voting system to MMP. This might also be seen 
as representing a vote of no confidence in the radical economic change. National's attempts at 
completing the reform process continue but have run into growing opposition from the media 
and public. In addition, there have been fracturing of party loyalties and the formation of the 
Alliance party which seeks to turn around the reform process. While there is less appetite for 
continued reform, many of the reforms in place are not easily reversed.21 International trends 
and the entrenchment of the current system, not to mention the lack of finance available to 
19Bolard, The Political Economy of Liberalisation In New Zealand, 1993, p.30. 
20 L.Bayliss, Prosperity Mislaid: Economic failure in New Zealand and what should be done about it, 
GP Publications 1994, Wellington, p.35. 
21 Bayliss, Prosperity Mislaid: Economic failure in New Zealand and what should be done about it, 
1994, p.35. 
Reforms, Ideology and the Coalition Government 55 
instigate any major overhaul means that it is more convenient to grapple with the current 
system than return to and remodel the old one. 
The Business Roundtable in New Zealand believed that many areas of policy were 
neglected because they were difficult or politically sensitive. 
Government is still facing immense difficulties, for example, in modernising 
bureaucratic and unresponsive education and health systems. The Gibbs and 
Carr taskforces concluded that hundreds of millions of dollars of extra value 
could be derived from resources used in the health sector, yet the government 
reforms in this area remain fiercely contested 22 
The health reforms have provided an environment where a few entrepreneurial health 
professionals have established businesses to provide health services. But it is dishonest to 
pretend they have provided a workable model for the provision of the vast bulk of health 
services. There is scant evidence of the health reforms improving the overall health status of 
the majority of New Zealanders. Indeed, diseases often associated with poverty, eg meningitis 
and tuberculosis, are increasing. Nelson-Marlborough Health Services no longer provides 
public hospital wards for the long-term care of the elderly and public health nursing services 
are facing cuts. For a few, namely the wealthy, the health reforms have made a positive 
difference. For the vast majority of New Zealanders, particularly the more vulnerable members 
of our society - the elderly, the unemployed and low paid - they have meant more expensive 
and less accessible health services.23 
In considering the reforms in a number of government provided areas, it 
would appear that the CHEs were created as SOEs so that they could 
ultimately be sold off, like the Railways or Telecom. The health reforms had 
aims which were consistent with National's approach in other spheres, 
whether it was education or utilities such as power. National could be seen to 
be driven by its ideology, which was wedded to the fundamentals of the 
market.24 
The health reforms created a market in health.with competition between providers. It could 
easily appear that this had no greater purpose than promoting the belief that competition is a 
pure good in its own right and that '1he market" should be the prime means of distribution of 
goods and services for health care. Some could and did contend that improved health status for 
New Zealanders hardly came•into it.25 
Allied to this, it would seem that National wanted to disentangle itself from the state 
provision of public services, whether it was housing, prison or health. It could easily appear 
22 RKerr, 'Rattle of Teacups', From recession to recovery- the Business Round Table, Wellington, 
September 1992,p.71. 
23 Health Reforms, The Nelson Mail, 1 August 1997. 
24 S. Coney, 'Despite the talk, little changes in health system•, Sunday Star Times, 12 Jan 1997. 
25 Coney, 'Despite the talk, little changes in health system', 1997. 
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that publicly provided health care was destined to become a welfare service, a safety net 
reserved for those in the lower socio-economic group. Hence user pays was implemented at 
the public hospitals and, consequently, public health services suffered forcing people to buy 
health insurance if they could afford it. The key mechanism for creating the health market was 
the RHAs. They held the purse strings and public and private providers competed to sell them 
services.26 
Under the National Government public spending on health has fallen in real tenns.27 A 
Ministry of Health report marked down many aspects of the health reforms, accusing the 
Government of making poor political decisions and throwing money at problems in an ad hoe 
fashion. Although health funding 'improved' under the Minister of Health, Mrs Shipley, the 
report stated that "funding is less generous now [1996] than it was in 1988-89". In real terms, 
public expenditure was 10 per cent lower. 
Most growth in health spending had been in the private sector. Between 1980 and 
1995, public expenditure grew by 0.4 percent a year in real terms, while private spending grew 
at an annual clip of 5.8 per cent.28 It appears that even after four years of reforms many New 
Zealanders are concerned with the state of the health system.29 National has tried to soothe 
public concern by producing more money. Since 1993, it has found hundreds of millions of 
extra dollars for health services. It continues to insist its health reforms are on the right track 
and that all it needs is more time to deliver the benefits. Its opponents insist that the 
competitive nature of the health reforms is the main problem coupled with serious under-
funding.30 
National's refonns created four regional health authorities as purchasers of services in 
a preparatory step towards producing more competition. It is widely felt this has not been a 
success. The RHAs are seen as remote, unresponsive and overly bureaucratic. In the past two 
years, the running costs of RHAs have swollen by 40 percent, while Health Ministry expenses 
have also grown by 11 percent in the past year. After cutting the Ministry's staffing by 20 
percent in 1989 when he was Director General, Dr Salmond has been galled to watch the 
RHAs swell in size. 
'Each RHA has about 100 people, they're bursting at the seams. If you put 
those 400 people in one place, the system would be a lot more cohesive and 
have a lot more horsepower. We are running four separate health systems. 
26 Coney, 'Despite the talk, little changes in health system', 1997. 
27 B. Orsman, Ministry attacks health decision, by Bernard Orsman, New Zealand Herald, 12 April 
1997. 
28 Orsman, Ministry attacks health decision, 1997. 
29 K. Scherer, Voters most tender on fate of change-weary hospitals, The Evening Post, 3 Sept. 1996. 
30 Scherer, Voters most tender on fate of change-weary hospitals, 1996. 
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Everyone develops their own version of the wheel, which is extremely 
inefficient· _31 
Dr Salmond says the belief that competitive markets can deliver health has led to the 
dismantling of the structural framework that held the system together. 
"The analogy is the Olympic Games. You can have a whole bunch of skilled 
people who can row but someone has to make sure that rowers get to the 
venue and someone has to make sure the boats get there and there have to be 
some rules for competing. We've lost all that structure. We're not talking 
about top-down central government but social leadership and framing up. 
There has to be a process for how people talk to each other so they don't just 
mill about.32 
There are recognised advantages in returning to a tighter national framework with greater 
national direction. Dr Salmond claims it would "give a clearer focus to our major national 
activities that have got fragmented, such as definitions for services, quality measures, 
information systems, workforce activities and research and development."33 One of the 
casualties of the health reforms was the elected area health boards. They were replaced by the 
RHAs and CHEs whose board members are government appointees, primarily from business 
backgrounds. This was a deliberate tactic to reduce the lobbying power of communities and to 
prevent "capture" by provider groups. As a result, says Dr Salmond, " we've had a health 
system run by politicians and managerialeties. It's got to be democratised."34 Toni Ashton, a 
health economist at Auckland School of Medicine agrees stating "if you don't talk to providers, 
you flounder around in the dark. The idea was to depoliticise the system but the Government 
hasn't been able to keep its hands off. It's kept on intervening."35 
The United States has found that polarisation means that the 'haves' are quite content 
because they're becoming better off at the expense of the poor. The poor, on the other hand, 
have become increasingly disenfranchised without their own political voice. Therefore, as 
Kawachi states, 
we might arrive at an overall impression that the country is doing quite well, 
when in fact, a sizeable percentage of the population has become an 
underclass, has ceased to actively participate in our society, and because of 
the situation these people find themselves in, few are complaining.36 
31 Scherer, Voters most tender on fate of change-weary hospitals, 1996. 
32 Scherer, Voters most tender on fate of change-weary hospitals, 1996. 
33 Scherer, Voters most tender on fate of change-weary hospitals, 1996. 
34 Scherer, Voters most tender on fate of change-weary hospitals, 1996. 
35 S. Coney, 'Parliamentary Elections', Sunday Star Times,15 Sept. 19% 
36 I.Kawachi, an assistant professor in the shcool of public health at Harvard Medical School, 
Boston, in J. Saunders, The nation with a heart of stone, 8 Feb 1997. 
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Many of the policies introduced in New Zealand in the 80s were justified by the trickle-down 
theory, the idea that the rising tide would lift all boats together. On the contrary, Kawachi's 
research suggests the rising tide will in fact drown up to 20 percent at the bottom as a result of 
the distribution problem. Dr Salmond commented: 
The illusion created to justify the reforms_ was that we were profligate with 
health money. That was not so, we hovered around spending 7 percent of 
GDP. By Western standards, that is pretty modest. A country like ours might 
choose to go to 8 to 10 percent like Australia or Canada and there's no reason 
why we shouldn't.37 
While the Government defends its line of change with the arguments presented above, the 
accompanying statistics tell a different story. There is a general agreement that not enough 
money is spent on health. Although the government is prone to produce figures showing it is 
pumping more money into health, the most reliable indicators tell a different story. Annual 
public health spending on each person in 1995 dollars is slightly less now - around $1400 -
than it was in 1989, before the start of the refonns. Public health spending at 5.8 percent of the 
GDP is lower than in 1988 and is in the bottom quarter of OECD countries. These figures are 
sobering yet the government is convinced that the theory behind the reforms if solid. The next 
section looks at the theoretical foundation of the reforms - neo-liberalism which has played a 
fundamental role in the new right ideology of the current government. 
The National Party's Ideology 
The dominant analysis of the modern state that derived from post-war pluralist 
thinking assumed a balance between the political and the economic within a self-contained 
nation state. The context in which this analysis emerged, the post-war or Keynesian 
accommodation, began to collapse on an international scale in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Nee-liberalism emerged to fill the policy vacuum left by this collapse. It was not a sudden 
transfonnation, rather ail alternative which, while usually dismissed, drew on a long 
intellectual heritage and was given an organisational focus after the Second World War. Its 
strength in the 1970s lay in three factors. First, proponents of the theory bad argued for many 
years that just such a collapse of state-run collectivism would occur. Secondly, neo-liberalism 
offered a complete alternative package for government based on a reduced state function, free 
markets, deregulation and privatisation, and an ideological commitment to the individual rather 
than to society.38 Third, this package served the interests of some very powerful groups. 
37 Dr George Salmond former Director-General of health, now director of the Health Services 
Reserarch Centre at Victoria University in S. Coney, Polls suggest health is the one issue that could 
swing this election, Sunday Star Times, 15 Sep 1996. 
38 N.Haworth, Neo-liberalism, economic internationalisation and the contemporary state in New 
Zealand, in A.Sharp, Leap into the dark; 'The changing role of the state in New Zealand since 
1984',p.27. 
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Neo-liberalism makes up one of the main strands of New Right ideology.39 This 
ideology, which is based on a belief in self-reliance, individual responsibility and the market, is 
essentially hostile to a Welfare State built on a 'social equity model'. The latter is premised on 
the idea that health care is allocated according to need rather than demand and that scarce 
resources are rationed by providers according to unspecified criteria.40 It also places great 
emphasis on the value of equality and its achievement through centralisation and the public 
ownership of the means of production. Providers in this context are paid directly by the state, 
usually through salaries.41 Neo~liberalism, by comparison, places its faith in the 'market 
economy model' and consumer choice as a means of allocating care. Emphasis is placed on 
freedom of action. and personal responsibility. State involvement is rejected because it is 
perceived to constrain freedom and create dependency. Thus, it is believed that if people are 
offered state benefits, such as health care, it weakens their desire to look after themselves and 
erodes their moral well being and voluntary expression of social concern. On this view, charity 
rather than the state is seen as the proper vehicle to meet social problems.42 
The mechanisms through which such freedom and personal responsibility are pursued 
and achieved are private ownership and rewards. Health care is seen as part of the reward 
system and, as a result, access to health care is determined largely by the ability to pay. 
Likewise, providers of care are directly rewarded according to market forces mainly through 
fee for service payments.43 Hence, on this approach, the consumer is sovereign and health care 
is based on demand expressed through the market, whereas in the 'social equity model' health 
care is based on need, with resources being distributed centrally on grounds of equity. Those 
who argue that health care is best funded through the market see the market model having a 
number of advantages which reflect the assumption that health care is an ordinary commodity. 
First, it is claimed to be more responsive to consumer preferences, contributing to innovation 
and equal treatment. Second, rationing by price is said to be a fairer system of meeting need 
than rationing in other ways. Third, it arguably more flexible and brings about a large 
expansion of hospital-based services. Finally, the claim is that it removes bureaucratic 
inefficiency, involving greater consumer and provider responsibility.« 
The "Sustainable Funding Package" report showed National had a poor record in 
matching service, access and quality levels with funding. The blame for this was placed 
squarely on politicians and a lack of clarity in policy, not the structure of the health system. 
39 T. Flynn,'The New Right and social policy', Policy and Politics, , 1989, Pp.97-109. 
40 R Klein, Private practice and public policy: regulating the frontiers. In McLachlan, G and 
Maynar~A. (eds) 'The Public/Private ABxfor Health', NPHT, London,1982, Pp.95-128, 
41 Klein, Private practice and public policy: regulating the frontiers, as cited in McLachlan & 
Maynard, The Public/Private Mix/or Health, 1982,Pp.95~128. 
42D.G.'Green, Working Class Patients and the Medical Establishment, Gower, Aldershot,1985. 
43 Klein,'Private practice and public policy: regulating the frontiers', 1982,p.40 
44 M. Calnan, S. Cant and J. Gabe, Going Private: Why people pay for their health care, Open 
University Press, Great Britain, 1993. 
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The report said that over the past three years the health and disability sector had suffered from 
frequent funding crises which had been dealt with by way of ad hoe cash injections.45 The 
overall concern was to develop a coherent system for funding, purchasing, and delivering 
health care. Refonns have inevitably impinged upon the assumptions of the welfare state. 
Although the welfare state provided all New Zealanders with equitable access to health care of 
high quality, equity of access is not the same as equitable health opportunity or outcome. In the 
1980s such inequities began to be acknowledged. Sometimes differentials in health and social 
indicators were interpreted in ethrtic as well as socioencomic tenns. Mounting evidence showed 
that, although the health experience of the Maori population (which accounts for 12.5 per cent 
of the New Zealand population) paralleled that of the non-Maori population, significant and 
avoidable inequities remained, such as economic hardship and remoteness from the areas with 
medical facilities.46 These insights coincided with renewed recognition of the Treaty of 
Waitangi (1940) between Maori and the British Crown as the nation's founding "charter" and 
as the enduring basis for equal partnership and cultural development.47 
If National continues to follow that market direction, the private health sector will 
progressively grow. Mechanisms for accelerating privatisation are being put in place in the 
form of GP budget holding and managed care organisations. In a future with National in 
charge, we could see a variation of the "alternative health care plans"48 and an introduction of 
the voucher system outlined by Simon Upton in his Green and White Paper but put on hold in 
1992. The public would enrol with an insurance-based or other style of managed care plan, 
responsible for providing their health care. 
I can't see National moving away from their basic approach that health is a 
commodity that people should pay for if they can. They want to move people 
off the public health system 49 
The Nurses' Organisation even accuses the Government of running down hospitals to put 
people off public services. 'They want people to take out private insurance' .50 Doctors would 
like to see the changes working but there's a feeling that they haven't achieved the promises of 
a brave new health system. Nurses would welcome a return to the former system. 
45 OECD,1994,p.234. 
46 E.W. Pomare and G.M. De Boer, Towards Responsiveness-Objective Setting and Evaluation/Me 
Penapena - Nga Whainga atu mo nga hua a kitea ana.(1989). 
47 , 
OECD, 1994,p.228. 
48 See appendix B for detail of the Green and White Paper 
49 As quoted by Dr Salmond, fonner Director-General of Health as cited in Coney, Sunday Star 
Times,1996. 
50 Brenda Wilson, national director of the Nurses Organisation,cited in Sunday Star Times, 15 Sept, 
1996. 
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They are demoralised and have complained about unsafe staffing levels 
without getting anywhere. Serious nursing practice incidents have increased 
by 2460 percent in five years from 1990.51 
However, to change tack every three or five years is not satisfactory either. The Fonner 
Director-General of Health52 supports a return to a system similar to the old area health boards 
but says the transition would need to be carefully managed. 
"We don't want a convulsive leap back. When the RHAs were set up, there 
was an enormous exodus of trained managers, who understood the health 
environment, to Australia and other countries. We'd have a managerial 
vacuum in terms of running a public health system so we'd need to invest in 
training and support."s3 
This view is supported by key health policy advisers. 
''You can't alter things in health quickly. It's like an ocean liner. You start 
turning the wheel and the ship will eventually turn around some kilometres 
down the route. The damage of the last few years shouldn't be 
underestimated. A lot of people are gone, the institutional memory is gone, 
relationships are gone and faith in the system is gone. We'll have to involve 
the public and health professionals in a genuine consultation about how we 
get to where we want to be. "54 
Coalition Governments Direction 
With the arrival of New Zealand First, one of the more pressing questions was the 
influence the junior partner would have on National1s reform policy. Those who hoped for a 
minor revolution were to be bitterly disappointed. No sooner had Treasurer Winston Peters 
delivered his first Budget than Opposition parties launched a furious attack, claiming its 
promises of future spending ignored economic reality and failed to address critical social needs. 
The Treasurer had announced $903 million in additional spending for the financial year 
beginning in July 1997, with health taking about a third of that and education a close second. 
But Labour and the Alliance accused him of lacking vision and continuing 'obscene' National 
Party policies. Peters delivered a Budget with a careful balance of tight fiscal management 
measured against the promise made in the coalition agreement. The Treasurer said the Budget 
incorporated 'a dramatic percentage of delivery on promise. No government can be expected to 
deliver on every single one in its first Budget. But Labour health spokeswoman Lianne Dalziel 
51 Wilson, Sunday Star Times, 1996. 
52 Dr George Salmond, now director of the Health Services Research Centre at Victoria University, 
cited in Coney, p.34. 
53 Salmond, as cited in Coney, Sunday Star Times, 1996. 
54 Lyndon Keene of the Coalition for Public health. 
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said it was 'window dressing' which, as well as disappointing the elderly, would also plunge 
nurses and doctors in public hospitals into even deeper despair.ss 
'The current government is decreasing the states role in financing health care 
and encouraging the private insurance sector to provide, so that ultimately the 
elderly's consumption of health care resources can be transferred to them as 
there numbers grow, relieving the government of the so called 'burden of the 
elderly' in the new millennium. '56 
A National party conference confinned that small hospitals are going to keep disappearing, 
but the possibility that very large hospitals will get smaller is more disturbing.s1 This offers 
private companies the opportunity to expand its services into the high-volume, low cost, high 
profit procedures which the public system have withdrawn from58 
What does the union of two right wing parties into a coalition government do for the 
health care of elderly in New Zealand? The 1997 Coalition Government budget declared that 
'the Coalition Government is one that is dedicated to better health, and is making solid 
progress in reshaping the health sector,'s9 A fundamental change was to move from four 
regional health authorities to one central funding agency to be known as the transitional health 
authority, and to shift hospitals away from a focus on profit towards one of 'service in a 
business-like fashion. ' 60 The Coalition Government has provided additional funding for health, 
by allocating an extra $300 million in 1997/98 and in each of the following two years. The 
extra resources are to be directed at 
• elective surgery to reduce waiting lists, 
• free doctor visits and pharmaceuticals for all children under six, 
• better mental health services, 
• improving services generally 
• managing additional health needs.61 
In addition to this $900 million, the government wants to provide a clear indication of future 
funding levels to enable health managers to plan. For this purpose, a further $180 million per 
year in the 1998 budget is allocated, increasing to $450 million in the 1999 Budget. The 
intention of this is to allow health managers to plan ahead on the basis of realistic expectations 
of future funding levels. From 1 October 1998, the Government will also remove income and 
55 F.Ross, $300m for health but asset-testing end delayed, The Dominion, 27 June 1997. 
56 Ross, The Dominion, 1997. 
57 D. O'Connor, 'Fatally flawed' principles; CHE statement alarming reading, The Nelson l-vfail, 23 
August 1997. 
58 J. Anderton, Health already private, Tmth, 18 April 1997. 
59Toe 1997 New Zealand Budget, p.148. 
60Toe 1997 New Zealand Budget, p.148. 
61Toe 1997 New Zealand Budget, p.148. 
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asset testing for long-stay public hospital care and asset testing for long-stay private hospital 
care for the elderly.62 
At present, the following asset levels apply. Anything under these amounts will be 
subsidised by the government 
• $6500 for single or widowed people or 
• $13,000 in joint assets if you are a couple and both in long term residential care or 
• $40,000 in joint assets if you are a couple and only 1 partner is in care 
• You must contribute any income you get towards your care - up to $636 a week (this is the 
maximum contribution required per person, regardless of your income). 
The assets taken into account include the following: 
• Cash or savings 
• investments, shares or stocks 
• loans made to other people 
• your house, chattels and care if you live alone 
• gifts over the limit below made in the last 5 years 
Assets that are not counted include the house, chattels or car if a partner or dependent child 
still lives at home, personal belongings such as clothing and jewellery, pre-paid funeral 
expenses up to $10,000. Income is considered money, irrespective of the source (New Zealand 
superannuation, veterans pension or income support, private pensions or pensions from an 
overseas government, contributions from relatives, ACC payments, earnings from investments 
or business are all included). The home is counted as an asset if the person is single, widowed, 
or both partners are in long term residential care. The home is not counted as an asset if there 
is a couple and only 1 partner is in care. If the home counts as an asset then eligibility for a 
subsidy is unlikely. However, an interest free loan may be sought.from income support which 
then must be repaid if the person dies or sells the home. 
As can be seen from the criteria, this nets a huge number of the elderly. These are 
people who have worked and paid taxes, accumulated assets for their enjoyment and necessity 
in later life, with the belief that their children will inherit what they have built up. For many 
elderly, to have it all striped away by the state when they become sick and in need care is an 
insulting way to be treated. The promise to abolish asset and income testing for long-term 
hospital care was welcomed, however, it is questionable whether the changes will reduce the 
hardship experienced by the elderly. Proposed changes promising the abandonment of asset 
and income testing for the elderly are not breaking down the economic drive of the health care 
reforms, but merely reversing an extremely unpopular policy. Furthermore, the actual effects 
of the legislation will be minimal. The Budget suggested income and asset testing for the 
elderly was to go from October next year. But the fine print spelt out that income and asset 
62Toe 1997 New Zealand Budget, p.148. 
Reforms, Ideology and the Coalition Government 64 
testing would be abolished only for people in long-tenn public hospital care. Furthermore, 
considering that the government is dramatically reducing public beds and hospitals•"J making 
room for the private sector which is building hospitals to take over the government's role, this 
change in legislation will iµlprove the situation for the few elderly who rely on the public 
system. Asset testing for people in long-tenn private hospital care was also abolished, 
however, they will still be income tested. All New Zealand's elderly will continue to be asset 
and income tested if they need resthome care. Only around 550 elderly are in long-term public 
hospital care while there are 5400 people in long-term private hospital care. Likew-ise only a 
handful of people are in public resthome care while the 21,000 residents in long-term private 
resthome care will continue to face both income and asset testing.64 The Grey Power 
Federation has only belatedly realised that the good news in the Budget was far from what it 
was promoted to be. 'What that effectively means is that both income and asset testing for 
most elderly people is still furnly in place,' said Grey Power executive officer Marie Bayer. 
She said most people who needed care first went to a resthome, which provided a lower level of 
care than a hospital. Pert Bates said that at the moment about half of the people moving into 
residential care did not qualify for a subsidy and paid the full fees themselves, with the other 
half qualifying for a subsidy.6' Based on this a couple would need around $1000-$1100 a 
week to pay for resthome care with many would be forced to sell their home to meet the bills. 
As they got older and more frail they would need long-term hospital care, and for most that 
would be in a private hospital. 'But at that stage many elderly would not have an asset left to 
test, they would have sold it to pay for resthome care,' Bayer said 66 They might still have a 
modest income, even if it was only their super payout and the government would continue to 
demand that be directed towards meeting the cost of hospital care. 'The perception among 
many elderly has been that asset and income testing had gone for people in care. But that is not 
the reality. '61 
The removal of income and asset testing for long-stay public hospital care and the 
removal of asset testing for long-stay private hospital care does not demonstrate that the 
current government has grown a conscience. · Rather it is a way of suppressing a burning 
political issue and an attempt at maintaining an increasingly powerful grey vote for the next 
63 Between 1984 and 1990, approximately 25 public hospitals were closed, mostly in rural areas, and 
against widespread community protest as cited in Health policies scrutiny urged by campaigner', The 
Press,30 July 1996, Newsnet 10. 
64 G.Sheeran, 'Asset testing still a reality; Budget's 'good news' affects very few', Sunday Star Times, 
6 July 1997. 
65Needs matched with best of care, Waikato Times, 29 August 1997. 
66Needs matched with best of care, Waikato Times, 1997. 
67Needs matched with best of care, Waikato Times,1997. 
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elections. While removal of income and asset testing is set for the end of 1998 it is naive to 
assume that the underlying theory has been abandoned. Just what form such testing will mutate 
into is something to ponder. 
It must also be questioned whether the proposals constitutive a fundamental change 
and, therefore, an implicit rejection of Nationals' health reforms, or just a disguise to make 
them more digestible. The Health Minister, Bill English, answers this somewhat cryptically as 
he is quoted as saying he will "dismantle and soften" National's health reforms.68 It is hard to 
understand how both of these objectives can be achieved. It appears that changes are to be 
implemented in areas which have either been starved of public funding or have been tainted due 
to their lack of popularity. In critiquing the proposed changes the following observations are 
made. The major structural change proposed, of moving from four regional health authorities 
to one funding agency, shows quite clearly the lack of popularity and indeed failure of the 
original reform idea. The move to abolish the RHAs and return to a single central funding 
department to finance regional services on a population-based formula would end National's 
purchaser/provider split. A return to centralised funding is welcomed by the Nurses' 
Organisation and the Medical Association which says doctors want to work with a single 
agency as trying to deal with four different systems for no apparent good reason is a difficult 
task. The Medical Association went further to unequivocally state that they would indeed 
encourage a central funding agency taking over from the RHAs.69 
The coalition government makes the claim that it will remove the profit motive from 
health. It would seem, however, that the deception in this is shown by announcements at the 
beginning of 1997 that Hamilton Doctors are building a multi-million dollar private hospital to 
compete with the area's CHE. Other similar contracts have recently been awarded out to 
private providers in other parts of New Zealand. For them, it is business as usual. The 
coalition agreement does not appear to be stopping this flow of public money into private 
providers' hands. Private providers are not philanthropists, they run businesses and the aim of 
all business is to make a profit. It is believed that if the coalition government meant what it 
said about removing the profit motive, it would end competition and the awarding of contracts 
to the private sector. It has not said it will do so.70 There has been little reaction from doctors 
about the coalition's announcements. This is not surprising. While there are pockets of doctors 
who continue to oppose the health refonns, the trend has been for industry self-interest to 
prevail. Most New Zealand doctors are deeply compromised as advocates for the public health 
system. The tradition in New Zealand is for specialists to work in both the public and private 
sector. The majority of GPs have been entering contracts with RHAs which give them 
capitation or bulk funding for patients and allow them to keep the profits they can make if they 
68K.IWINET. Sunday Star Times, 12 Jan 1997 
69coney, 'Parliamentary Elections', 1996,p.34. 
70.KIWINET, Sunday Star Times, 1997, p.68. 
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under service them.71 The CHEs were used because they offered lower prices than the private 
providers. The CHEs are able to operate on private patients under protocols drawn up by the 
Ministry of Health last year. However, under the coalition agreement between National and 
New Zealand First, private work undertaken by public hospitals must be limited and approved 
by the coalition partners.72 
While additional funding for health in the budget is welcomed, it is hard to see past the 
fact that this is just a variation on National's crisis-inspired ad hoe cash injections. Such 
injections appear more as a necessary appeasement ploy, rather than achieving any real benefit 
to the health care system. The money is being injected into the most sensitive areas, those 
which are causing the most contention amongst citizens and Parliament, such as waiting lists, 
mental health, and child health care. It appears that proposals cover the bare minimum which 
needed addressing. Health care was a major issue of the 1996 election with political parties 
staking their reputation on fundamentally changing the system. Each party published 
manifestos as to the changes it was to make. Proposals ranged from the Alliance's 100 percent 
publicly funded health care system financed by those in the upper income bracket to National's 
status quo with a continuation of ad hoe cash injections in specific places. The Coalition 
Government's health care proposal outlined in the 1997 budget is New Zealand First initiated. 
The proposed reshaping of the health sector appears to be more of an appeasement plan to 
satisfy those who voted for the stand New Zealand First took on health care, than a substantial 
abandonment of the popular market reforms. 
It would appear, based on the changes that have been made, that self-interest on behalf 
of the junior coalition partner was the main reason for any changes at all to health care. There 
seems to be two clear reasons for this. First, there was strong public pressure for changes to 
the controversial areas, namely mental health, asset testing for the elderly, and waiting lists. 
Those areas had received the most media coverage and were seen by the public as having been 
neglected by the public system. The second reason involved Winston Peters' need to retain a 
substantial grey vote come next election. The direction which the Coalition has embarked upon 
is far from a turning point for health care. New Zealand First made election promises it knew it 
needed to keep if it was ever to have a chance in the next election. It needed to gain credibility 
by fulfilling its promises, therefore, public health care was earmarked for much needed 
funding. But in reality the substance of changes made were superficial and unconvincing to the 
critics and those elderly in need of ongoing care. 
The Coalition health policy defines its 'overriding goal' as 'ensuring principles of 
public service replace commercial profit objectives for all publicly provided health and 
disability services.' Fonner Ass0yiate Health Minister Neil Kirton is adamant that it was his 
adherence to that principle, and specifically his continued resistance to 'creeping privatisation', 
71KIWINET, Sunday Star Times, 1997, p.68. 
72N.Maling, 'Public hospitals to cater for private patients', The Evening Post, 13 Dec 1996. 
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that led to his sacking in early August 1997. 'In vital policy areas, I was combating the 
vigorous attempts of (Health Minister) Bill English and various health officials to renege on 
the coalition agreement. Their agenda to privatise remains plain.'73 
Conclusions 
The goal of this chapter was to evaluate the validity of the questions being asked in 
regard to three fundamental changes. The first issue to be addressed related to what instigated 
the reforms and whether or not the reforms have been responsible for the rapid increase in 
private health insurance (PHI). If so, the objective was to discover in what way, and whether 
or not the justifications for the reforms stand up to critiquing. It was found that the instigation 
of the reforms emanated from two factors. First, the world wide drive for privatisation which 
was influenced by international bodies, the IMF and the World Bank. This has been especially 
influential when combined with policies of ·cost containment initiated by other countries, 
namely the United Kingdom. The second reason for the reforms may be attributed to the 
government's concern for rising social expenditure and the continuing economic slump. On this 
basis, reforms would be seen as a way of allowing the private sector to take more 
responsibility for health care costs. The facilities of the reforms could be seen in the supposed 
benefits, the improvements of management, more effective and efficient use of resources, 
clearer lines of accountability, and the idea of cost-containment. 
The second issue discussed is the impact of the ideology of neo-liberalism becoming 
the corner stone for policy formulated on health care in New Zealand. Neo-liberalism appears 
to have been adopted as the New Right ideology from which all policy is to be based 
incorporating the market into the functioning of the social framework. National has used this 
ideology to disentangle itself from the state provision of public services, in particular health 
care, with publicly provided health care destined to become a welfare service; a safety net 
reserved for those in the lower socio-economic group. It is easy to see why a policy of 
redistribution of burden, from the government onto the individual, is advantageous given the 
burgeoning numbers, and consequently increasing health care cost, of the elderly in the next 
millennium. 
Third, the Coalition Government made some necessary changes to the system which 
will see a lessening of hardship and despair for the elderly. The question was posed whether 
this injection of funding is a turning point for health care, or merely an act of appeasement by 
the Coalition Government. Evidence points to the latter being the case as evidence shows that 
the changes made are basic and critical ones, promised in the election manifesto - the 
government would not have got away with anything less. The cash injections are token 
73Policy is to remove profit from public health, The Dominion, 9 August 1997. 
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appeasement to be injected into health care areas which were originally government funded 
before the reforms. This finding, although not conclusive, is also suggestive of the junior 
coalition partner's mindful view of gaining a substantial amount of support from the grey 
power vote in the 1999 election. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Validation of the micro issues: Reality for the Elderly of Private Sector 
involvement in Health Care 
This chapter will examine the impact of changes on the elderly as a result of the 
market being incorporated into health care. It is argued that the private sector, in particular 
insurance companies, while increasingly important providers of health care services have a 
number of fundamental deficiencies which are affecting the elderly now and are unlikely to 
improve in the future. The key questions that this chapter will address are what evidence is 
there of a continued policy push by the Coalition government to shift health care into the 
private sector and reduce the state's role in the provision of health care? How would such a 
shift be likely to affect the ability of the elderly to access the services? How does the shifting of 
funding sources impact on the problems of access for the elderly? Are rising premiums forcing 
many elderly to cancel or reduce the coverage of their policies? 
The results of a survey answered by 230 elderly over the age of 65 confirm much of 
what has been hypothesised. The private sector perspective was obtained in interviews with the 
managers of leading insurance companies, Southern Cross and Unimed.1 The purpose was to 
gauge the position of these companies and their opinion both as to the direction of the private 
insurance market and their increasing role as providers of health care. The feedback here 
generally expressed frustration and uncertainty about government decisions coupled with 
concern over having to increase premiums. 
'a clear, long term vision and direction for the health sector - is still lacking. 
Until this direction is set by the government and understood by health 
providers, New Zealand may not see the commitment to innovation that its 
health sector needs'2 
1 The managers of eight other insurance companies declined the opportunity to comment. 
2 G.Sheeran, 'Private health costs sure to rise', Sunday Star Times !June 1997. 
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The Continuing shift into the private sector 
What ev.idence is there that the coalition government will continue to propel health care 
into the private sector and effectively reduce the state's role in the provision of health care'? 
Continuous cutbacks in public sector spending, as shown in chapter 2, reveal Lhat the 
government's premeditated withdrawal from the health care arena is not a recent trend but has 
been a continuous long tenn withdrawal. As Health economist Dr Pim Barren commented, 
there has been a huge shift from public to private health expenditure taking place with no 
consensus about what was the proper level of public health :funding.3 
'Before the last election, there was a lot of talk about more money being put into the 
public health sector, but we have seen little evidence and I think there is some 
disappointment out there ... ' 4 
'The Coalition government is committed to travelling the path of privatisation for health care' 
stated Jim Bolger the then National party leader and Prime Minister in the middle of 1997.5 The 
~overnment's message after the 1996 election was clear - there was to be a continuation of the 
private sectors role in health care and, at the same time the so called 'nonsense' over private 
sector involvement in health was to end6 Bolger stated: 
' .. .it is time to confront the reality that better integration of the public and 
private sectors would provide better health care. We must stop the nonsense 
that seeks to portray public health care as good and private health care as 
wrong, . Only when we confront the reality of the benefits of integrated health 
care will we, the community, get the best possible care. '7 
Bolger shows here that he is committed to incorporating the two sectors. The result, he 
contends, is the provision of better health care for the community. Exactly what is meant by 
'Only when we confront the reality of the benefits of integrated health care will we, the 
community, get the best possible care' is obscure. Considering the agenda of Treasury is to 
reduce spending in all social areas, Bolger can only be referring to the trickle down effects of 
running a budget surplus and achieving a favourable economic position by slashing social 
spending and incorporating the markets. 
3 G.Sheeran, 'Private health costs sure to rise', Sunday Star Times !June 1997. 
4 Sheeran, 'Private health costs sure to rise', 1997. 
5 Prime Minister Jim Bolger stated in a speech in Manukau on the 8th of October 1997, as cited in 
The Dominion, 'Government moves to wrest back initiative on health issues', 9 Oct 1997,p.2. 
6 Prime Ministers, speech, 1997. 
7 Prime Ministers, speech, 1997. 
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A Health Ministry report 'Health Expenditure Trends in New Zealand 1980-1996' shows the 




















The increasing prop?rtion of Private Health funding 
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Figure 9 Source: Health Expenditure Trends in New Zealand, Note Private Health 
Funding Comprises private insurance and other sources. 
Figure 9 denotes the increasing proportion of private health funding while conversely showing 
the steady decline of public health funding. The Health Ministry Report confinns a 
continuation of shifting the provision of publicly funded health services from public hospitals 
to private ones.a 
·If public understanding of what the tax dollar \'\-ill provide is not enhanced 
and the cost shifting driven by the increased demand for acute services in the 
public sector continues at the current pace, then the burden of the shift for 
elective surgery falls on the currently insured market. It already has·~ 
8 J>owell 'Public Health Privatisaion trend conem'. The Dominion. 21 Mav 1997. 
9 Roger Bowie, CEO, Speaking at the Annual General meeting, as cited i; Southern Corss Annual 
Rep(,)rtl997. 
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While the National Party's agenda involves privatisation, New Zealand First stated in its pre-
election manifesto that it was opposed to privatisation of the health care sector. Yet the 
coalition agreement appears to have forced a change of heart with New Zealand First adopting 
National's position wholeheartedly. When Associate Minister of Health Neil Curta;n opposed 
the Minister of Health's determined privatisation push, he was removed from his position by 
the leader of the junior coalition partner. This was a clear demonstration of the coalition 
govenunent's intention to follow the privatisation path as laid down by National with as little 
interference as possible. The new Prime Minister Jenny Shipley appears to be as ideologically 
neo-liberal as her predecessor, if not more so. Her record in the Health and Social Welfare 
portfolios suggest that she will follow the lines of Bolger, if not even more aggressively, having 
already stated publicly that there is to be a continuation of the current coalition policy.10 
Impact of Privatisation Push 
The government has forced people onto private providers by reducing public funding 
across the board and ultimately diminishing the size of the protective public health care 
umbrella. For example, in 1985 around 12 percent of health care was funded by the individual 
and 88 percent by the government. Now, in 1997 the government picked up only 76 percent of 
the bill, with individuals paying for 24 percent (see chapter 2). 
'Part of the plot in health is to run down the public sector so people feel they 
have to go private, as the public sector gets run down there is more of a case. 
for the involvement of the private sector.' 11 
An 80-year old a war widow from Palmerston North suffering from a brain tumour was 
admitted to Palmerston North Hospital for four weeks of radium treatment. When the 
treatment was finished the family was told the women would have to leave as there were 'no 
more funds available' on the woman's file. When the family asked if the woman could be 
transferred to one of the geriatric wards, they were told these wards were not taking anyone. 
'The staff said they were sorry but she would have to go. ' 12 The patient needed nursing care as 
she is incontinent, could not walk or get out of bed by herself and has memory problems. 
Hospital staff were sympathetic with one urging a family member to 'make some noise' about 
it as she was tired of having to turn people away.13 This case is indicative of the macro health 
10 This was announced by Winston Peters on Television 3 on the 6pm News, November 4 1997. 
Further in a press conference after taking the oath of office on the 8th of December 1997 Mrs Shipley 
stated that Welfare reforms would be back on the agenda 'with a new emphasis on soical policy' 
stating further that 'The question is: are we bold and brave enough to address the social policy 
1uestions that are still before us?' The Press 9th December 1997, by Michael Rentoul 
1 K. Batchelor, 'Health for the rich only: Coney', The Daily News, 10 October 1997. 
12 R Forde, 'No bed for dying war widow', The Evening Standard, 4 Oct 1997. 
13Ibid. 
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management structure that has been adopted. In response to criticism attracted over their 
action MidCentral Health medical and surgical services manager Anne Aitcheson stated that; 
'Palmerston North Hospital was not funded [by government] to provide 
continuing care for the elderly, which was why it could no longer 
accommodate the woman after her cancer treatment had finished.' 14 
With the hospitals unable to provide continuing care, elderly needing long-term nursing must 
be placed elsewhere for their needs to be met. Aitcheson stated that fewer public hospitals were 
in a position to offer continuing care as regional health authorities had tended to award such 
contracts to private providers such as rest homes. A private hospital in Manawatu would cost 
$1100-$1200 a week to look after a patient such as the widow. Similarly a place in a private 
hospital in Taupo costs $637 a weekts 
As a result of a reduction in public spending, private health schemes have 
developed to fill the void. 'While funding for public health services is still 
below the levels of spending in the late 1980s, private has almost doubled 
since then, Nearly a quarter of total health spending is now from private 
sources.' 16 
1.3 million people now spend in excess of $400 million annually for such protectioR 
Fundamentally, when the private sector controls areas of health delivery and provision, the 
criteria for entry become economic and this creates major distributional concerns. Services 
which were once part of the public sector are being dropped as willing entrepreneurs in the 
private sector take advantage of inelastic demand for essential life preserving services. Private 
companies are reaping the benefits of perfonning high-volume, low-cost, high profit 
procedures while the cost of the same procedures in the public system rises. Far from reducing 
the cost pressure on the public system, private involvement is likely to intensify iti7 As the 
Health minister commented; 
'private insurers had not been as effective at controlling costs as the old 
public sector. Prices in the private market are significantly above prices that 
are paid in public. '1s 
In October 1997 the Health Minister announced that they would be reversing the CHEs profit 
making agenda. The Minister affirmed that the profit motive had failed in health.19 This 
14R Forde, 'No bed for dying war widow', The Evening Standard, 4 Oct 1997. 
15Forde, 'No bed for dying war widow', 1997. 
16Ian Powell, Association of Salaried Medical Specialists executive director was refferig to stats in 
the Health Expenditure Trends in New Zealand 1980-1996 in 'Public Health Privatisaion trend 
conem', The Dominion, 21 May 1997, p.8. 
17J. Anderton, 'Health already private', The Truth, 18 April 1997. 
18 J.Kirk, 'Eye surgeons investigated', The Press, 6 March 1997 
19 As stated by the minister of health in response to a question by M.Hoskings on BREAKFAST 
show, 22 October 1997. 
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illustrates to a degree the experimental and naive nature of the policy decisions made by 
government. This erosion of the public health system feeds concern over access to public 
health facilities. Public concern is now so great that a third of the population is covered by 
some form of private health insurance.20 The process of withdrawing public financing from 
health care is generating great anxiety amongst the elderly, so much so that 50 percent of those 
surveyed place this as their greatest concern ahead of waiting lists. Figure 10 shows the 
findings. 






Figure 10 Source: Health Care Survey of the Elderly 1997 
Legend: 
Those which are of the greatest concern to the elderly: 
a, (49%) the reduction in public funding in health care 
b. (37%) waiting lists 
c. (10%) rise of private involvement in health care namely private insurance markets 
d. (2 % ) other concerns 
e. (2%) nothing is of concern in the health care system. 
· The elderly are perceptive of changes occurring in the health system and the 
consequential diminishing of t:4e government's social responsibility. The changes have created 
20 Anderton, 'Health already private', 1997,p.17. 
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a feeling of vulnerability. Government withdrawal of financial support means both physical 
and financial uncertainty for the elderly as concern over accessibility of treatment and an 
ability to pay for it increases. These are issues oflife and death for an elderly population which 
is very aware of the importance and impact of changing public policy. They are not blessed 
with decades of working life to prepare for economic outlays in their budgets, a fact which 
leaves many with imposing uncertainty. Figure 9 reveals the results of a survey question asking 
the elderly about their concern \\~th their ability or inability to access adequate health care 
services. 
The Concern of ACCESS to Health care services to the Elderly 
9% 
Figure 11 Source: Health Care Survey of the Elderly 1997 
Legend: 
1. 80% are those elderly who say that access to health care services is a concern for them. 
2. 9% are elderly who have no access concerns whatsoever 
3. 11 % are those elderly which have private health insurance and are not currently 
concerned. 
The reduction in public funding is causing grave concern for the elderly who have 
limited financial resources to allocate to their health care. Public concern is also evident. 33.2 
percent of voters pinpointed health services as 'the most important issue in the country at the 
moment.' This was 5 percent higher that any other concern.21 
Shifting the Health Providers and Creating Access Issues 
Ron Dowdall has spent his mother's $90,000 savings in two and a half years to keep 
her in a tiny resthome cubicle. A large chunk of the $200,000 his 87 year old mother, Connie, 
inherited from her brother will be taken by the Government under the asset testing policy on 
21New Zealand Hea.rald Opinion poll, New Zealand News Teletext, 18 Oct 1997. 
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elderly people which remains in place in private rest homes despite being abandoned in both 
public and private hospital care. Ron worked hard helping his parents develop properties and 
was always told he would one day be rewarded with an inheritance. 'But now I've paid out 
$90,000 and I can see the family asset being stripped away.' It costs $951.72 a week for his 
mother to be kept in a private rest home, with her paying $636 and the rest topped up by the 
Government. Mr Dowdall said the policy has detrimental effects. 
'It makes everybody conscious of grabbing what they can, when they can. 
There were no holidays or new cars, there was a family sacrifice to get that 
asset. Asset stripping encouraged families to waste their money because there 
was no point in working for an asset. My father would be turning in his grave 
with this sort of situation. After the war they worked hard to save, now a 
lifetime's savings will be gone in three years. '22 
Around 550 elderly are in long-term public hospital care and their presence is really a carry-
over from the days when public hospitals provided that sort of service. There are 5400 people 
in long-term private hospital care. Similarly, only a handful of people are in public rest home 
care while 21,000 residents are currently in long-term private rest home care, and will continue 
to face both income and asset testing.23 In the 1997 budget the Coalition Government 
announced it would abolish asset and income testing for long-term hospital care from October 
1998. However, this applies to private and public hospital care only, the tests will still apply to 
residential resthome care. Currently about half of the people moving into residential care did 
not qualify for a subsidy and paid the full fees themselves (around $600 plus per week).24 
'What that effectively means is that both income and asset testing. for most 
elderly people is still firmly in place. ' 25 
Most people who need care would first go to a resthome which provides a lower level of care 
than a hospital. A couple would need around $1000-$1100 a week to fund the care and many 
would be forced to sell their home to meet the bills. As they get older and more frail long-tenn 
hospital care becomes necessary and for most a private hospital is the only option 26 The 
reality is, however, that many elderly would not have an asset left to test as everything would 
have been sold it to pay for resthome care. ' 27 
22G.Bailey, 'Too late to save mum's nest egg', The Evening Post, 27 June 1997. 
23 Sheeran, Sunday Star Times, 1997. 
24According to Petra Bates as stated in 'Needs matched with best of care', Waikato Times, 29 August 
1997. · 
25 Grey Power executive officer Marie Bayer as cited in G.Sheeran, 'Asset testing still a reality; 
Budget's 'good news' affects very few'_,._Sunday Star Times, 6 July 1997. 
26 Bayer, as cited in G.Sheeran, 'Asset testing still a reality; Budget's 'good news' affects very few .. 
1997. 
27 Sheeran, 'Asset testing still a reality, 1997. 
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Over enthusiasm by private entrepreneurs has raised concern by funding agencies that growth 
in residential care for the elderly has leapt ahead of population growth and threatens to take 
funding away from other people with disabilities. Midland Health stated in mid 1997 that it 
would put a cap on funding Taranaki's rest homes and private hospitals. This followed an 
announcement in early 1997 that the demand for home care had caused funding to jump from 
an initial $2.5 million to $16 million in two years. Even Midland's view that elderly people 
would rather live in their own homes than in institutions did not prepare the funding authority 
for such sky-rocketing demand and a tightening of criteria was announced in January. Midland 
stated that the demand for home care is keeping people out of rest homes for longer, which 
means the age of admission is becoming higher and the required standard of care more 
expensive.28 Figure I O shows the elderly's opinion of rest home expense and what impact it has 




The Elderlys Experience and Opinion of 
Private Rest Home Costs 
11 S ource: H lthC ea are s urvey o t e ery f h Eld I 1997 
1. 75 percent are those elderly who in there experience thinks that the cost of staying in a 
rest home is an impediment to actually using the care 
2. 11 percent of elderly believe that the cost of private rest home care is not an 
impediment to using the care 
3. 14 percent of those elderly surveyed were not sure about the issue. 
As one elderly person commented: 
28'RHA to explain fears over cost of growth in old folks'homes', The Daily News, 14 August 1997. 
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'I think an inquiry should be made as to why it costs $500-600 per week in a 
home to keep one person, when none of these people live in their own homes 
costing this much'29 
Policies relating to the elderly, such as the income and asset testing are apparently designed to 
keep them in the community for as long as possible. Asset and income testing results in the 
elderly remaining in their own homes for longer out of fear from losing them or due to family 
concerns over the thought of their inheritance eroding. A number of wider implications result 
from such policies. The domination of the private sector of rest home market and the high costs 
of being put in resthome care for the elderly combined with government asset and income 
testing have caused greater numbers of elderly to stay by themselves or in their family's care 
for longer. Effectively there is then a transfer of responsibility to the families which in tum 
takes the cost off the government. As the burden is transferred onto the caregivers, usually 
family members, frantic efforts to juggle work and family commitments creates great stress in 
the home and workplace.30 Both parents work in more than 50 percent of households and in 27 
percent of families (over 165,000 families) there is just one parent. Three years ago 12 percent 
of unemployed women and 3 percent of men had left jobs because of family responsibilities. 
Many parents are caught in the double squeeze of having children late in life and also having to 
care for elderly parents.31 This all adds up to greater stress on families and an alarming number 
of elderly abuse cases. 
A nation-wide service investigates 500 complaints of abuse against the elderly each 
year with Age Concern setting up seven pilot schemes in the past four years to combat the 
growing problem of elderly abuse and neglect. The departments of Police, Social Welfare and 
Health have identified elderly abuse as a key area needing attention. New South Wales 
research suggests that about 2% of older people are victims of either abuse or neglect. In tenns 
of New Zealand's senior citizens that is 8700 cases. Other international studies report rates as 
high as 3% to 5%. So far, elderly abuse teams working twenty hours a weeks have detected 1 
percent of the population. 
'It's quite possible within the next two years we will get to 3-5 percent. It's 
unfortunate if we do, but our research mimics that done overseas. We are 
falling into a pattern here, so we have no doubt that we have a similar 
incidence of abuse. ' 32 
The latest figures released by Age Concern show that its seven teams deal with around 495 
referrals from friends, families, health professionals and other agencies each year. Of those, 80 
29comment made in the HC 1997 by an elderly person, refer Appendix C. 
3o M.Henderson, 'Employer help with juggling act is vital', Sunday Star Times, 13 July 1997. 
31Henderson, 'Employer help with juggling act is vital',1997. 
32This observation was made by the national director of Age Concern Deborah Moran 
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percent are confirmed· as cases of abuse and neglect. The overwhelming majority of clients (7 l 
percent) are women over 65. 
'What horrifies me most is the range of abuse people have been putting up 
with for a long time. In 41 percent of cases, the abuse has been going on for 
more than a year and that's really significant. In most cases, the abusers are 
the son or daughter of the client ( 43 percent), compared to 14 percent 
involving partners and 23 percent involving primary caregivers. In the cases 
where the son or daughter is the abuser, the older people do not want to go to 
the police or take legal action against their O\\'n children, but they will go to a 
community agency like Age Concem'33 
The most common type of abuse is psychological (39 percent), followed by financial (30 
percent), physical (11 percent) and sexual (0.5 percent). But 72 percent of referrals report 
multiple incidents of abuse and neglect features in 19 percent of all cases. While elderly abuse 
does occur in rest homes, 32 percent of abuse victims live alone and 24 percent with their 
families. It is the elderly in this latter category who were more likely to suffer multiple types of 
abuse. There is a concern that as the reluctance to enter private rest homes grows this scenario 
will increase.34 
Teams spend significant amounts of time dealing with cases of self-neglect reported to 
them. A national advisory group consisting of Age Concern, the police, the Ministry of Health 
among others, has monitored the elderly abuse programmes for the past two years. There are 
22 assessment, treatment and rehabilitation units throughout New Zealand.35 The purpose-built, 
multi-disciplinary unit known as the Assessment and Rehabilitation Unit for the Elderly at 
Taranaki Base Hospital is about to be dismantled and beds cut. The Day Ward is no longer 
going to exist. 
How is this going to affect the elderly in the community? At present, services for the 
elderly are superior. Representatives say many of the patients are at home, independent and 
maintaining their dignity. 
'I cannot understand why the managers are dismantling this unit, and, 
although I am told that there will be services available, I cannot understand 
why they are pulling to bits the most efficiently run service in the hospital. '36 
Dr Taylor has striven over the last few years to build up a geriatric service that is envied by 
units up and down New Zealand. 'I am quite disheartened by the changes I am seeing and I do 
worry about my elderly patients and their future. '37 Professionals from a number of different 
33Henderson, 'Employer help with juggling act is vital',1997. 
34Y.Martin, 'Elderly could lose abu~ relief scheme', Sunday Star Times, 11 May 1997. 
35 Martin, 'Elderly could lose abuse relief scheme', Sunday Star Times, 11 May 1997. 
36 Dr Lorraine Taylor developer of the multi-discilinary Assessment and Rehabilitation Unit at 
Taranaki Base Hospital. 
37~Why change unit which is running smoothly?', The Daily News, 5 August 1997. 
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areas in the caring process of the elderly are very apprehensive as to the impact reduced public 
funding is having on the elderly. The concern is that as greater numbers of elderly are forced to 
stay on their own, their physical safety will be compromised and the pressure on family 
members to care for them increased. These repercussions are a formula for neglect. 
Fundamental Access Problems for the Elderly 
Are rising premiums forcing many elderly to cancel or reduce the coverage of their policies? 
This is part of a broader question of access for the elderly. Fifteen years ago more than half of 
all New Zealanders held health insurance. That has now fallen to 40 percent. The cost of the 
cover is rising sharply with the major insurer Southern Cross putting premiums up an average 
of 12 percent per year. The company says that this is reflective of diminishing government 
input into the health sector.38 Given this trend it is clear fewer people feel they are able to afford 
private health insurance at a time when public resources are being stretched further and 
further.39 The public sector is struggling to manage increasing levels of acute hospital 
admissions leading the Government to suggest a cut in elective treatments. However, if fewer 
elderly people can afford private health insurance, sooner or later a large percentage of this 
growing group will have little or no access to elective hospital treatments such as hip or knee 
replacements, glue ear or cataracts.40 The private sector is pricing itself off the market with 
massively rising insurance costs. This creating longer waiting times for hospital care and 
increases the pressure on the public system. 41 fu 1990, before the refonns, there were 60,000 
people on waiting lists. fu 1997, that number had risen to 97,000 people; that is 1 in every 38 
New Zealanders.42 Moreover, in 1997, 20,000 people were reported to have been on waiting 
lists for more than 2 years. 
'There is nothing efficient in long waiting lists, the procedure eventually costs 
the same or more. A person who waited for over two years before being 
treated for a heart problem estimated the delay cost him and the Government 
more than $200,000. Had the operation been done as soon as needed it would 
have cost $5000. So there's huge wastage in the delay particularly if a person 
is unable to work.' 43 
One of the arguments for implementing the refonns was that it would reduce the waiting times 
as a result of extra efficiency. This has failed. The public system is not providing an improved 
38'Health's catch-22 dilemma', The Timaru Herald, 13 Aug 1996. · 
39 Dr Pim Borren as cited in M. Inge, 'Elective surgery access restricted to wealthy', New Zealand 
Doctor, Business, Sept. 1997. , 
40 M Inge, 'Elective surgery access restricted to wealthy', New Zealand Doctor, 1996. 
41 Graham Edmand, Chief Executive of Auckland Health Care in FRASER by Ian Fraser, TVNZ, 
Channel .1, 7 Oct 1997. 
42channel 3 News John Campell, 21 Oct 1997. 
43 htge, 'Elective surgery access restricted to wealthy', 1996,p.40. 
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ease of access to quality services.44 A tension exists between a fixed level of financial resources 
available for public hospital care on the one hand and a demand that greatly exceeds this fiscal 
cap on the other. Acutely ill patients are able to gain immediate access to the public hospital 
system but, once admitted, many will be subjected to long waiting times. A similar fate awaits 
those seeking elective services. In both the high-profile waiting-list surgery and the equally 
important but lower profile medical and diagnostic procedures, patients find themselves 
waiting inappropriately long and potentially unsafe periods of time for their surgical, medical 
or diagnostic procedures. In a number of North Island hospitals, for example, doctors are 
complaining that there are up to 16 week delays between diagnosis and treatment of cancer.45 
These waiting times are mainly a result of rationing due to a fiscal cap on public hospital 
expenditure, rising demand for emergency and acute services (naturally accorded clinical 
priority) and sub-optimal levels of productivity in the public hospital sector. No public 
relations campaign promising additional surgical and medical interventions will convince the 
.individuals and families who require services that the system has improved unless they are 
given more timely access to waiting list surgery.46 
Complaints regarding waiting lists for surgery are on the increase with many coming 
from people unable to get treatment because they do not have health insurance.47 The 
government established a Waiting Times Fund dedicated to clearing waiting list backlogs. To 
date $130 million has gone into the fund with more offered in the budget. This money 
according to those who run the hospitals is not nearly enough and is spread extremely thinly. It 
is difficult to imagine that this is anything more than token appeasement fund, given that what 
is required is more substantial and consistent than what was given. Over the last three years 
health funding 'has been characterised by frequent ad hoe injections.'48 These injections have 
been sprinkled on political hot spots when problems in health care arose due to cuts imposed 
from the reforms. 
The latest proposal from the Minister of Health involves a Booking System. This is 
designed to alleviate the waiting list problem, not by providing more money but rather by 
implementing a process which assesses the eligibility of a person to have treatment paid for in 
the public system. The justification for the new system is that many people who are on 
existing waiting lists do not need to be there, a rather bizarre theory suggesting that people are 
wilfully undertaking unnecessary surgery. It is likely that the reference here is to those who do 
not require acute surgery and may, if adequately concerned, seek solace in the private sector. 
With 97000 people on waiting lists and an admission from the Minister that as many as 1/3 to 
44 As shown in the survey of the Elaerly 1997. 
45 Channel 3, John Campell, 21 Oct 1997, interview with Health Minister Bill English 
46 L. Levy, 'Throwing money at hospitals won't cure their ills', The National Business Review, Feb. 
21 1997. 
47•surgery wait lists 'increased 39%', The Dominion, 5 Aug 1996, p.3. 
48 _1Surgery wait lists 'increased 39%', The Dominion, 5 Aug 1996,p.3. 
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1/2 of those currently on waiting lists will no longer qualifying for treatment,49 Graham 
Edmand, Chief Executive of Auckland Health Care, points out that significant numbers will be 
denied access through this new system. The criteria for qualification will become extreme need, 
he states, with the ultimate impact of the booking system being that many people will miss out 
on necessary health care services altogether.50 
Mrs Kenna.rds1 went for her annual check up in order to renew her drivers licence. The 
medical examiner found she had developed a cataract on her left eye and had to have it 
removed before the licence could be re-issued. If she was to have the operation through the 
public system there would be a eighteen month to two year waiting list to see the specialist and 
then a nine to twelve month wait for the operation. Meanwhile she would not be able to drive. 
If, however, she chose to go private and pay for it out of her own pocket (she was not covered 
by medical insurance), she could see a specialist in 2-3 days, have the 20 minute operation 
within one week and be driving soon after - the cost $3000 dollars. Iris took the latter option. 
Now she has a cataract on the other eye. Mrs Kennard's story is not an uncommon one in New 
Zealand. Long waiting periods, reduced funding and the general ineffectiveness of the public 
health system makes it impractical for people to wait, so out of necessity they pay. This is in 
accordance with the user pays policy thrust of the government. 
There is widespread concern about demands for hospitals to live within budgets, The 
bottom line is that people do not want fixed spending on health care52 and from public feedback 
it appears they do not mind paying for it through their tax. A survey question asking the elderly 
what method of payment for health care was preferred revealed the following. 
49 Minister of Health Bill English quoted in FRASER by Ian Fraser, TVNZ, Channel 1, 7 Oct 1997. 
In order to qualify, the customer must be in an acute state. 
50 Graham Edmand, Chief Executive of Auckland Health Care in FRASER by Ian Fraser, TVNZ, 
Channel 1, 7 Oct 1997. 
51 Interview with Mrs Kennard, 10 June 1997, at 64 Hansons Lane, Upper Riccarton, Christchurch. 
52 Inge, 'Elective surgery access restricted to wealthy', 1996,p.42. 
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Elderly's Prefered Method of Paying for Health Care 
58% 
23% 
Figure 13 Source: Health Care Survey of the Elderly 1997 
Legend: 
58% are those elderly in favour of paying for health care through taxation. 
14% segment is for those in favour of paying through health insurance premiums. 
23% are those in favour of paying for health care directly as needed ( out of your own 
pocket). 6% are those that favour of all the above ways of paying for health care. 
Nearly 60 percent of those elderly surveyed said that their preferred way of financing 
health care was through taxation. This could be interpreted as an endorsement of the old social 
policy with proponents wanting a 'free ride' on the system, especially considering that the 
elderly do not contribute to the tax talce instead receiving government retirement income in 
various forms. 
'I would gladly pay higher taxes and have no private health insurance in order 
to have public health care. 's3 
However, in a Co1nar Brunton Poll it was found that 67 percent of the general population 
agree with the rejection of tax cuts, preferring that the money be put into health care and 
education54 This at least must signal the importance that the public in general and not just the 
elderly place on an health care system which is centrally funded. 
53 Comment from the HC survey 1997 by an elderly person, refer Appendix C. 
54 Data from One Network News Colnar Brunton Poll, as cited on BRE4KFAST, 21 Oct 1997. 
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Private health insurance - the necessity, the expense! 
'The only way to get equality of access in health care provisi~n is to ban private health 
insurance - and that is not going to happen' ~ Bill Englishss 
What can this case study tell us about the effectiveness of the PIM in providing health 
care effectively to the elderly on a micro level? The case study reveals a number of substantial 
inadequacies in the effectiveness of Private Insurance Markets in providing adequate health 
care effectively to the elderly. The first major problem concerns the financial accountability of 
insurance companies whose premium rates skyrocket uncontrollably. As earlier stated the 
major insurer Southern Cross is putting premiums up an average of 12 percent per year.56 
Fixed incomes of the elderly do not provide the flexibility needed to enable the over 65 group 
to adapt to these changes. Those who can afford the premiums are a diminishing group based 
in the middle to higher socio-economic group. In 1988 a family of four paid $404 for Southern 
Cross's Regularcare policy. In 1997 the same family now pays $1336. That's a rise of 230 
percent during a period when inflation was only around 30 percent 57 Older people have been 
hardest hit. In 1988, an older couple paid $432 for Regularcare. In 1997 it was up to $2140, 
that is an increase of nearly 400 percent. Southern Cross is not alone, premiums have been 
rising rapidly across the board. One reason for this is the increasing cost of claims. This has 
been caused by a variety of factors itself, including an ageing population and advances in 
medical technology. But primarily it is the transfer of elective surgery from the public domain 
into the private which has been the dominant contributor. The general manager of Southern 
Cross, stated that premium rises reflected what was happening in the health market. 'One of 
the key drivers is the fact people are having to use the private sector.' 58 The number of 
operations being performed in the public system has dramatically declined. Southern Cross is 
this country's largest private medical insurer with over 900,000 members. It claims that it now 
funds more elective surgery than the government. Latest official annual figures available show 
143,626 elective procedures carried out in private hospitals compared with only 81,040 in 
public.59 A second reason is the inclusion of new insurers who set premium prices at an 
averaged rate (undercutting existing insurers). This means that the old process of 'community 
rating' where by the young policy holders subsidise the older ones is no longer effective as new 
insurers are targeting these young groups and offering lower cost premium cover. 
55 Bill English was asked a question in an interview with John Campell on 3 Network News, 21 
October 1997 by D.Galler; 'Do you believe in equality of access to HC provision for all New 
Zealanders?' the Health Minister Bill English replied with the above answer. 
56 Inge, 'Elective surgery access restricted to wealthy', 1996,p.38. 
57B. Holloway, 'Health Insurer raises premiums', Waikato Times, 26 May 1997. 
58Holloway, 'Health Insurer raises premiums', 1997. 
59H.LeGrice, Chairman of Sourthem Cross, statisitics from there annual report 1997. 
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Media reports suggest that thousands of retired New Zealanders are surrendering their private 
medical insurance once they tum 65 because their premiums have doubled.60 Many el~erly 
who have had insurance for many years have been forced to quit their policies due to 
skyrocketing premium increases. Figure 12 shows the number of elderly surveyed who are and 
are not covered by insurance and who have since cancelled it. 
Those Elderly Surveyed who are Covered by Health Insurance 
35% 
Figure 14 Source: Health Care Survey of the Elderly 1997 
Legend: 
46% are those who do not have private health insurance 
35% are those elderly who do have insurance 
19% are those elderly who have had insurance but have since cancelled it. 
Figure 14 shows the duration of policies held by the elderly before cancellation. 40 percent 
who had cancelled their insurance premiums had in fact held them for 20 or more years. 20 
percent paid premiums for 15 years. 
60 Sheeran, 'Asset testing still a reality, 1997. 
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The Duration of Policies held by the Elderly before 
Cancellation 
1 5 10 15 20 
Duration of policy (years) 
Figure 15 Source: Health Care Survey of the Elderly 1997 
The point is that the majority of the elderly who cancelled their policies had been long standing 
premium payers. They paid premiums for the past two decades, when they were younger, 
healthier and working. Now when they are older, retired and more in need of health insurance 
they are forced to cancel and take the risk. 
'When the premiums rise, those who have not used their insurance tend to be 
the ones to cancel their policies. When Unimed announces that it will be 
putting premiums up on the l October 1997 by 10 percent, you can bet there 
will be a stack of resignation letters on my desk the next week, half of those 
people would not have put a claim in, in the last few years. The people who 
will keep their policies are the wealthy and the very sick as they need it - this 
results ultimately in adverse selection occurring. ' 61 
The numbers of people abandoning private health cover has steadied after some big drops in 
the early nineties when health reforms were first introduced and the premiums on some policies 
doubled overnight.62 50 percent of the population had some form of private insurance cover in 
1991 but that figure has dropped to 41 percent in 1997 as a quarter of a million people quit 
their policies. Southern Cross 'sensed' it was now around 40 percent.63 The potential for 
61 Interview with Dermott Martin, 1997. 
62 Sheeran, 'Asset testing still a reality,1997,p.2. 
63 As commented by David Turner, general manager of Southern Cross, in Sheeran'Asset testing still 
a reality, 1997. 
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disaster that this trend carries is demonstrated when one considers that the elderly, more than 
any other group \'Vi.thin society, are heavily reliant on their medical insurance. 
The Last Time the Elderly who have Insurance 




Figure 16 Source: Health Care Survey of the Elderly 1997 
While insurance companies have recognised that 'they [the elderly] are tremendously more 
likely to make a claim in the next 12 months than any other group' many were nevertheless · 
startled at the number of elderly (80%) who had lodged a claim vvith their insurance company 
in the last twelve months. While arguably the presence of medical insurance encourages many 
to utilise their cover even for the most trivial of ailments, the fact remains that deteriorating 
health is a reality of ageing and if the comforting presence of health insurance becomes 
unaffordable then everyday healthcare becomes unattainable. 
In spite of these sobering figures some still claim that the costs of health insurance are 
at a realistic level. One insurance company manager argues that 
'while private health care was becoming more expensive, it was still 
affordable for a great many people. What is happening in New Zealand is 
part of a world-wide trend, and no government can afford to meet all the 
costs of health care with its new technologies. '64 
While it is arguable that 'in global terms, New Zealanders still receive moderately priced health 
care, even if it is' more expensive than it was in the past165 the question is for how much longer? 
Premium rises show no sign of ebbing. Instead Aetna acknowledges that premiums are likely to 
64 David Turner, general manager of Southern Cross, Sheeran, 'Asset testing still a reality, 1997. 
65 Sheeran, 'Asset testing still a reality, 1997. 
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double in the next few years. 'We suspect all insurers will meet the increasing numbers of 
claims and increasing costs with further rises. ' 66 Rising premiums and decreasing public care 
means that a great many elderly are left in the middle, unable to rely on public health care, yet 
unable to purchase health insurance. 
'Premium rises reflected what was happening in the health market. .. With one 
of the key drivers being the fact that people are using the private sector much 
more for surgical needs. If you look beneath government announcements of 
one-off policies their funding is decreasing in real terms eveiy year.' 67 
Figure 14 shows that of the elderly who currently hold health insurance, 24 percent of them 
would discontinue their policies if premiums rose by 20 percent. Following the trends such a 
rise would be upon the elderly within two years. Borren predicts that by the start of the new 
millennium insurance premiums would have doubled. 68 
Percentage of Elderly who would discontinue with their 










66consumer magizine, p29 July, 1997. 
67 Quoted by David Tumer, general manager of Southern Cross in Holloway, 'Health Insurer raises 
gremiums', 1997,p.57. . 
8 Borren & Maynard, Searching for the Holy Grail in the Antipodes: the Market Refonn of the New 
Zealand Health Care System, 1993. 
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Legend: 
a. (24 % ) would discontinue their policies if premiums increased by 20 percent. 
b. (10%) would cancel after 30 percent premium increase: 
c. (7%) would cancel if premiums rose 60 percent 
d. (11 % ) would not discontinue their medical insurance coverage, even if the cost o1 
premiums continued to rise steadily 
e. (48%) Did not know and would decide at the time. 
Based on these survey results 41 percent of the elderly would cancel their policies 
before the turn of the millennium. This could increase considering the large percent (48%) of 
those who said they would decide at the time of the increase. Access would then be at a critical 
level for the elderly as they would be unable to rely on the public system and unable to afford 
the private. In 1985, private care accounted for 12 percent of total health expenditure. By 
1995, this had doubled to 24 percente.> The rise was 'more of the same' for Southern Cross 
which also increased premiums by an average of 12 percent in 1996 and again in 1997.70 The 
companies are entitled to crank up their premiums because, after all, they are a business with 
an overriding goal of making inoney. Only two of the insurance companies in New Zealand are 
non-profit. But the burden of premiums topping $1000 annually - $1800 for superannuants - is 
making health insurance a less attractive option for many people. Therefore, their health care is 
pushed back onto a public system already struggling to cope without inheriting more patients 
from the private system. 
'The position facing elderly people with health insurance is especially tough. 
They may have been paying premiums for years without making claims, but 
just as they reach an age where their reliance on the insurance increases, they 
get hit with a sharp rise in premiums. For many, this will force them to drop 
their policies and place them back at the mercy of the second rate public 
system.'11 
What seems to be happening as a result of premium rises is that some elderly, instead of 
cancelling their policies altogether, are having them reduced do\\'n. By reducing cover to the 
bare minimum, surgery only for example, they are protected for the 'big one.• According to 
Unimed managing director, Dermott Martin, 'the elderly are re-configuring their cover so they 
69Quoted by David Turner, general manager of Southern Cross in B. Holloway, 'Health Insurer raises 
~remiums',1997,p.57. 
~olloway, 'Health insurer raises premiums',1997. 
71 J. Anderson, Operation Kiwicare, Truth, 23 Aug 1996. 
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are able to afford the costs of say a 'big bang' and insurers are responding by offering reduced 
policy cover'n 
According to Consumer magazine, people should consider getting health insurance 
cover because access to public health care is worsening, . In July 1997 Consumer wrote a lead 
article on the necessity of health insurance in order to have ease of access to health care. This 
was a different position from the earlier stances taken in relation to the issue. On each previous 
occasion when they looked at this topic, they made it clear that they did not think health 
insurance was necessary. They believed that the public hospital system, despite its much 
publicised difficulties, remained capable of dealing with the medical needs of the vast bulk of 
New Zealanders. Now, they said, they were not so sure. It is not the quality of care that 
concerns them because, by and large, the people and systems of the public sector appear to 
remain strongly committed to high standards. The issue they say is access 
'The system is backed up, in many areas badly overloaded. Far too often, 
patients have to wait for lengthy periods with a painful and often debilitation 
illness, before they can be treated. Despite very extensive restructuring, and 
despite the issue having been at or near the top of the political agenda for 
many years, the problem is getting worse. ' 73 
Consumer stated that evidence suggests too many New Zealanders may now be unable to rely 
on the public hospital system to deliver important surgical and other hospital based medical 
care within a reasonable time frame. As a result, Consumer advocated that many people should 
consider taking out health insurance in order to secure access to necessary care.74 
With the government now predicting that the already lower levels of elective surgery 
being performed in public hospitals will be halved within the next three years, the 1.4 million 
New Zealanders with private health insurance face the prospect of even steeper premium rises. 
A Health Ministry report finalised earlier this year on sustainable health funding said that the 
state would do 50 percent less elective surgery in next three years. The general manager of 
Southern Cross, said that figure was 'quite frightening' with the big driver behind recent 
premium rises being the burgeoning amount of elective surgery undertaken by the private 
sector as public hospitals, strapped for cash, concentrated mainly on acute surgery. 
'That has been going on for several years now, but when we read that elective 
surgery in public hospitals is to be cut even further, I wonder if we have really . 
taken on board the implications. '15 
72 Interview with Dennott Martin, 1997. 
73consumer magizine, 14 July 1997,p.29. 
74consumer magizine, 14 July 1997,p.29. 
75sheeran. 'Private health costs sure to rise',1997. 
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The implications are not ambiguous. If the current trends of public system cuts and 
corresponding premium rises continue, people paying for top-shelf medical insurance will see 
their premiums double in under five years. The situation is little better for people who take out 
the more popular regular options that provide for surgical, doctors' visits, prescriptions, and 
some specialist care for a family with two or more children. Their annual health insurance bill 
is up to $1308, and if you add the 25 percent 'co-payment' made when claiming on policies, it 
brings the annual health spend to $1635. That is around 4.5 percent of the average wage, and 
based on increases during the past three ye;irs, could rise to nearly 7 percent in a little under 
five years. The news is equally bad for the 60 percent of the population who don't have 
medical insurance, and who must take on board even greater financial risk if they fall ill. 
Turner stated that New Zealanders were going to have to get used to health care spending 
moving further up their budget priorities. 
'Then there will be those people who just cannot afford health insurance, and 
that is a real worry for us, and not just from a strict business point of view. 
As a not-for-profit organisation, we have a strong philosophical view that we 
want to see as many people as possible with adequate health care. ' 76 
The general manager of the largest insurance company states that 'there is a real concern New 
Zealand would end up with a two-tiered health system, one for the wealthy and one for the 
poor' 77 Affordability issue means many will not take out the cover, yet according to Unimed 
25 percent of the population will always have insurance. But for many especially the elderly on 
fixed incomes, health is one of the first covers to go, before house and contents insurance and 
even before car insurance.78 
Increasing numbers of elderly are finding rising premiums due- to increased claims a 
financial barrier to accessing adequate health care. The evidence of this is in figure 17 Only 7 
percent of the elderly find that health insurance is most accessible to them, with almost 60 
percent finding health insurance the least :financially accessible. With predicted premium rises 
by all the major health insurers this scale of accessibility is only going to move further to the 
right of the spectrum, making health insurance even less :financially accessible to the elderly. 
76 Sheeran, 'Private health costs sure to rise',1997. 
77 Sheeran, 'Private health costs sure to rise',1997. 
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The Current Financial Accessibility of Health Insurance for the 
Elderly 
2 3 4 5 
Scale of Accesslblllty 
(1 most 5 least access Ible) 
Figure 18 Source: Health Care Survey of the Elderly 1997 
Conclusions 
This chapter sets out to answer a number of questions put forward which were designed to test 
the validity of the hypotheses in Part Two. These postulated first, that the Coalition 
government will continue shifting health care into the private sector while effectively reducing 
the state's role of social responsibility. As a result increasing financial pressure and continuing 
uncertainty is being placed on those over sixty five regarding access to health care services. 
Evidence of this was collected from survey results of 230 elderly, interviews of elderly and of 
insurance companies, reports and articles. The first finding established the government's 
continuing determination to privatise health care. This was manifested in four ways, first, from 
announcements made by the Minister of Health and the former Prime Minister who signed the 
coalition agreement. There is a substantial degree of evidence which suggests that continuous 
integration of the private sector in funding health care will be pursued by the current coalition 
government. The arrival of new Prime Minister, Jenny Shipley, is unlikely to alter the course of 
the ship, a fact which previous statements support. Second, the removal of New Zealand first 
MP, Neil Curtain due to outspoken behaviour and actions voiced at opposition to the 
privatisation policies. Third, statistics backed up the shift graphically showing an increasing 
proportion of private health funding. Physical evidence of this is found in the building of 
private clinics, hospitals and resthomes, coupled with a reduction in public funding. Fourth, the 
macro trends of reducing public spending over the last 15 years as discussed in depth in 
chapter two. 
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The second finding concerns the increasing financial pressure on the elderly and the 
resulting impainnent in accessing health care services. This has shown to be manifested in two 
main ways; first, through the massive increases in private health insurance premiums which 
has resulted in a considerable nwnber of elderly cancelling their policies. This is reflective of 
the increased pressure on the insurance market due to considerably more usage by the elderly 
which in tum is a result from the governments withdrawal in providing the services in the 
public sector, such as elective surgery. Second is the financial pressure which the government 
has exerted by the imposition of inCDme and asset testing of those elderly who need care. This 
results in them having their asset base eroded away with wider social repercussions impacting 
on them and their families. 
The third finding concerns the continued uncertainly created by government 
withdrawal and private sector involvement. There are four main areas of concern for the 
elderly, the first and most pressing of which is the reduction of public funding into health care. 
SeCDnd was the involvement of private health care, namely private insurance. Third, the overall 
fundamental concern for those elderly surveyed (80 percent) is with access to health care 
services. From overseas experience and the evidence collected here it is difficult to have any 
confidence in the ability of the private insurance market to make health care coverage 
accessible to those over 65. Comments from insurance company managers did little to alter this 
finding, rather their inability to acCDmmodate the elderly was highlighted. 
The second part of this chapter examined the hypothesis that the shifting of funding 
sources are creating fundamental problems of access for the elderly as claims on insurance 
premiums rise forcing many elderly to cancel or reduce the coverage of their policies. From the 
information available there was evidence to suggest that there are fundamental problems of 
access for the elderly as a result of the governments withdrawal from funding health care and 
the consequent involvement of the private sector in providing it. Evidence of this was 
manifested in two main :findings. First, the increased size of waiting lists with backlogs in such 
areas as hip and knee replacement, cataracts, and similar elective surgery predominately 
required by the elderly. futroduction of the booking system is bad news for those on waiting list 
as many will be removed after the proposed reshuffle. Second, the cost of private health 
insurance to cover medical procedures which-are no longer available in the public sector. 
The Minister of Health admitted that the only way to get equity in access to health care 
provision is to ban private health insurance. Such inequity is becoming apparent with the 
skyrocketing cost of health insurance which has seen large numbers of elderly cancelling their 
long held insurance policies. Already the numbers of elderly adds who are not covered by 
private health insurance is high (some 46%) and, more importantly, is on the increase with no 
signs of slowing.79 For the 35 percent who are current holders, over 40 percent said they would 
79sheeran, 'Private health costs sure to rise',1997,p29. 
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cancel their policies if premiums were to rise to the level they have been predicted to by the 
tum of the new millennium. Another 48 percent would decide at the time. This poses 
fundamental problems as to the distribution of health care resources if the system is run on a 
basis of an ability to pay and a rapidly growing group do not have this ability. 
However, there are options for the elderly, in particular, reduction in cover to the 
extent that they are only protected against the 'big one.' This means many policy holders will 
have to pay out of pocket for almost everything else that is not major. The survey finding 
found that of those elderly who had insurance, 80 percent of them had made a claim in the last 
12 months. This is a staggering finding but not surprising to the insurance companies. What 
this shows is that the private sector is becoming a critical supplier of health care to this group 
further highlighting the concern above. 
The United States has a two tier health system distinguishing those who can afford 
insurance from those who cannot. An Insurance company manager is concerned that New 
Zealand would end up in the same situation and there is evidence of this already. When the 
current financial accessibility of health insurance for the elderly was measured it was found 
that 60 percent of the elderly surveyed said health insurance was extremely inaccessible. This 
should be cause for alarm. 
Reforms have not provided improved ease of access to quality services as advocated. 
Instead access to health care· services, as shown in other countries, has created fundamental 
distributional concerns. While governments may make health-policy decisions about 
populations, it must not be forgotten that at the point-of-service delivery there is an individual 
patient, not a population. The common argument advanced to improve quality and patient 
access is for the government to increase overall health care expenditure. Evidence here 
suggests that such an approach would go a long way to alleviating many of the problems that 
have arisen in the health system.80 The lack of funding must not obscure the fact that much 
responsibility for the current crisis lies with the private sector which distributes health care on 
an ability to pay rationale. 
SOL. Levy, 'Throwing money at hospitals won't cure their ills', The National Business Review, Feb. 
211997. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Validation of the Macro Issues: 
Implications of Private Sector involvement 
The first four chapters have dealt with the stated hypotheses which postulated the 
following: 1) that the government's transition from a welfare state to a market framework for 
the provision of health care has fundamental flaws in its ability to provide equity of access to 
the elderly; 2) that the government is decreasing the state's role in providing health care, 
resulting in a shifting of provision from the public to the private sector; 3) that these shifts are 
creating fundamental problems of access for the elderly as claims on insurance policies 
increase due to reduced services in the public system. As insurance premiums rise many elderly 
are forced to cancel or reduce the coverage of their policies; 4) that the Coalition government 
will continue to transfer health care into the private sector, effectively reducing the state1s role 
of social responsibility and perpetuating the access problems. 
This chapter intends to deal with the questions which address the macro issues in this 
thesis drawn from the theories in chapter one. Evidence from the case study, interviews and 
health reports are consolidated to support and refute the arguments put forward. This chapter 
begins by analysing the implications of the market reforms in relation to the elderly with 
reference to the findings of the case study. It then investigates the existence of moral hazard 
and adverse selection within the insurance companies and makes an assessment as to whether 
the private sector is capable of providing for the health care needs of the elderly in the new 
millennium. Furthermore, the experimental public policy transfonnation of health care in 
relation to the elderly is reviewed at a macro level. Finally consideration is given to adjusting 
the current health agenda for the new millennium. 
Implications of Market Reforms 
Has incorporating the market into health care actually achieved what advocates said it 
would? In order to answer this a case study of the elderly was undertaken with a focus on how 
market reforms have impacted upon the elderly as a group.1 It has canvassed issues such as 
insurance coverage, waiting lists, financial accessibility, access to services and other essential 
issues which assess the effectiveness of the reforms. Based on the case study and varied 
1 Consult Appendix A for survey questions. 
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primary sources, it appears that a number of the advantages which advocators of the refonns 
purported would result from changes to the health care system have not in fact materialised. 
Conversely, many side effects which were predicted have become a reality for the elderly. 
Chapter one reviewed advocates arguments that market incorporated health care had a 
number of advantages, all of which reflected the assumption that health care is a commodity. 
First, it was claimed that such a move would be more responsive to consumer preferences and 
contribute to innovation and equal treatment. Second, rationing by price would be a fairer 
system of meeting need than rationing in other ways. Third, the market would be more flexible, 
bringing about a large expansion to hospital-based services, and fourth, removing bureaucratic 
inefficiency would involve greater consumer and provider responsibility. This section seeks to 
critique the validity of these claims by assessing the effects of these alleged advantages on the 
elderly. 
Harris and Seldon argue that the market in health care responds readily to the needs of 
those who require the services it provides and then accommodates what they choose, as well as 
bringing in new ideas and change.2 Further, they argue, it offers equality in treatment Referring 
back to the story of Iris Kennard in chapter four it can be appreciated how the private sector 
operates at the interface level3 Once Iris had decided that she would pay for her cataract 
operation out of her own pocket instead of waiting the estimated three years for the operation 
in the public system she found that the private sector were indeed very responsive to her needs 
operating with efficiency and effectiveness. The cost was a major factor in her deliberation. 
However, due to the necessity of the situation she dipped into her savings for the $3000 dollar 
fee. Iris's case highlights the issue of accessibility to health care based on an ability to pay 
criteria, The obvious problem with the first 'market advantage' is that it presupposes the 
person requiring care can afford to take out either private health insurance or pay for essential 
treatment out of their own pocket. In fact, case study results showed that only 35 percent of 
elderly are currently covered by health insurance. As figure 18 shows 65 percent of those 
surveyed were without cover, with over 19 percent of this total having just recently cancelled 
their policy because of premium rises.4 
2R Harris and A.Seldon, 'Not from Benevolence'. Institute of Economic Affairs, London 1977. 
3Tue interface level is where the markets created by the private sectors connect between the 
availability from the system to the purchase and usage by the elderly. 
4 Health Care Survey 1997. 
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The Elderly and Insurance Coverage 
Figure 18 Source: Health Care Case Study of the Elderly 1997 
Legend 
1 - (35%) Number of elderly currently covered by private health insurance 
2 - (65%) Number of elderly without insurance cover 
When asked what the preferred method of paying for health care was, 23 percent of elderly 
said they were prepared to pay for it out of pocket.5 In order to receive the benefits which the 
private sector claims to provide, the patient must be willing or, more importantly, able to pay. 
Financial rationing then becomes the main mechanism to control the use of resources in health 
care. 
The financial ability of those over sixty-five to pay for health care appears minimal. 
Table 19 shows that the median income for a person over sixty-five is $12,177 dollars per 
year. Over 30 percent of elderly have an income which is less than $10,000 annually. 
Approximately 11.5 percent of elderly receive an income of between $15,001-$20,000, and 
just over 15 percent of elderly receive an income above 20,001. By far the majority of elderly 
fall within the income bracket of $5,000 - $15,000 
5 This is higher than the actual level of payment out of pocket for the entire population in 199 5 which 
was 17 percent, (excluding insurance policy costs which where a further 6%) as cited in 'Insurance 
picks up the tab'; The Evening Post, 24 September 19%, p.6. 
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Total Yearly Personal Income by Age and Sex for People Aged sixty-five 
and Over, 1996 
Total personal Age and sex 
income 65-79 80+ Total 65 + 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Percent 
Loss 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Zerohconle 0.3 0,5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.6 
$1 • $5,000 1.7 2.3 3.2 4.2 2.0 2.7 
$5,001 · $10,000 31.8 33.0 28.2 24.0 31.2 30.8 
$10,001 • $15,000 33.7 42.8 36.7 45.7 34.2 43.5 
$15,001 • $20,000 11.7 11.2 12.7 13.8 11.9 11.8 
$20,001 • $25,000 6.6 4.3 6.7 5.1 6.6 4.5 
$25,001 • $30,000 4.8 2.4 4.6 2.9 4.8 2.6 
$30,001 • $40,000 4.2 1.9 3.7 1.9 4.1 1.9 
$40,001 • $50,000 1.9 0.7 1.6 0.7 1.8 0.7 
$50,001 • $70,000 1.5 0.5 1.1 0.5 1.4 0.5 
$70,001 • $100,00 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.2 
$100,001 °' more 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Median Income ($) 12,360 11,658 12.459 12,312 12,378 11,832 
Table 4 Source: Statistics New Zealand, 1996 Census of Population and Dwellings 
The amount of income that individual superannuants need to ·cover their living expenses 
depends to a large degree on their housing costs. New Zealand has a high rate of home 
O\'inership in all age groups and people in the retirement age group are considerably more 
likely than others to O\'ITI their home without a mortgage.6 Table 4 sho\'.'l'S that almost three 
quarters of elderly over sixty-five o\'ITI their o\'ITI home without a mortgage, with only around 8 
percent with a mortgage and 10 percent renting . 
. 6 Statistics New Zealand, 19% Census of Population and Dwellings. 
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Housing Tenure by Age and Sex for People Aged Sixty-five and Over 1996 
Housing tenure Age and sex 
65-79 SO and over 
Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Percent 
Owned with mortgage 8.5 7.6 8.0 4.7 5.4 5.2 
Ovmed without mortgage 74.5 72.4 73.4 73.1 67.5 69.5 
Owned, mortgage not specified 2.5 3.3 2.9 4.6 4.9 4.8 
Provided rent free 3.4 3.7 3.6 5.2 5.6 5.5 
Rented 9.1 10.5 9.8 9.6 13.0 11.8 
Not owned, rental status not specified 1.9 2.5 2.3 2.9 3.5 3.3 
Totlil 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 5 Source: Statistics, New Zealand 1996 Census Population and Dwellings 
However, as figure 20 shows, housing remains the largest item of expenditure for 
superannuants. Among superannuant households, 21 percent of expenditure ,vent on housing in 
the 1992/93 and 1993/94 March years, slightly more than in other households. Other major 
items of expenditure for superannuant households were food and household operation (both 19 
percent), transport (15 percent) and personal and health services (9 percent). 
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Weekly Household Expenditure by Expenditure Group, 1992/93 and 1993/94 





















Figure 20 Source: Statistics, New Zealand, Household Economic Survey 
Compared \\-ith other households, superannuants spent a greater proportion of their 
money on these items and less on apparel, tobacco and alcohol, recreation, education and credit 
charges.7 
'Privatising has made things difficult for a lot of the elderly. You can't save on small 
income[s] and meet large premiums. The pension has shrunk so much, prices and 
charges have got too high ... '8 
Figure 21 shows diagrammatically how the elderly perceive their ability to adequately access 
health care after the implementation of the reforms. Only 2 percent of the elderly surveyed 
thought that government reforms had greatly improved accessibility to health care services, 
while 20 percent found that there had been no difference. 76 percent of the elderly stated, 
however, that health care ,vas less to much less accessible. 
7 Statistics New Zealand, 1996 Census of Population and Dwellings. 
8 Comments made by an elderly person who was surveyed in Christhurch 2 October 1997. 
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Impact of Reforms on Access to Health Ca re for the Elderly 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40. 45 
Percentage of Bderly 
F" urure 21 S ource: e t are HalhC C ase s yo t e erly tud f h Eld  1997 
Legend: 
a ~ greatly improved accessibility c ~ no difference e ~ much less accessible 
b ~ more accessible d ~ less accessible 
For three quarters of the respondents the reforms have made health care accessibility a real 
issue with finance seen as the main impediment to access; 
'Health care is only for people who have the money to buy it. Justice is a commodity, 
if you can't afford to pay for it, you don't get it'.9 
'Access to surgery should not be dependent upon one's ability to pay for private care' 10 
'In our society we now have a user pay[ s] system [ which] has gone too far, a great 
number of our people cannot afford to meet these extra costs' 11 
The elderly are feeling robbed in a new environment which has imposed a system completely 
contradictory to previous public policy. Evidence suggests that the elderly have been the 
victims in the market refonns, they are the ones being squeezed out of the system. Ian Powell, 
of the Association for Salaried Medical Specialists, states that those he represents feel very 
helpless about what is happening; 
9 Comments made by an elderly person who was surveyed in Christhurch 2 October 1997. 
1 O Comments made by an elderly person who was surveyed, 1997. 
11 Comments made by an elderly person who was surveyed, 1997. 
Implications of Private Sector Involvement 102 
'I see a lot of people quite distraught and upset about what's happening, and a sense of 
powerlessness as well. There's a belief that doctors have a lot of power, but it's just 
not the case. I think there's an increasing level of despair and frustration among 
specialists and among health practitioners generally. They know the demand is there, 
but the resources to do the operations are not. They know that people are suffering and 
there will be no end to their suffering. '12 
The feeling is particularly strong among the elderly. 'Many are convinced', says Ross Ogle, a 
GP in Tauranga who treats large numbers of elderly, 'that the government is going to strip all 
state help to the minimum and make them pay twice for everything. A lot of them do feel 
they're about to be abandoned.' He recalls a 75 year-old he saw recently who was facing a hip 
operation. She was told by the hospital that she couldn't be guaranteed a place in intensive care 
but would have to take her chance in the general wards.13 Such treatment is not uncommon and 
reflects the impact of reducing funding. 
The market is said to bring new ideas and change to the health care system. Such 
innovation is evidenced by a number of initiatives taken by insurance companies, for example, 
the reduced cover policy. Premium rises over the past six years has resulted in the total pool of 
uninsured being reduced as much as 10 percent,14 with a large number of these cancelled 
policies being held by the elderly.15 Figure 12 in chapter 4 shows that 19 percent of elderly have 
cancelled their insurance with premium increases being the direct catalyst in 98 percent of 
them. To counteract this problem insurance companies have come up with an innovative way 
to retain elderly policy holders after premium rises have occurred. They simply offer a 
reduced cover. For the company it means they are able to retain the policy holder and their 
annual premium each year. It also means that the company covers the elderly for less care, 
reducing the avenues available for putting in a claim which effectively reduces pay out costs 
for the company. For the policy holder it has important implications. First, the policy is 
reduced to cover the elderly for less medical problems which might arise. This means that they 
will have to either rely on the shrinking public sector which is reshaping itself to ultimately 
provide only acute care, or pay out of pocket for health problems which are not covered in 
their new downsized insurance policies. Second, the cost of the new reduced policy premium is 
around the same price as the original policy which covered the elderly for a lot more. 16 
12 Powell I, 'Public Health Trend Concern', The Dominion, 21 May 1997. 
13 Comments made by Ross Ogle G~ in Greerton, Tau.ranga, as cited in Welch.D, 'The Nation's 
health', The Press, 1 Novemeber, 1997. 
14 'High cost blamed for health insurance fall', Van den Bergh. R, The Dominion, 19 November 
1996, plO. 
15 Dennott.M the Christchurch branch manager ofUnimed, 1 October 1997, 10am at 163 
Glouchester Street, Christchurch 
16Information gained from Interview with Dermott Martin, 1997. 
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'[I]Have changed my cover from full to 'surgery only' because of premium inc.reases 
[I]would prefer to have retained full cover' 17 
The benefits gained by the insurance companies and the disadvantages for the elderly policy 
holder reflects the imbalance of power in the situation. The inherent danger in this is that the 
elderly continue to lose out and as premiums rise, the procedures included in a reduced cover 
policy will diminish to the point where the policy holder is covered for only very serious health 
problems. Other non-life-threatening procedures, such as hip replacements or cataract 
operations, would have to be paid for out of pocket or forgone altogether. This type of market 
adjusting is creating financial uncertainty and hardship, not to mention long-term suffering 
from easily treated health problems. This is a notable example of how new ideas and change by 
the private sector in the market are directed at serving the private sector's own interests. 
One claimed advantage of implementing the market in health is that it makes the 
system more responsive to consumer preferences. What this translates to is that those paying 
for care should effectively have the right to choose who provides that care. Technically this 
theory applies in the public system, but reducing budgets is making this impossible. Health 
care in the private sector operates by giving the person requiring care the right to choose the 
professionals they want to have treating them. In fact, most will be referred on to health 
professionals by local General Practitioners. Yet this private sector accommodation of choice 
is proving to be costly to the company insurer. 
'If people have the cover, they want the best and most expensive treatment by the best 
health professionals .. .if you are insured then the resources will be available and 
ultimately used ... a lot more procedures are done a lot earlier in the disease process, 
from what used to happen.' 1s 
The concern expressed here by insurance companies is that insurance resources are being 
overly utilised by policy holders to the detriment of their profit margins. Recent revelations 
have shown that the Medical Association has claimed that health insurers are asking surgeons 
to undercut colleagues' prices. Dr Brian Linehan said he feared the practice was becoming 
widespread and could jeopardise patient safety. 19 The Association was aware of cases where 
insurance companies asked surgeons to undercut prices previously quoted by other surgeons. 
The Association had serious concerns about the trend and doctors were worried some 
companies were using their monopoly to bring prices down.20 
'There could be situations where patients are forced to go to surgeons 
or secondary care providers not because of their professional suitability but 
17 Comments made by an elderly pe~n who was surveyed in Christhurch 2 October 1997. 
18rnterview with D.Martin,1997. 
19rs charirnan of the New Zealand Medical Association as cited in M. Alexander, 'Cut price surgeons 
~referred', Sunday Star Times, 27 July 1997. 
Oor Linehan was quoted as saying in M. Alexander,'Cut-price surgeons preferred'..Sunday Star 
Times, 27 July 1997. 
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simply because of price. If we carry that even further, people could be forced 
to go to unappropriated specialists and people operating outside their 
specialists simply because they are offering to do something at a cheaper 
price. ' 21 
Dr Linehan said patients would not appreciate insurance companies selecting surgeons. 
'The implication is that it will be on the basis of which is the cheapest rather than the 
one who is best for you. The practice stemmed from insurance companies trying to 
cut their costs. '22 
However, that is exactly what is being proposed by Aetna, which plans to contract doctors to 
perfonn operations. Aetna purports that it is a viable way to drive the health care dollar further 
and to keep premiums from rising at the current rate. Nonnally clients can choose the specialist 
or doctor they want when a medical problem arises and then simply send the bill to the 
company. However, if Aetna proceeds with its proposed contracting plan then consumer choice 
may become a thing of the past. The potential outcome is that where an Aetna client's G.P is 
not on the insurance companies contract schedule and is charging more than Aetna's rate, the 
client would be liable for the difference. Further, there is concern that the insurance companies 
will dictate what sort of care the patient gets. White points out that medical services provided 
by contractors is a problem already experienced in the United States, with doctors consulting 
with insurance companies as to whether a specific treatment will be applied and made 
available.23 If successful, Aetna's profit-orientated proposal will create a breakdown in the 
consumer choice aspect of the market advantage. Once such a precedent is created it will not 
take long for other insurance companies to follow this economically-driven initiative. 
Advocates of the Market consider rationing by price a fairer system of meeting need 
than rationing in other ways. It is easy to agree with this if one adopts the private sector's 
perception of health care as an ordinary commodity. In order to understand the so called 
'market advantage' of this fonn of rationing, one must comprehend the rationale and logic 
behind the market advocate's belief as to who benefits from this new system. To do this two 
scenarios set in the refonned tax based health system are created. Scenario one involves a 
middle aged 45 year old executive with a gross income exceeding $100,000. She pays tax of 
$.33 of every dollar earned to be divided into the various social policy programmes by the 
government. Her nett take home pay is $67,000. $33,000 of her income is paid to the 
government on an annual basis and the executive's health care is taken care of. If she gets sick 
she can expect to get the necessary treatment, she does not have to pay for it out of her own 
pocket or through annual premiums. Scenario two involves a 75 year old Pensioner who has a 
gross taxable income from the government of $12,177. Such a person will pay $2922.48 in 
21 Alexander, 'Cut-price surgeons preferred' .. 1997. 
22Alexander, 'Cut-price surgeons preferred'..1997. 
23 J.White, One Network News, 13 Jamuy 1998, 
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tax with an annual take home of $9,255.00 per year. He will get the same care despite his 
much smaller tax contribution. 
The observation which market advocates highlight is that the variations in tax 
contributions between the scenarios are significant. This is important considering that the 
health care needed by the 75 year old is likely to be much higher than that by the 45 year old, 
yet their actual individual contributions to health care do not reflect this under a publicly 
funded health care system. The 45 year old, in effect, subsidises the 75 year old for who makes 
little health care contribution (even though he has done so throughout his life). Compare this 
with the market involvement in health care. The government reduces the tax take as it needs 
less money to run the system because people are paying for their care through private health 
insurance companies. Those who fall into the scenario one category retain much more 
disposable income which increases greatly as their income rises because tax cuts have a little 
or no impact on low incomes but a large impact on high incomes. Each person is now paying 
for their own health care; no one is cross subsidising as under the old system. This is the 
market advocate's notion of fairness. 
The flaw in the system lies in the other significant difference between the executive and 
the pensioner - their personal disposable incomes. Under the market health care system, both 
individuals need to take out private health insurance in order to secure access to health care 
services when they require them. For the scenario one person this is no problem as the tax cuts 
pay for the annual premium. For scenario two, however, the situation is very different. Not 
only do they have to make provision out of their meagre disposable income each year but they 
must pay more for their cover than the executive due to the fact that they are older.24 The extra 
financial outlay uses a larger proportion of the elderly's disposable income because they have 
less of it and because the tax cuts have minimal effect for them. Based on this only small 
higher socio economic groups would receive the advantage that the market brings in this type 
of society. Rice25 argues that the privatisation of social policy areas such as health care is 
part of a wider redistributive agenda. Income distribution is an issue so sensitive and important 
that it arouses intense political and social passions in all societies.26 Yet is questionable whether 
New Zealanders are aware of the implications these reforms will have on the redistribution 
balance. 
Another alleged advantage of the market system is that it is more flexible and brings 
about a large expansion of hospital-based services. From case study comments and other 
24 A person over the age of 65 pays approximately 60 percent more for their health insurance than 
does a person under the age of 65, refer comparison of Premium costs at Southern Cross, p26 of this 
chapter. 
25 T.Rice, 'Can Markets Give Us the Health System We Want', UCLA School of Public Health, cited 
in Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Volume 22, No.2, April 1997. 
26 L Bayliss'Economic failure in NZ and what should be done about it', Prosperity Mislaid, GP 
Publications, Wellington,1994, pl04. 
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commentaries.27 however, it would appear that far from expanding the hospital based services,2s 
the practice of closing hospitals that were not economically viable has been the nonn. As the 
Minister of Health saliently put it, 'large hospitals will get smaller and small hospitals will 
close'29 Many hospitals face an uncertain future as the drive for financial viability creeps 
through the New Zealand health system. Already increasing hospital closures has been 
witnessed since the commencement of reforms; 
'Closure of small regional hospitals should not be used as a cost cutting 
exercise. People in smaller towns should have ready access to hospital care in 
their own area where family support is available. '30 
Moreover, massive cuts to central region hospital services, including a 40 percent cut 
in the number of hospital beds have been .forecasted. The widespread perception according to 
Welch is that public hospitals are under threat and the smaller ones will be completely 
eliminated.31 The fear is that the larger hospitals are being turned into trauma centres with no 
wider caring role. The CHEs are being forced into a 'business model' straitjacket that does not 
fit. The darkest thought of all is that they are being groomed for purchase by the private sector-
being deliberately kept short of funds and resources in order to prove a) their inability to cope 
as public institutions and b) the desirability of them being privatised. 
These fears are not unwarranted. In a leaked report from Coopers and Lybrand written 
for the Central Regional Health Authority it shows that only two of eight central regional 
public hospitals are clinically viable. The report defines clinical viability as the safety and 
sustainability of services offered and measures whether hospitals can provide safe and effective 
24 hour cover. Masterton, Blenheim and Nelson hospitals were assessed as not viable and 
doubts were expressed over Hutt Hospital. The report studied scenarios which included 
cutting all inpatient services to the hospitals. The report predicted that these would be axed 
with remaining day patient services provided by private clinics. The hospitals and services 
which are seen as not clinically viable will be removed instead of improved. It is proposed that 
they will be replaced with greater privatisation through privately owned independent practice 
associations and health maintenance organisations, which operate private insurance-based 
schemes.32 
It is questionable whether the government can realistically expect the private sector to 
provide the services which it has withdrawn from in the small rural areas. If it is non-viable for 
27 See C. Guyan, 'Hospitals not viable, face cuts', The Evening Post, 1 September 1997 and 
D.Welch, 'The nations health', Listener, 1 November, 1997,p.18. 
28 With the exception of a couple of superclinics recently opened. 
29 Minister of Health Bill English on TVNZ interview with John Cambell, 21 October 1997. 
3o Comments made by an elderly person who was surveyed in Christhurch 2 October 1997 
31D.Welch, 'The nations health', Listener, 1 November, 1997,p.18. 
32 C. Guyan, 'Hospitals not viable, face cuts', The Evening Post, 1 September 1997. 
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government the private sector is unlikely to move in. The notion that the private sector will fill 
the void left by the state's withdrawal from health care provision also means that there is no 
guarantee that every area of need for the elderly ~ill be met. Further, the concern for the 
elderly is that the private sector will focus on providing services which are most profitable for . . 
them, as has been the case in the provision of rest homes and private hospitals. The most likely 
occurrence, as in the United States, is a clumping together of services in the main areas, such 
as in Auckland and Christchurch, based primarily on population size. Areas such as in the 
bottom of the south island with declining population bases, places such as Gore, lnvercargill, 
Dunedin and Oamaru will be unlikely to get substantial services from the private companies . 
. Already this can be seen in Southern Cross's health delivery network (Figure 21). 
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Figure 12 Source: Southern Cross annual report 1997 
Marked on the map are the private hospitals, Accident and Medical Clinics and Associate 
. Clinics which Southern Cross provides. The North Island has more due to the greater 
population levels. Apart from the abundant Associate Clinics in Christchurch, representation is 
minimal in the South Island. Evidence of this prejudice was partly responsible for the United 
States government entering the marketplace in order to correct the geographical maldistribtion 
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of hospital beds caused by private companies moving hospitals to more wealthy suburban 
areas.33 
The market is said to remove bureaucratic inefficiency and involve greater consumer 
and provider responsibility. Theory aside, the reality is that bureaucratic inefficiencies still 
exist. The private insurance market is a competitive one, anything which is competitive in this 
type of environment has added costs. In the insurance market these are called 'loading costs' 
and include extras such as advertising, administration, directors fees, premises rental and 
other overheads. The more competition, the greater the need for advertising, and consequently, 
the greater the loading cost added to premiums. Cost escalation in this type of market is a 
likely result.34 The removal of bureaucratic inefficiency can really be seen as a transfer from 
public sector to the private sector the only fundamental difference is that the cost is coming 
directly out of the consumers pocket where previously it was coming out indirectly by route of 
the public purse. 
Harris and Seldon claim that the incorporation of the market into health care involves 
greater consumer and provider responsibility.35 Central regulation and control is reduced and 
individual choice is advanced. This introduces issues of what is the appropriate level of 
government intervention in a market orientated health system.36 Effectively provider 
responsibility in the market comes down to whether there is demand and profit. It has little to 
do with ethical considerations where there is a need but an inability to pay, for example, 
counselling for abuse of the elderly. Consumer responsibility involves ideas of self interest and 
protecting oneself and one's family. The difficulty with this aspect of the market is that self 
interest involves many facets and often health care is subordinated to other necessities, such as 
mortgages and commodities. Unimed's branch manager commented, 'when the budget's tight 
health insurance is one of the first insurance policies to go, ahead of house and even car'.37 
Market incorporation into health care has raised a number of fundamental concerns for 
the elderly and for the wider population as a whole. Impediments to accessing health care as a 
result of the cost of insurance premiums has led to serious equity concerns as has the insurance 
companies practice of reducing their policies while retaining their income. Government closure 
of rural hospitals and the private sector's development in clusters raise serious geographical 
maldisribution concerns. 
Assessing the Presence of Moral hazard and adverse selection 
This section examines the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance 
companies is examined. At the beginning of this thesis two theories about market failures were 
33 RH.Blank, Rationing Medicine, Columbia University Press, New York 1988,p.98. 
34RHarris and A. Seldon, 'Not from Benevolence.' Institute of Economic Affairs, London 1977. 
35Harris & Seldon, 'Not from Benevolence', 1977. 
36 These issues are studied in more detail later in this chapter. 
37 M. Dermott interview,1997. · 
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introduced which exposed a number of shortcomings in the insurance market. They were seen 
as ways in which failure could result in the provision of health care to the public. In order to 
assess whether these two negative aspects of the market were present both the insurance 
companies and a number of elderly were interviewed. 
As stated earlier moral hazard or rather 'consumer moral hazard' arises because the 
very fact of being insured reduces the financial costs of treatment at the point of consumption, 
hence being ill is made a less m1desirable state. The incentive to adopt healthier lifestyles is 
decreased and the probability of requiring care increases. The other aspect of consumer moral 
hazard is the effect of insurance when sickness occurs and services are demanded. A zero or 
reduced price at the point of use encourages a higher rate of consumption than would otherwise 
be considered efficient. Effectively there is a wedge driven between paying for the cost of what 
is provided and the value of or \villingness to pay for what is provided. Thus, the market fails 
to transmit efficient price signals to consumers.38 
To assess whether moral hazard is present amongst the elderly they were asked 
questions designed to gauge their view on being insured and whether they felt it was something 
to be exploited. Figure 26 shows the elderly's view on insurance utilisation. 50 percent of the 
elderly believe that they utilised the insurance coverage which they hold while 21 percent of 
elderly did not believe that they did utilise their cover. A further 29 percent did not think of 
their health insurance as something to be utilised. 





F' 1gure 23S ource: e are H alth C C t d f th Eld I 1997 ase s u yo e er y 
Legend: 
1 (50%) believe they utilise the insurance cover which they bold 
2 (21 %) did not believe that they utilised their insurance 
3 (29%) did not think of their in_surance as something to be utilised 
38oonaldson and Gerard, 'Economics of Health Care Financing', p.31. 
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These results suggest that the elderly indeed do utilise the insurance cover that they have. 
Figure 15 ( in chapter 4) confinns this demonstrating that over 80 percent of policy holders 
surveyed have made.a claim in the last 12 months. With nearly 30 percent of those surveyed 
saying that they did not think of their insurance cover as something to be utilised, it appears 
that while many are using the system they are not exploiting it. This is supported by figure 23 
which shows that 80 percent of the elderly say that they use their health care coverage only 
when necessary. With 10 percent of the elderly claiming that they do not use it enough and 
only 10 percent saying that they use it in order to get their moneys worth, it appears that the 
level of insurance abuse amongst the elderly is rare and they are responsible with its use. 





Figure 24 Source: Health Care Case study of the Elderly 1997 
f:!l 
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From these relatively rudimentary case study results it would seem that moral hazard is not 
present in the attitudes of the elderly. The reason for this is the co-payment system which is an 
important impediment to the manifestation of moral hazard. Southern Cross (SC), the insurer 
with the· largest number of elderly people with policies in New Zealand, has implemented this 
co-payment system where the policy holder pays a pre-determined amount towards the 
treatment of their care (the most popular is 20 percent). It is similar to an excess on car 
insurance, working effectively as a deterrent to frequent use. The co-payments are the comer 
stone for SC with over 75 percent of members opting for the 'Regular Care' program, which 
requires a 20 percent contribution towards their own care.39 The user of the insurance pays 20 
percent of the cost of the care out of their own pocket at the point of treatment, while at the 
same time paying a reduced p~um compared to other policies which have no co-payment 
39 Interview with Fiona McCloud, Christchurch branch manager of Southern Cross Healthcare, 26 
September 1997, 11am, 148 Victoria St, Christchurch, 1997. 
Implications of Private Sector Involvement 111 
allowance. According to the SC branch manager this has been extremely successful in 
deterring people from using their insurance unnecessarily. 
According to the Southern Cross branch manager the group which is most likely to 
commit moral hazard is the white collar workers who have health plans which cover 
everything, i.e. the ones with no co-payments.40 Interview with Fiona McCloud, Christchurch 
branch manager of Southern Cross Healthcare, 26 September 1997, 11am, 148 Victoria St, 
Christchurch The fact that usage is up amongst the elderly does not necessarily reflect the 
presence of moral hazard. Rather it may reflect the need for care which stems from the cut 
bacl--..s in public health and the shifting of elective surgery into the private sector. 
As chapter one explained, adverse selection results from asymmetry of information in 
the insurance market; that is, buyers of insurance often have more idea about their risk status 
than sellers of health care insurance. Initially in a competitive market if the insurance 
companies have no idea of individual risk status a premium could be set reflecting the general 
health risk of the insured population. Thus, the premium paid by everyone who takes out 
insurance would be the same reflecting the 'average' risk level of the insured population known 
as 'community rating'. The elderly, for example, are considered a high risk group. For some 
members of the insured population who perceive their own risk level to be lower than average 
this community rating premium will be too high and they will elect not to take out health care 
insurance. The effect of this decision means, however, that the average risk level of those 
remaining insured will rise because it is people of lower-than-average risk who have dropped 
out of insurance. Thus, to cover the projected health care costs of this population group 
premiums must rise. Again, the effect is that those perceiving their risk status to be lower than 
the average of those remaining insured will exit the market and the cycle will continue. This 
process, whereby the best risks are selected out of the insured group is called 'adverse 
selection'.41 
In a competitive system other phenomena would be expected to follow from adverse 
selection. The presence of a low-risk uninsured group of people presents insurance companies 
with the opportunity to tailor premiums to the levels of these individuals rather than the 
population risk. This is known as 'experience rating'. If fine distinctions can be made a 
premium will reflect assumed future risk level based perhaps on some idea of past history of 
personal and family health as a predictor for the future. As a result of this process, higher-risk 
groups (typically the lower-paid, elderly people and the chronically sick) will be required to 
pay higher experience-related premiums to maintain coverage, premiums which they may not 
be able to afford. The process by which low-risk individuals are drawn into low-premium plans 
is often referred to as 'skimming,' or 'creaming off'. The elderly is a high-risk group and 
premiums for the over sixty five age group are the highest for any of the groups. They are 
40 Interview with Fiona McCloud, 1998. 
41 As outlined in Chapter 1. 
Implications of Private Sector Involvement 112 
being required to pay higher experience-related premiums to maintain their coverage. It is clear 
from the case study that those elderly who have insurance are indeed using it. Whether they 
are doing so unnecessarily is difficult to gauge accurately, but with over 80 percent of policy 
holders making a claim in the last 12 months one thing is very. clear: claims are high and so too 
is the increase in premiums.42 
The theory suggests that two groups of people are left uninsured as a result of this, 
those at low risk who trigger the cycle by pulling out of insurance at community rates, and 
those in high-risk groups who cannot afford experience-rated premiums.43 From the evidence 
revealed it would appear that it is the high risk group, who are finding it increasingly difficult 
to finance their insurance with a continual increase in premium levels of 12 percent every year. 
The current cycle sees premiums rising due to increased demand on health care resources 
provided by the private sector because those services are now very difficult, if not impossible 
to obtain from the public system. As the premium prices increase many older people who have 
not claimed recently but may well have had a policy for a lengthy period of time (refer chapter 
4, figurel3) will cancel them. Figure 14 (chapter 4) shows that if premiums rise another 20 
percent by 1999, then a quarter of elderly who have policies would cancel them44 'Each time 
premiums rise 'a layer of policy holders are burnt off.45 This trend is very concerning as it 
effectively means that only those elderly who can afford the cost of cover will have open access 
to health care provided through the private sector. Those who retain their cover will either be 
risk adverse, be dependent on their insurance and be able to afford insurance, or will have a 
known health problem. Many others in this grouping will have scaled down their insurance 
policy to partial cover, others will be forced to take their chance in the public sector. 
This leaves the insurance companies with those elderly who are the 'bad risks'. They 
are the ones who use insurance on a regular basis or are the ones who have health problems or 
simply those who do not feel they can do without it. Effectively the total policy pool reduces 
and the claims increase. Consequently the margins for the companies are reduced. Unimed's 
manager commented, 'The more well elderly who pull out, the company are left with the 
adverse group and this becomes detrimental to both parities' 46 This is a fundamental flaw in 
the insurance market and is a example of how the market is failing and will continue to fail in 
providing adequate access to health care for the elderly. 
42 Refer chapter 4, Pp34-35. 
43 Refer chapter 4,p.36. 
44 As was evidenced in the survey of the elderly 1997. 
45 M.Dermott Interview,1997. 
46 M.Dennott Interview, 1997. 
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The Ability of Insurance Companies in Providing the Health Care Needs of the Elderly in 
the New Millennium 
'Growth in the elderly [population] is now a problem for the insurance company'47 
Are Insurance companies capable of providing the health care needs of elderly in the new 
millennium? The short answer is not under the current direction. The reasons for this are the 
costs of premiums set by the insurance companies which are causing financial inaccessibility, 
and the continual increases which exacerbate the problem. Consequently, many elderly are 
scaling down their policies to one which offers a reduced cover leaving them reliant on the 
decaying public system for their other health care needs or forgoing health care altogether. 
Based on the evidence gathered, this thesis predicts that the numbers of elderly without 
insurance will steadily climb as New Zealand proceeds further into the 21 Century.48 This 
coupled with the withdrawal of government funding will put increasing pressure on the private 
sector. 
Premium prices for this high-risk group are going. to be expensive in the future, quite 
possibly too expensive for many of the elderly to afford. Trends in premium rises are likely to 
continue according to the major insurance companies. 12 percent increases on a yearly basis 
has seen premiums for the over sixty-five high risk group increase 400 percent in the last six 
years with no end in site.49 Table 1 gives a comparison of the costs of policies for an Adult 
under sixty-five and an Adult over sixty-five at Southern Cross. The obvious difference here is 
the fact that those over sixty-five are paying around 60 percent more for their insurance then 
those under sixty-five. 
47 F.McCloud, Interview, 1997. · 
48 In this section a number of premium projections for the next decade based from current and 
predicted trends are made, the rising premium levels suggest that this will result in a declining of 
~licy holders, refer p26-27. 
9 Refer chapter four, Pp 34-35. 
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'Members continue to make increasing use of their premium contributions, 
particularly in the area of elective surgery. Surgical claims have grown by 
40.6 percent over the last five years as evidenced by the pay--out amount, for 
surgery alone, of $154.7 million during the last twelve months. This can be 
compared with an annual figure of $9 5. 8 million in 1992/93. This reflects the 
increasing shift of non-urgent surgical procedures away from the state 
hospital sector and into the private domain - a shift which has continued 
unabated for several years.'51 
Senario One: Projected Premium Estimates for the New Millennium 
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The figures in scenario one are based purely on the evidence gained from interviews and an 
assessment of current trends and annual reports. It gives an indication of what premium levels 
those under and over sixty-five could well expect to pay if current trends persist. It is a 
conservative prediction of premium rises for the next ten years. It projects a continuation of the 
annual 12 percent rise for the next four years and then a decrease to 8 percent for the following 
six years. The reason for the projected reduction in premium increases is a prediction of 
stability which will come about when the government finally settles on the level of provision it 
is willing to provide. Once the government has :finished reforming the health system and a 
degree of stability returns to the health environment, the insurance companies v,ill know what 
level of elective surgery they need to provide. Consequently, the companies should be able to 
reduce the increasing premiums. Furthermore, as claims become more predictable for the 
insurance companies, the insurance market obtains a degree of certainty and price stability 
resulting in a stabilisation in policy holder numbers. This ultimately translates into a 
diminished need to increase premiums at such a high rate. 
51or Hylton Le Grice, Chairman of Southern Cross cited in the Annual Report 1997,p2. 
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Senairo Two: Projected Premium Estimates for the New Millennium 
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This is, however, a conservative estimation as figures in 1996 show that as the numbers of 
high-risk groups, such as the elderly, increase premiums rise as much as 20 percent a year.$2 
Unimed is a company which has increased premiums at this rate. The figures in scenario two 
are based on a prediction of these continued high increases. The projection is for the_ premium 
rises at 12 percent to continue for the next four years, followed by a further increase to 16 
percent in 2004 (as opposed to the decrease to 8 percent as in scenario one). The reason for 
this is the increase in work load of insurance companies which must satisfy the demand for 
more services as the government withdraws completely from its role in areas such as elective 
surgery. It is predicted that the total pool of policy holders will increase as people become 
aware that if they want access they have to have insurance. However, it is predicted that those 
who are in the low risk groups will chose not take out health insurance but rather pay out of 
pocket for care as they need it, possibly covering themselves for only the bare minimum (like 
surgery).53 The effect of this is that while the total pool of insured people will increase, it is 
predominantly those who believe that they need the insurance and are likely to use it that will 
insure themselves. The low risk groups will take the chance and stay out of the market hence 
adverse selection continues. This effectively means that premiums will keep rising as the high 
risk groups, or rather those in need of care, continue to claim. 
In Table 1 it is clear that the difference between the two levels of risk groups are 
significant. The price discrepancies are most notable between the 'Regular Plus' plan and the 
'Ultra Care 400'. In the former plan the over sixty-five pay 144 percent more than those under 
sixty-five whereas in the latter plan those over sixty-five pay 130 percent more in premiums 
52 Love.P'GoingPrivate',, The Evening Post, 26 Oct 1996, p.17. 
53 Many elderly (235) put 'paying out of pocket' as a prefered way of paying for HC refer chapter 4, 
p.28. 
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than the other group. If we consider scenario one ten years on this difference has increased 
substantially. 'Regular care' shoots up to a premium rate which is 164 percent higher than the 
under sixty-five's. However, the most significant changes occur in scenario two. In 'Regular 
Care' ten years from now, it is estimated that premium levels for the elderly will be close to . 
$5000 per year. The difference between the two risk groups is significant, with those over 
sixty-five paying 180 percent more for their premiums than those under sixty-five, The 
important issue in this is that while there is a vast difference in premium prices, there is also a 
vast difference in income earned between the two groups. The average weekly income in New 
Zealand as at November 1997 is $624 gross 54 For the elderly, their average weekly personal 
income is $234 gross.55 If an elderly person has a 'Regular Care' policy it will cost them over 
10 percent of their disposable income to pay the premiums for one year.56 For a person under 
sixty-five earning the average wage and covered by the same health policy as an elderly person, 
the cost would constitute only 1.4 percent of their disposable income. 
The fundamental future problem is that this premium figure is quite likely to be three 
to five times higher in ten years, Any rises in the superannuation level are not going to 
correspond to such large increases. Even if, as predicted in scenario one, premiums rise at the 
current rate for only four more years, then reduce by one third for the next six, they would still 
be almost three times what they are today. This would mean that the elderly would be spending 
around 23 percent of their disposable yearly income on private health insurance.57 In scenario 
two the elderly would lose 37 percent of their disposable income just for basic health care 
coverage, or for a policy which provided them with a little more cover, 'Regular Plus' would 
absorb around 50 percent of their yearly income. For complete cover under "IBtra Care 40011, 
the elderly would be faced with paying over 70 percent of their total yearly income.58 Such 
trends are unsustainable for many elderly and the insurance companies recognise that as the 
elderly are faced ·with further rises they may lose large numbers of policy holders. 
' ... there will inevitably be increasing claims, and therefore more costly 
premiums. Members have to carefully understand the reasons for this 
increasing burden in a changing environment, and why, it is now more 
54 Television Three, 6 o'clock News on 19 November 1997 
55S tatistics New Zealand, Census of Population and Dwellings, 1996. 
56~fost people insured earn $40,000 to $65,000 a year says New Zealand health Insurance 
Association president James White who has warned that in the longer term people will continue to 
pay more in premiums. Premiums have doubled in the past five years and are expected to double 
during the next five years. One insurance expert predicted the cost of an insurance premium would 
eventually rise to between 5 and 6 percent of annual gross income. This he commented would rival 
the contributions some New Zealand~rs made saving for their retirement.' Going Private', Love.P, The 
]Jvening Post, 26 October 1996,p17. 
, 7 This is taking into consideration an adjusted income to compensate for inflation 
58 This figure is projected off an increase in the average elderly yearly income which had been 
adjusted for inflation at 3 percent over 10 years. The average income for the elderly in 1997 is 
$12,177 this would then rise to $13000 per year by 2008. The 70 percent figure is taken from the 
adjusted figure. 
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important than ever for individuals to continue with private health 
insurance. 's9 
It is certainly not exaggerating to suggest that in the next few years health care policies for the 
elderly will be reduced down to only bare essential coverage for those financially able enough 
to afford the luxury of even reduced cover. The projected premium increases are at a level 
which many elderly would simply not be able to afford to purchase. It can be seen that if such 
trends continue complete health cover will be reserved only for the wealthy, turning the old 
proverb 11health is wealth" on its head. 
Discrimination against the elderly is a prominent problem amongst some insurance 
companies who have set age restrictions on the elderly's ability to take out policies. In the past, 
most health insurers refused to accept new members above a certain age. However, the 
introduction of the Human Rights Act 1993 means that it is against the law for an insurance 
company to deny a person coverage due to their age. Yet despite this legislation a number of 
companies still persist in setting limits. 'I was accepted for cover but my husband was 
refused because he was 8 months over the age limit. I consider that discriminatory. ' 60 
Farmers mutual group (FMG), a small predominantly rural insurer, has an age limit of 
sixty-five years. At PSIS, applicants must be under sixty-five years to obtain the health care 
policy and under 70 years of age to join Surgical Care. These insurers are clearly 
discriminating on the basis of age.61 It is quite obvious, in most cases, that discrimination has 
not been eliminated by the introduction of the Act but rather mutated from exclusion by age to 
exclusion by price. Rising premiums costs which force the elderly to either cancel or downsize 
their polices is one way of alleviating the problems of growing numbers and increasing needs. 
Discrimination is a necessary way for the companies to control the burgeoning numbers of 
elderly needing cover and the corresponding demand for services. Considering the amount of 
increased pressure on the private insurance market, the insurance companies were asked about 
the reliability of the private insurance market for making health care coverage accessible to 
those sixty'.'five and over now and when their numbers start rising in the future. Unimed's 
branch manager expressed his personal opinion: 
'I am really concerned about my elderly members and my inability to 
financially assist them [with their health care policies]. In the past the costs 
have been cross subsidised by younger people, however competition with 
other companies under cutting premiums means we can no longer do this. ' 62 
Despite the paternalistic concern it is the insurance companies which make the decisions to 
raise the premiums. However, the insurance companies argue that it is only out of necessity 
59 Dr Hylton Le Grice, Chairman of Southern Cross, cited in the SC Annual Report 1997,p.3. 
6° Comment in HC Survey 1997, by elderly refer Appendix B. 
61 Consumer magazine, 14 July 1997, p.29. 
62 M.Dermott Interview, 1997. • 
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that premiums are increasing and indeed doing so is detrimental not only to the premium holder 
but also to the companies themselves. The problem is circular according to the branch manager 
of Southern Cross. 
'When we are forced to increase premiums due to increased claims [ as services once 
provided in the public sector are being cut]. Those who have not claimed or are in 
relatively good health tend to cancel their policies, hence reducing the pool [ of policy 
holders from which to draw premiums]. The problem is that the company is left with 
those who are of poor health and are frequent users, this in turn perpetuates 
increasing costs which have to be passed on through premium rises. '63 
Unimed's branch manager made a similar observation in stating that: 
'Each time you increase your premiums you bum off a layer of policy holders, the so 
called 'valuable policy holder' [those who are infrequent claimers] the bad risks stay 
and continue to claim - everyone loses out'. 64 
These comments demonstrate the belief held by insurance companies that they too are the 
victims of the governments restructuring plans. At present insurance companies contend that 
they are feeling the squeeze and are likely to be in this position for some time. A number of 
managers expressed concern over the lack of dialogue between themselves and government as 
. ' 
to the future direction of health care funding. Despite these concerns the insurance companies 
are definitely better off than their policy holders. Profit margins do appear tight, however, 
Southern Cross announced in 1996 that the rate of return on claims was 98 cents to every 1 
dollar paid in premiums. An across the board increase in premiums of 12 percent has seen this 
margin increase in ·1997 to 96 cents to every 1 dollar received in premium payments. A 
preferable margin, according to McCloud, is 9 cents.65 
Insurance companies will not have to struggle to keep up with the reforming system 
forever. While the private insurance market is going through a transitional period premiums 
are being continuously increased so as to return some operating margin. However, once the 
health sector settles down and the government bas withdrawn to its desired level of input, the 
companies will play a vital and lucrative role in providing health care to the public. Private 
insurance will become a necessity in obtain adequate and timely access to health care and 
ultimately public health care will become the poor man's alternative.66 
Despite the earning potential for the private insurance market, New Zealand health 
insurance is dominated by a non profit organisation. Southern Cross is a not-for-profit 
company registered under The Friendly Society Act, therefore, its motive is not as 
63 F.McCloud, Interview, 1997. 
64 M.Dermott Interview, 1997. 
65 F.McCloud, Interview,1997. 
66 K. Batchelor, 'Health for the rich only: Coney', The Daily News, 10 October 1997. 
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l..!Conomically inclined as othcr profit making msurancl.! companies. At Southern· Cross 
ml..!mbcrs arc considered share holders with surpluscs reinvested and kept as reserves to 
supplcmcnt premium rises. However. the "noH~1r-profit" nature of ~ew Zealand's largest 
h1.!alth insurer warrants a more thorough inn:sr1gat1on. When the branch manager of SC was 
nskcd about the excess earned. she said that it ,,as im·ested as ·shareholders funds· and was 
hdd as a "buffer against increasing premium r::ucs" :•· Knowing that premiums have been 
steadily increasing at around 12 percent each year one would expect reserves to be 
correspondingly decreasing in accordance with the stated purpose of the excess fund. 
However, an inspection into the company's 1997 annual report found that in fact as premiums 
have been steadily increasing so too have the reserves (see figure 27). Not only have the 
reserves been increasing, but they have more than doubled from $86.6 million in 1992 to 
$197.4 million in 1997. 
260.3 252. 7 262.2 
,,, 
1995 1996 1997 
June years 
Premium Income ($ million) 
These figures represent the sum of member 
contributions on a yearly basis. Premium 
income is influenced by a combination of 
factors including premium increases, 
membership and plan changes. 
190.5 197.4 
June years 
Reserves ($ million) 
Health insurance reserves (or 'shareholders' 
funds') are the buffer against future claims. In 
a not-for-profit mutual co-operative, reserves 
must also act as working capital for the day-
to-day running of the business. 
Figure 25. Southern Cross's financial figures 
Source: S,outhern Cross . .\nnual Report 1997 
6"'. F McCloud inter\'iew.1997. 
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Arguably, it is possible that the insurance companies are increasing the reserves in 
expectation of future increases in claims. However, the company has been dealing with sharp 
increases in claims ever since the reforms began and has so far refrained from using the reserve 
funds to buffer against raising premiums. There is no indication that this practice will alter 
given that claims show no sign of abating. The result is that the company is making a profit 
but failing to channel it back as intended as a benefit to its members in the form of protection 
from premium hikes. It is a dubious situation which appears to bolster the financial credibility 
of the company, but actually undermines the non profit objective. 
Expenmental Public Policy - the results 
The current model has failed to evolve into what the government intended. There was 
supposed to be an internal market, i.e., public hospitals competing against each other and 
against the private sector. That never eventuated and last year's coalition agreement effectively 
abandoned the plan in favour of a transitional health funding authority. Another critical 
element of the reforms was supposed to be the defining of a list of core public health services 
so that all New Zealanders knew exactly which expenses they would be responsible for at the 
point of delivery. That plan wound up in the too-hard basket. Without such a list, however, it 
is impossible for the health reform model to function properly. Neither has the radical idea of 
giving people entitlements ('vouchers') to spend as they wish on their own health care 
survived, except in the policy of the Act party. Perhaps the most unrealistic goal involved the 
plan for the CHEs were to make profits; quite extravagant profits if some ministers were to be 
believed. A policy U-tum stating that the CHEs are to be non-profit-making brings policy in 
line with reality. 
Retreats, smokescreens and swerves mark the government's progress towards the 
health care system of which Treasury once dreamt. 'This country is now left, with a hybrid, 
half-commercialised, clumsily structured system resembling the original blueprint only in the 
way that a camel could be said to resemble a horse' .68 The impacts of the experimental nature 
of the reforms have taken their greatest toll on the elderly. Nine main areas which have been 
addressed throughout this paper reflect the impact on this vulnerable and rapidly growing 
group. Below in point form are the main impediments; 
• The increasing financial inaccessibility of health care in the private sector. 
• The increasing inaccessibility of health care in the public sector. 
e The increasing waiting lists in the public sector and the introduction of the booking system 
which results in many elderly being denied surgery altogether. 
68 D.Welch,'The nation's health', Listener, 1 November, 1997 
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• The creation of apprehension and anxiety over the withdrawal of government funding in 
health care. 
• Deterrence from private rest homes due to the expense. 
• Increased pressure on families and the elderly due to asset and income testing in long stay 
private and public hospitals as well as rest homes 
• A trend of reducing insurance cover due to cost, hence a further reduction in access to 
necessary health care. 
• The closure of hospitals and the added concern with travelling and on-going care. 
• Loss of family inheritances due to resources being diverted into paying health care costs. 
These are all areas which have resulted from changes to the health care system and which have 
impacted on the elderly in varying degrees of intensity. All reflect the failure of the experiment 
conducted by the N~tional government since the beginning of 1991. 
Adjusting the Agenda for the New Millennium 
It is clear that an adjustment to the current health care agenda is in need if the fundamental 
impediments to access are to be adequately addressed. One of the most compelling reasons for 
an adjustment is the fact the access problems are not specific to the elderly. Certain ethnic 
groups, in particular the Maori, and even individuals in the middle to lower socio economic 
levels are currently dealing with impediments to access.69 Another important reason for 
adjusting the health care agenda is the rapid growth rate of the over sixty-five group (as 
highlighted in chapter two). By 2020 the elderly will have increased by 16.5 percent70 so that 
one person in every five will be in defined as elderly.71 Considering this the government is 
faced with the possibility of a large proportion of the population being heavily dependent on a 
system which is unable to cater for them. 
With this in mind the two main areas of health care which need addressing are 
assessed. The first is the tension between the competing elements of access on the one hand 
and rationing of health care resources on the other. The second area involves the need to 
determine the appropriate proportions of public and private involvement in health care in order 
to alleviate and, ideally, prevent the problematic distribution outcomes. 
Access Versus Rationing 
Perhaps the most important question for domestic public policy in this decade is how 
to provide high quality health care to all citizens at a cost the country can afford. The 
government's answer bas been to privatise and incorporate the market into the provision of 
69 S.Coney, 'Despite the talk, little changes in health system', Sunday Star Times, 12 Janury 
1997,p.5. 
7o NZ Now 65+ Statistics NZ, Wellington, NZ 1995 p.14 
71 Bolger in Taranki election speech June 1996 
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health care in order to bring about efficiency and contain potentially escalating costs for the 
government. Further, the government has been decreasing its input into public health for the 
last decade (as shown in chapter two). There is little doubt that the government is going to save 
vast amounts of money by bulk funding and withdra\ving from major areas in health care like 
elective surgery. It is quite clear that we are living in a cost-driven society. However, there is 
debate amongst economists as to how much of the GDP should be apportioned to health care 
costs. Chapter two showed that relative to other countries New Zealand's expenditure on 
health care is in the bottom tier of the OECD countries. Despite this, rationing is seen as a 
paramount goal by the government even if it is not specifically articulated. 
'Financial constraints also mean that priorities must be addressed. Demand 
for health care will always outstrip the resources available. It is more honest 
to define which services will be made available to all, rather than to continue 
to place patients on waiting lists where they may stay for years without 
treatment. Countries much richer than ours are having to face these issues. As 
a heavily indebted nation, New Zealand cannot avoid facing the limitations 
that its income imposes on it. ' 72 
The fact is that there is not "an infinite pool of money to pour into it [health care]"73 and 
technological advances in health care are not cheap. 'People now realise that health services 
have an insatiable appetite for money and we must put the brakes on somewhere. '74 The point 
is that although technology is developing to meet the needs of the ageing population, the elderly 
themselves are not in a position to meet the huge funding requirements. Neither, it seems, is the 
government prepared to channel the requisite amounts into meeting these costs. As Mechanic 
states 
'As people have learned to have high and more unrealistic expectations of 
medicine, demands for care for a variety of conditions, both major and minor, 
have accelerated. No nation that follows a sane public policy would facilitate 
the fulfilment of all perceptions of need that a demanding public might be 
willing to make. As in every other area of life, resources must be rationed. '75 
Rationing decisions are difficult and politically unpopular as the survey results 
demonstrate. Figure 27 shows that while nearly 40 percent of the elderly conceded that 
72 Your Health and the Public Health, A statement of Government Health Policy by the Hon. 
Simon Upton Minister ofHealth, Crown, Wellington, July 1991. 
73 According to chief executive John O'Neill as cited in D.Welch,'The nation's health', Listener, 1 
November, 1997. 
74 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: The refonn of Health Care Systems; A 
Review of Seventeen OECD Countries, France: Paris Cedex 16, 1994. 
75 D.Mechanic,1977. 'The Growth of Medical Technology and Bureaucracy: Implications of Medical 
Care.' Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, as cited in RH.Blank, Rationing Afedicine, Columbia 
University Press, New York 1988, p.87. 
Implications of Private Sector Involvement 124 
rationing was a necessary element of health care, 82 percent rejected the idea that they should 
be subjected to rationing (figure 28). 
The 'Elderlys Opinion of Rationing Health Resources 
62% 
19% 
Figure 26 Source: Health Care Case study of the Elderly 1997 
Legend: 
19 percent of the elderly do believe in some form of health care rationing 
19 percent do not necessarily agree with rationing but say it is inevitable 
62 percent of elderly say no to the rationing of health care resources. 
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Legend: 
2% thought they should face rationing, 
16% said it was inevitable for al! 
82% believed the elderly should not be subjected to health care rationing 
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. . 
This indicates that while many elderly believe in the theory of rationing, very few are prepared 
to share in the responsibility of conserving medical resources. It may well be true that the 
elderly in New Zealand have an unreasonable expectation of what health care provision should 
be. However, this is not surprising considering that it they have experienced a lifetime of 
government funded care. Furthermore, this attitude may reflect the perception that they will 
bear the brunt of rationing since they are not regarded as productive members of society. 
The predominate argument used by the government to justify rationing is efficiency. 
The question which arises in respect of this is what does "efficiency" mean in the context of 
health care. If one accedes to O'Neil's view "efficiency" is not the "culture of long corridors, 
lengthy stays and procedures, bumbling bureaucracy and boards ... [but] ... one that is 
professional and business-like, and crucially, more efficient in treating patients".76 In achieving 
efficiency in this last area the government policy of rationing has seen the criterion for access 
shift from need to an ability to pay. It is this shift which has created a crisis for the elderly 
which was not in issue prior to the reforms. The changes introduced by the government have 
the potential to seriously undermine equity, a possibility which is becoming a critical concern 
for the groups most adversely affected. While the CHE' s blueprint for the future focuses on 
providing a high standard of care and improving health through prevention and education, there 
is no mention of adequate distribution77 There is. no doubt that as a country New Zealand has 
to live within its budget, however, this does not create a mandate to exclude large minorities 
from accessing much needed health care. Medical resources are scarce and are characterised 
by inelastic demand, but it is precisely this these attributes which make health care an 
inappropriate resource to open up to the competitive based private sector. Any market place 
which controls a· limited resource with -inelastic demand is a fertile environment for 
exploitation. Moreover, the most dangerous aspect of the reforms is that in the areas where the 
government has withdrawn there has been a corresponding removal of responsibility and 
accountability which has not be compensated for in the private insurance market. 
The access/rationing dilemma is one which has plagued the United States system since 
it privatised health care in the 1930s. Considering the similarities to the New Zealand system, 
the American experience is of intense interest (see Chapter 2). Private hospital care was 
rationed by price and generally available only to those persons who could afford to pay their 
own way. Conversely, public hospital care was rationed to the poor on the basis of rigid 
'means' tests. The result of this market allocation scheme was a dual or tiered system that 
produced inequalities in distribution as .well as severe financial instability for hospitals. More 
importantly, the cost escalation of private hospital care forced many working and middle class 
people whose modest means disqualified them for public hospital care to forgo necessary 
76 Chief executive John O'Neill cited in D. Welch, 'The nation's health', Listener, I November, 1997. 
77 According to chief executive John O'Neill as cited in Welch 1997. 
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treatment.78 Although insurance coverage afforded widespread and substantially expanded 
access to hospital care, a significant minority of the population failed to be served by the new 
market situation in the United States. The lower middle class and the poor could seldom obtain 
adequate insurance coverage. Also, the greater need of the elderly for health care made them 
bad risks, thus pricing all but the most wealthy out of the market. In 1962, approximately half 
of all persons over the age of sixty-five had no insurance for hospital care, double the 
proportion an1ong persons under sixty-five. Because of their greater need for hospital care, 
many elderly persons were without health insurance protection.79 
The resemblance to the current direction of the N~ Zealand GC system is disturbing. 
While rationing is critical, the need to prevent barriers to access arising out of private 
insurance market involvement is fundamental. In order to achieve this the government must 
intervene in the market process even though this contravenes the theory of unfettered market 
intervention. Health care is a resource unlike any other in that it provides essential life 
preserving services. The private insurance market are proving inadequate in fulfilling their 
adopted role and if the government continues to ignore the evidence showing the inability of the 
private insurance markets to provide non discriminatory access to the elderly, it will fail in its 
fundamental role of socialy responsibility. 
Public and Private Involvement - the necessary combination 
From the elderly's perspective there are not many positive aspects to things the current 
health care system. Health care was free and easy to obtain now it is expensive and 
increasingly difficult to access. People were given the opportunity in the case study to express 
any thoughts or experiences they had with the health care sector. Any positive comments were 
in relation to acute hospital care and emergency services which is an area currently unscathed 
by reforms.so 
78 RE.Brown, 1983, 'The Rationing of Hospital Care, 'R In President's Commission for the Study of 
Ethical Prolems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Securing Access to Health 
Care, vol.3. Washington, D.C, GPO. as cited in RH.Blank Rationing Medicine, Columbia University 
Press, New York 1988, p.87. 
79Brown, 1983, as cited in RH.Blank, Rationing Medicine, Columbia University Press, New York 
1988, p.87. 
80 In a recent article The Christchurch Mai!, 12 January 1998, 'Thumbs up for Health', a high degree 
of satisfaction was reported for customers using Christchurch hospital. Those using hospital services 
were asked to rate their level of satisfaction with the way staff handled various aspects of service. In 
all categories high'percentages of customers rated the services as good or very good. Eighty-nine 
percent rated the hospital's performance in dealing with patient needs at admission as good or very 
good; 88% rated staff availablility a.qd courtesy as good or very good; and 86% rated their satisfaction 
with the way patient needs were met as good or very good. Also rated as good or very good by 86% 
were quality of facilities and 82% saw communication between departments as good or better. 
However, only 75% rated discharge information as good or very good. Asked if they would come 
back, 94 percent said yes. There is no doubt that once patients are in hospitals in New Zealand they 
get the best treatment available, what is the issue rather is that many in need are not getting there. 
This article which talks of patients as 'customers' conducted a survey which did not address any issue 
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' . .I get excellent service from med[ical] centre, G.P, Oncology, Pathology, 
Haemotology, for my post OP and diagnostic follow up. A good Team!'s1 
' ... I have heart problems and have gone to A&E [accident & Emergency] at 
the public hospital I had excellent support but they were far too busy ~ 
not enough staff. If the government continues to tax us all (GST) they should 
support us (the public) with adequate well staffed [and well] run public 
hospitals - If we privatise like the USA God help us all. '82 
The case study offered some evidence of where government intervention or regulation 
is required to provide adequate and accessible health care to the elderly. Six areas needing 
adjustment were identified; 
• the escalating cost of resthome stays and the way that they are operated. 
• the geographical distribution of the private health delivery network in the future. 
• access to a base level of health insurance, including services such as elective surgery. 
• the distribution of core services which will be available based on realistic asset and means 
testing. 
• the implementation of a 'safety net' for those financial unable to access essential health care 
services. 
• control of the insurance rriarket and the monitoring of discriminatory behaviour, such as 
continuous premium increases for certain high risk groups, age limits and future genetic 
discrimination. 
Market advocates will argue that in order to have a truly effective market system then 
there must be minimal government intervention. In spite of this the government acknowledges 
that it needs to manage the competitive element in health care, however, it is not acting 
accordingly. The government's detennined cost cutting measures are creating a concern that 
the government will bequeath too much of the health care system to the private sector. 
Essentially the problem is one of funding. 'The core concern that people have is the question 
of funding, and much will flow from the rectification of that problem' .83 The government has 
cut costs to the bone. Referendum campaigners are calling for an increase in government health 
spending to at least seven percent of GDP. That way, they claims, the government would have 
more money to give RHAs, the RHAs would pass the savings on to the CHEs and the CHEs 
would distribute it on. Public discontent would then subside. David Seedhouse, senior lecturer 
that is in question in the health system, yet the title graced the front covers of a high circulated 
magizne in Christchurch with the title 'Thumbs up for Health' not only does the article have no 
substance it is misleading which begs the question that it is designed to convey a messege which 
overrides real issues of concern in health. 
81 Comments made by an elderly person who was surveyed in Christhurch 2 October 1997. 
82 Comments made by an elderly person who was surveyed in Christhurch 2 October 1997. 
83 Comments made by fonner Auditor-General Brian Tyler, as cited in 'The nation's health', 
Listener, 1 November, 1997. 
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in medical ethics at Auckland University, rejects this claiming 'It will just make people· think 
throwing money at it is the answer'. Like Alister Scott, of the Coalition for Public Health, he 
believes that our whole approach to health care must be reviewed in the context of a coherent 
social policy. But he sees no current mechanism for doing that, other than a change of heart by 
the government, and that is unlikely. 
'We blew the whole thing up and now we have a bunch of fragments. And 
there aren't any established policies to put the bits back together. We've got 
the cathedral on the ground, but nobody's got a map of how you put the thing 
together'84 
The backlash against the refonns suggests that, for most people, the whole point of 
electing governments is that they have a responsibility for to act in the best interests of the 
people. That is the social contract: you pay tax to the state and in return the state looks after 
you in various ways. If this belief is widespread then one would expect a reasonably astute 
government - one with a keen interest in being re-elected - to adapt accordingly. So far, 
however, there is no sign of major government concessions. If anything the new Prime Minister 
Jenny Shipley has indicated that she will further intensify the reforms. This is dangerous 
considering that an attack on. a social service such as health affects the entire population in 
ways that are very difficult to compensate for. Arguably because the groups which form the 
bedrock of National's voting support are the ones who stand to benefit most from the current 
policy refonns, the government base support should not be eroded. However, to accept this is 
to assume that these people are all in the very high income bracket and that they are not 
influenced by elderly friends or family who are disadvantaged. The refonns will affect every 
New Zealander in some way even if they do not realise it yet. Because of this the health issue 
is not only one which could undermine the government's current public support, it also has the 
potential to haunt the National Party and NZ First in the future. 
From a survival point of view, therefore, the government is arguably standing on a 
political minefield. However, in the environment of MMP it is very difficult to second guess 
election outcomes. Moreover, any U-tum in policy must involve an implicit admission that it 
had pursued unsound policy and created much hardship for the past seven years. Any 
judgement as to the merit or otherwise of the reforms aside, the disturbing fact is that the 
health reforms have to some extent been a paper exercise from the outset. In order to get them 
to function like private businesses Clffis were given artificial debt, therefore, ,vhatever is 
achieved through further 'efficiency gains' may be meaningless except in terms of collateral 
damage. New Zealand could find itself with an 'efficient' health system boasting balanced 
84 Comments made by the former Director-General of Health George Salmond, cited in 'The nation's 
health', Listener, 1 November, 1997,p.20. 
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books, but suffering an inefficient society at large in which noticeable numbers ofpeople·suffer 
needlessly because their predicament cannot be accommodated or even comprehended by the 
cost-accounting mentality of the government. In the light of that prospect, a critic might be 
tempted to paraphrase Oscar Wilde and say, 'Efficiency is the name we give to our mistakes. 's5 
It seems clearer and clearer, as Welsh recognises, that the machinery of market forces, so 
unstoppable in its advance through various parts of society for more than a decade, has finally 
run into something it can not shift, something profoundly unamenable to be run like a business 
and that most people want the state to stick around in a fairly meaningful way as far as public 
health is concemed.86 
Conclusions 
The first section of this chapter set out to assess the outcome of market incorporation 
in health care. The case study and interviews were used as evidence for this purpose. It was 
argued, first, that in order to achieve many of the market objectives, an essential variable was 
presupposed- the ability to pay. Results of the case study convey a picture of serious financial 
concern amongst the elderly over their ability to access adequate health care given the 
increasing :financial instability resulting from a continuous rise in premiums and the on-going 
government withdrawal. The first set of market objectives, therefore, introduced a fundamental 
problem, the issue of financial accessibility. 
Secondly, it has been argued that innovation in the market can mean transferring a loss 
onto someone else in very subtle ways. This was manifested in the fact that rising premiums 
meant many elderly were being forced to cancel long held insurance policies. The insurance 
companies invented a scheme whereby those who were unable to pay the higher costs could · 
scale down their existing cover. This further reduces the elderly's access to health care and, at 
the same time, reduces the private insurance company's liability to pay. 
Thirdly, it has been argued that there is a danger of professional aptitude being 
subordinated to price as insurance companies encourage surgeons to undercut each other. This 
is an aspect of the type of behaviour a market environment can bring about. Such behaviour is 
not incited in the interests of the patient but rather in the interests of return and capital gain. 
Fourthly, I have questioned the notion that rationing by price is a fairer system of 
meeting need than other alternatives, such as public waiting lists and urgency. There is nothing 
fair about being denied health care because a person is unable to pay for it. However, those of 
the neo-liberal view find that a policy of rationing is more effective economically because the 
wealthy retain more in their pockets as the public take individual responsibility for health care 
payment. 
850. Welch, 'The nation's health', Listener, 1 November, 1997,p.21. 
86 Welch, 'The nation's health', 1997. 
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Finally, I have questioned the assumption that the private sector will to fill the void 
left by public withdrawal. The closing of non viable public hospitals will not result in the 
private sector moving in to these regions. The more likely outcome is a clustering of private 
hospitals and medical clinics in the higher populated cities. This then creates geographical 
maldistribution which is ultimately extremely inconvenient to rural populations and can be 
dangerous in emergencies. 
The second section of this chapter assessed the presence of moral hazard and adverse 
selection. Results showed that the elderly did not have the attitudes towards their insurance 
policies that would suggest the presence of moral hazard. Evidence of this was found in case 
study questions and interviews from the insurance companies. This was however, relatively 
difficult to gauge due to a couple of factors. First, some elderly may not have been truthful in 
the case study and second, the use of insurance has skyrocketed due to public cutbacks making 
it difficult to gauge moral hazard through conventional methods. Considerable weight was 
assigned to comments made by the insurance companies that moral hazard plays an 
insignificant role in the elderly's attitude to health care consumption. In fact, it highlighted the 
increased level of genuine need for services offered through the insurance companies. From the 
insurance companies perspective the critical issue affecting the elderly was adverse selection as 
it added to the upward direction of premium prices and the increasing inaccessibility for the 
elderly. 
The third section investigated the capability of the insurance companies in providing 
health care needs to the elderly in the new millennium. Under the current direction there are 
major distributional concerns. Premium costs now are too expensive for many elderly and 
future projections predict that the issue of inaccessibility will only deteriorate. Age had once 
been used as a way for the private sector to discrimination against the elderly, however, recent 
legislation has brought about a change so that price has now become the main means of 
denying many elderly health care protection. 
The fourth and final section examined the need to adjust the health care agenda for the 
new millennium. The access/rationing dilemma was weighed and it was argued that while 
rationing is necessary, the government must continue to play a role in ensuring that access to 
health care is available to the elderly. The fact that the management of health care system has 
the potential to undermine the government's support should make the issue as important for the 
government as it is for those affected by its actions. Because the basis of rationing has been 
transferred from need to an ability to pay, the questions of access and equality are relevant not 
only for the elderly, but for all New Zealanders. 
Conclusion 
Implications of Private Involvement in Health Care for the Elderly, 
Now and In the Next Millennium 
The conclusion of this thesis is not a solution to the system's ills, neither is it a policy 
proposal. It is, however, a warning to the policy makers and to government that its decision to 
ration health resources through a competitive market comes with a high cost to society, in 
particular to the elderly. This thesis has addressed fundamental issues surrounding the 
implications of the competitive market in health care on the elderly. It has shown that the effect 
is real and critical. 
Research for this thesis was conducted at two levels. The first level was concerned 
with formulating a theoretical framework for studying New Zealand's dynamic health care 
environment. In doing so the benefits of incorporating the market principles into health care 
were analysed and, conversely, arguments against such incorporation were elucidated. This 
drew on the works of several theorists, particularly Donaldson and Gerald, and Harris and 
Seldon. In chapter 1 it was established on theoretical grounds that, first, while there was 
strong support by economists for the incorporation of market principles in health care, there 
was an equal number of economists who thought otherwise. This shows that support for such a 
transformation is very much a debatable issue and, in fact, the whole validity of the refonn 
process, can be questioned considering the lack of empirical evidence internationally, as well as 
the lack of comprehensive support by professionals. This then makes the market reforms to 
New Zealand's system all the more experimental in its nature. Second, while the intent has not 
been to argue along the lines of 'state verse the market,' this did not remove the obligation to 
critique market advantages against market failures. This was highlighted in the second level of 
research, which conducted an empirical test of a number of theoretical propositions. The first 
hypothesis postulated that if the current involvement of the private sector continues unabated 
into the next millennium then New Zealands largest growing population group, those over 65 
will have limited access to essential health care. 
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The so called advantages of the market place were examined in chapter five with the 
following conclusions reached. The first :finding ascertained that in order to achieve any of the 
market objectives, the ability of the elderly to pay was presupposed. The case study supported 
this by conveying serious :financial concern amongst the elderly brought on by them failing to 
be able to finance continuously rising insurance premiums while on fixed incomes. It was 
detennined that over 60 percent of elderly surveyed. placed :financial accessibility of health 
insurance at the lowest end of the access spectrum while only 18 percent claimed it to be most 
accessible to them. With the government withdrawing its support in providing elective surgery 
the private sector is left to provide essential health resources required by elderly. The public 
system is in continual decline evidenced by :funding data over the last decade as well as the fact 
that of those surveyed who had insurance cover, a staggering 80 percent had lodged a claim in 
the last 12 months. Those who are unable to afford insurance go on the every growing public 
waiting lists. The issue is that in order to be assured of essential and timely health care the 
elderly need to take out private health insurance, the problem is that an increasing number are 
unable to due to :financial cost . 
Further, skyrocketing premiums are forcing many, especially those who have had 
policies for long duration's (over 20 years) to cancel them. So while entry into the market is 
critical to gain access, both new policy holders and established holders are having to drop out. 
While demand is inelastic price is able to rise steadily for some time before any real change is 
noticed, however this decline, especially with the elderly is already evident. 
Two fundamental obstacles are likely to be present in the future if the government 
continue to increase the role of the private sector as providers of elective care. First, is the 
clustering private facilities in only the economically viable areas. By closing public hospitals 
due to non-viability the private sector is unlikely to be encouraged to move into these regions, 
the more likely outcome is a clustering of private hospitals and medical clinics in the higher 
populated cities where there is certainty of income, as is currently occurring. This then creates 
geographical maldistribution issues which are extremely inconvenient to rural populations, 
especially those who need on going care. With limited transport means in many cases, this will 
only add to the cost and inconvenience, not to mention discomfort the elderly must endure when 
seeking health care. Such a situation occurred in the United States, prompting the government 
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to enter the marketplace to correct the geographical mald.istribtion of hospital beds caused by 
private companies moving hospitals to more wealthy suburban areas.1 
The second fundamental obstacle is the private sector's capitalisation on the growing 
needs of the elderly for long term care. With the government's gradual ,vithdrawal form 
providing public rest homes, there has been tremendous development by the ptivate sector in 
this area. While subsidised by the government, it recoups this cost through its policy of asset 
and income testing on the elderly, which is priced on average at around $600 dollars per week, 
a couple would need around $ 1000 ~ $1100 a week to fund the care with many forced to sell 
their homes to meet the bills. The intention of this policy is twofold, first to transfer the 
responsibility of the elderly back onto their families, and to make the user pays system relieve 
the government in part of the growing elderly burden. The reality of this, however, is greater 
stress on families and relationships as they are forced to juggle work commitments with elderly 
care, or with pressure being put on them with eroding inheritances and resentment building 
toward their parents for using up the families capital resources. Evidence shows that in the last 
few years there has been increases in elderly abuse cases reported, while no direct correlation 
can be made between the problems and the increasing numbers in the community it is certainly 
a logical conclusion to draw. 
A society is judged on how it treats its most vulnerable members and these include the 
young, the· old and the sick. But it also can be measured according to how honestly it faces up 
to the most difficult problems. New Zealand needs to work out how precious, limited health 
funds are best spent. Weighing up the competing needs of different generations is part of that. 
A second hypothesis postulates that the government's shift from a 'social equity model' in 
health care provision to one based on 'competitive markets' favours certain minority groups 
while disadvantaging the largest growing group, the elderly. This was tested empirically 
through the survey conducted of the elderly and by analysing the relationship between access 
and rationing. The phenomenon of rationing should be seen as the fundamental motive by the 
government in incorporating market competition into the health system, as it cuts the 
governments expenditure by transferring the cost directly to the individual. The government has 
taken to changing the direction of public policy on advice from international bodies, with 
justification derived from the argument of efficiency. But for whom will it be more efficient? At 
most to those in the higher socio economic group. Such a transformation gives credence to 
1 RH.Blank, Rationing Medicine, Columbia University Press, New York 1988,p.98 
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Evans redistribution theory, which purports that part of the agenda behind market based health 
care reform is in effect to transfer the cost away form the wealthy and on to the individual user 
regardless of their financial position. By cutting taxes, the higher income earners keep far more 
of their disposable income. They effectively only pay for the health care they want through 
insurance, and not for a handful of others, which include the low socio groups, the dispossessed 
the young and elderly. So it seems the approach taken towards rationing is one based on the 
self-interested neo-liberalists view. Income distribution is an issue so sensitive and important 
that it arouses intense political and social passions in all societies and New Zealand is no 
exception. There is concern that the burden of economic adjustment has not been fairly carried 
out, with those benefiting most having high disposable incomes. 
The government has effectively moved rationing from the sphere of access by need to 
the sphere of access based on an ability to pay criteria. This is a critical change in the 
allocation of health care resources to New Zealanders and threatens to put equity at risk. As 
this thesis has revealed many elderly are being denied essential health care now and many are 
likely to in the future under the current direction. The rationing argument raises the issue of 
access verse the future cost to government by rapidly increasing numbers of elderly, and their 
projected burden on the state in the next millennium. As the elderly over 60 make up over 16 
percent of the population and use over 40 percent of health care resources, the issue of who is 
to pay becomes critical. Rationing by price under the competitive market ·approach has been 
implemented in an attempt to transfer and in effect reduce the use of health resources. These 
resources had previously been rationed on the basis of need, with patients being filtered through 
long public waiting lists. Now the individual is being made responsible for their own health 
care needs. For the majority of elderly who are on fixed low income, such a change is 
unplanned and unbudgeted for, leaving them financially vulnerably, reducing independence and 
dignity in there old age. 
The third hypothesis postulated that private insurance companies are not suitable for 
providing the elderly with the necessary health care that they require, now or in the new 
millennium, unless changes are made. Under the current directions there are major 
distributional concerns. Premium costs are currently to expensive for many elderly and future 
projections see the situation worsening. Age had once been used as a way for the private sector 
to discrimination against the elderly, however reforms have changed this, now price has 
become the main means of denying many elderly health care protection. 
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Companies are adaptable to changing situations, with massive increases in claims on 
them due to the publics withdrawal, they have put up the cost of premiums to off set this and 
keep margins where they want them. The result as pointed out is the unaffordability for the 
elderly, the companies solution for those unable to pay the higher costs, is to scaled down their 
existing cover. This meant that elderly were getting less for paying more further decreasing 
there access to essential health care with insurance companies at the same time reducing their 
company's liability to pay. This is not the only concern, evidence revealed that surgeons were 
undercutting quotes bought on by company monopoly pressure in bringing prices down. Such 
behaviour is not being done in the interests of the patient but rather in the interests of a return 
from the to these companies. 
Interestingly, one of the conventional weaknesses of the insurance market was not as 
prevalent as the theory had suggested it maybe. The testing of moral hazard and adverse 
selection, showed that the elderly did not have the type of attitude towards their insurance that 
would suggest the presence of moral hazard. Evidence of this was found in survey questions 
and interviews from the insurance companies. This was however, relatively difficult to gauge 
due to a couple of factors, first the elderly may not have been inclined to put down in the 
survey their true practice, and second, the use of insurance has skyrocketed making it difficult 
to gauge through the conventional method of usage. The evidence lent itself on the weight of 
connnents by the insurance companies that moral hazard plays an insignificant role in the 
elderly's attitude to health care consumption. Despite these limitations, some of the findings 
were of general significance and importance, by highlighting the increased level on genuine 
need for services offered through the insurance companies. Adverse selection with the elderly 
on the other hand was seen to be a serious issue for the insurance companies. Adding to the 
upward direction of premium prices and the increasing inaccessibility for the elderly. The 
trends found here were indeed concerning only adding increasing evidence as to the problems 
that providing health care through private insurance companies brings about. 
What of the experimental nature of the reforms and the impact on the elderly? Pressure 
by the Business Roundtable on the government to implement reforms saw widespread 
objectives laid down. The results however can only be said to be riddled with failure from a 
social perspective. At the micro level the empirical evidence of the case study of the elderly is 
testimony to the out come of the experiment and its chronic inadequacies in being able to 
provide health care equitably to the elderly. The fifth and final section looked towards adjusting 
the agenda in health care for the new millennium. The dilemma of providing access and 
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rationing health resources were weighed up, the result were that since the refonns the health 
care system has been put into a crisis, a crisis due to a withdrawal of government funding and 
slashing of the public's health budget, in the process closing effective and essential hospitals. 
The introduction of the private sector has meant that the basis of rationing has been transferred 
from that of need, to that of an ability to pay, and this situation is inequitable for the majority 
of New Zealanders not just the elderly. 
Against the theoretical base of competitive market, this thesis has shown that the 
involvement of the private sector in providing health care to the elderly under the principles of 
the competitive market has created a serious access issue. Due to the fact that the elderly are 
growing at the rate they are, this is an issue of significant concern to both the elderly and wider 
society. If analysts misinterpret economic theory as applied to health - by assuming that market 
forces are necessarily superior to alternative policies in every sphere and that other tools of the 
trade neatly translate to health care - then they will blind themselves to policy options that 
might actually be best at enhancing society's welfare, many of which simply do not fall out of 
the conventional, demand driven competitive model. Market forces may indeed have a 
prominent place in health care organisation and delivery, but, as I have 'tried to show, when the 
private sector is made responsible for the provision of health resources it is not a paternalistic 
player concerned with issues like equity and accessibility but rather dictated by getting a return 
from the market environment, regardless of the cost to society's most vulnerable. In an era 
where the government wants less responsibility for its citizen's welfare, and is detennined to 
withdraw the state from such important social policy areas making families and communities 
more accountable, it is perhaps more important than ever that the issues addressed by this 
thesis are recognised and dealt with. Otherwise we may find ourselves in a society where the 
class system is defined, not only from a financial basis, but from longevity as well. 
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Appendix 
University of Canterbury Health Care Survey of the Elderly 
Interview with Insurance Company 
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UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY 
HEAL TH CARE SURVEY OF THE ELDERLY 
Today's Date: 
This survey is carried out for the purposes of Andrew Shead's masters thesis, any 
enquires please telephone: (03) 3667001 extn.8677 
All data will be kept in strict confidence, no personal information will be given to any 
health insurance companies. 
Please DO NOT put your name on this sheet. 
. Just tick the letter ( e.g a) which best reflects your position and opinion 
(N/ A means not applicable) 
Q 1 %at ethnic group do you associate yourself with: 
a) Caucasian 
b) Maori 
c) Pacific Islander 
d) Asian 
e) Other 
Q2 How would you describe your health status 
a) ~Poor 
b) ~ Fair 
c) ~Average 
d) ~ Good 
e) ~ Excellent 
Q3 What method of payment for Health Care is most preferable to you? 
a) ~ Paying premiums for health insurance 
b) ~ Paying through taxation 
c) ~ Paying directly as you need it 
d) ~ All of the above 
Q4 Are you currently covered by Private Health Insurance? 
~ Yes (Go to question 9) 
~ No (Go to question 8) 
~ Was, but cancelled my policy 
Appendix A 149 
Q5 For what reason did you cancel your policy? 
a) because premiums rose? 
b) b~cause you did not f~e.l it was worth having? (under utilised) 
c) Other reason 
.......... ,, ......... ,,., ................................................................... . 
............................ , ............................................................... , 
Q6 For what period of time had you had, private insurance cover? 
1 <yrs S<yrs 1 O<yrs 1 S<yrs 20<yrs 2o+yrs 
Q7 Have you been rejected for private health insurance, as a result of: 
a) ~ health problems 
b) ~ age 
. c) ~ gender 
e)~N/A · 
*Q8 Have you used the Health Care system for something more than just a check up 
in the last: 
a)~ 6months 
b) ~ Syrs 
c) ~ 1 Oyrs or longer 
d) ~ No (Go to QlJ) 
@ Was it elective surgery? (non-life threatening) 
a)~ Yes 
b)~No 
@Was it life saving surgery 
~)~Yes 
b)~No 
@Did you have to go on a waiting list? 
a)~ Yes 
✓b) ~ No 
@ How long did you have to wait 
./ a) ~ short wait 
b) ~ >6months 
c) ~ within 12months 
d) ~ 18months or> 
@ Was this satisfactory to you 
✓a)Yes 
b)No 
c) Didn't mind 
@ How did you pay for this? 
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a) How did you pay for this? 
,A,) Out of your pocket 
c)No payment paid for by the public health department 
d) Other .................................................................... . 
(Go to Q13) 
*Q9 How iong have you had private insurance cover? 
1 <yrs S<yrs 1 0<yrs 1 S<yrs 20<yrs 2o+yrs 
Q 10 Have you made a claim on your health insurance in the last 
a)-6months 




Q 11 Would you have had the treatment if you did not have insurance, i.e paid for it 
out of your own personal poc~et? 
a)Yes 
b)No 
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@. Do you believe you utilise the insurance coverage which you have? 
a) Yes 
b)No 
c) I don't think ofmy insurance cover in this way 
@What type of attitude do you have with regards to using the coverage you 
have: 
a) Use it only when necessary 
b) Don't use it enough 
c) Use it 'So I get my moneys worth' 
Ql2 Are rising insurance premiums a concern for you? 
a) Not a concern, it does not effect me 
b) Is an increasing concern 
c) If they rise to much more I will be forced to quit my policy 
@ supposing premiums were to rise, when would you dis-continue 
your medical insurance coverage if at all? 




d) I would not dis-continue my medical insurance coverage, even if the 
cost of premiums continued to rise steadily. 
e) Don't know - decide at the time 
*Q 13 Is 'ACCESS to services' in the Health Care system a concern for you? 
a) Yes 
b)No 
c) No, because l have Private health insurance 
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Q 14 Do you think that the governments reforms have made Health Care more or less 
accessible to you? (In that if you need care, it is easy to obtain). 
a) ~ greatly improved accessibility 
b) ~ more accessible 
c) ~ no difference 
d) ~ less accessible 
e) ~ much less accessible 
Q 15 Do you believe the cost of Private health Insurance premiums is an impediment 
to Health Care services for yourself. 
a)Yes 
b)No 
Q 16 How accessible (finically) is private health insurance to you personally 
1 2 3 4 5 
(1 being most accessible & 5 being least) 




@ Should the elderly be the ones to face rationing measures? 
a) Yes 
b)No 
c) Inevitable for all 
Q 18 What is the biggest concern for you with the current Health Care system 
a) ~ The reduction in public funding for Health Care 
b) ~ The rise of private involvement in Health Care namely Private 
Insurance Markets 
c) ~ waiting lists for surgery 
e) ~ Other ........................................................................ . 
f) ~ Nothing is of concern for me regarding the Health Care system 
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Q 1 .9 Do you think it is suitable to have the majority of rest homes owned and 
operated in the private sector? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Not sure 
Q20 From your experience, (considering your parents or yourself), do you think that 
the cost of staying in a rest home an impediment to using the care? 
a) Yes 
b)No 
c) Not sure 
Notes/General Comments: 
End of Survey 
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Name of Company: 




Interviews with Insurance Company 
OBJECTIVE: 
A quick interview of20 mins on: 
• There origins, the problems insurance companies face with issues such as 
Moral Hazard which is partly responsible for the increase in premiums 
and how to deal with this, for both the company and the individual. 
• The reduction in government spending on public HC and the pressure this puts 
on the insurance companies to provide the necessary back stop for the 
public. · 
• Info on types of policy holders, the issue of an aging population and how this is to 
affect policy's-of companies. 
Here the objectives are to find out the following: 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Apart from things I can read in your prospectus, just ad lib some ideas here for me. 
Start with some general questions: 
Q What are the companies origins? (Briefly) 
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Q Does it have sister/brother companies overseas, the States, Australia, etc? 
@How successful have they been? (i.e market share etc) 
@ What's this companies aim regarding market share. 
Q With the increased reliance by the public on insurance companies to provide 
HC coverage does this mean expansion is immanent in the future? 
yes/no 
Explain? 
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Q Do you (the insurance company) think that moral hazard is a prevalent issue 
for you to take into consideration? (i.e is it a problem?) (Moral hazard, the 
change in attitude of an insured person towards their behaviour of consumption) 
yes/ no 
@How can you deal with moral hazard, or safe guard against it? 
Q What group in your opinion is the most likely to be responsible for committing 
moral hazard? 
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Q Introduction of no-claims bonuses, would -this be one way to help solve the 
moral hazard problem? - do you employ this technique. 
[To prevent moral hazard, Southern Cross introduced a 20 percent co-payment on its 
standard policy, and a list of maximum refunds which have been universally adhered to 
by private specialists, hospitals, and competitors alike. The small size of New 
Zealand's population, together with limited user-chargers, have in the past prevented 
private health insurers offering a more administratively expansive range of policies and 
premiums.] 
Q What role do you see this company playing in the future as a provider of HC 
coverage to New Zealanders? 
Q What is your policy for expansion into the market, if any? 
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@ What group are you to target? 
@Why? 
Q What protection measure do you take to prevent people joining up just to 
have surgery etc? 
Q Is the growth in the elderly going to be a problem for the company? (it is 
estimated that by the middle of next century 1 in 4 New Zealanders will be over 65). 
Appendix A 159 
@ How do you propose to deal with this? 
@ Is this not seen as a problem or an untapped resource? 
Q How does the government policies (namely the reforms) affect the company? 
negatively, beneficially or other wise? (i.e the decreasing of spending in the public 
sector making the demand for private provision increase). 
@ What have you had to change to accommodate the reforms? 
Appendix A 160 ·· 
@How do you perceive this? i.e a good/bad thing for the individual/the 
country as a whole? 
@How effective is implementing policies with varying chargers (i.e 80% 
refund on the cost 9f care and 50% coverage etc.) Does this go some way to 
solving the problem. 
@ How great a problem do you perceive it to be? 
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Q What composition of people take out insurance with you? young, old, ethnic, 
low upper soci economic bracket? 
Q What plans have you got in mind to target the Maori elderly for HC 
insurance? if at all, or are they not viable to insure? 
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Q Are certain groups simply not viable to insure against? 
(like the elderly for example) 
- So how do you deal with this? 
Q Can you see a continuation of the trend in rising premiums into the new 
millennium? 
@How can this be prevented if at all? 
Q Are you a For Profit or non-profit company? 
END OF SURVEY 
